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ABSTRACT
Strategic Scarcity:
The Origins and Impact of Environmental Conflict Ideas
Elizabeth Hartmann 
This thesis examines the origins and impact of environmental conflict ideas. It 
focuses on the work of Canadian political scientist Thomas Homer-Dixon, whose model 
of environmental conflict achieved considerable prominence in U.S. foreign policy 
circles in the 1990s. The thesis argues that this success was due in part to widely shared 
neo-Malthusian assumptions about the Third World, and to the support of private 
foundations and policymakers with a strategic interest in promoting these views. It 
analyzes how population control became an important feature of American foreign 
policy and environmentalism in the post-World War Two period. It then describes the 
role of the "degradation narrative" — the belief that population pressures and poverty 
precipitate environmental degradation, migration, and violent conflict — in the 
development of the environment and security field. Based on archival research and 
interviews with key policymakers, foundation officers, and scholars, the thesis identifies 
a process of "circumscribed heterodoxy" in which an illusion of openness to diverse 
views masks a politics of uniformity at both the project and policy level. It examines the 
intentional and unintentional effects of environmental conflict ideas on U.S. policy 
institutions, and considers the nature of the knowledge communities that formed around 
these ideas. In so doing, the thesis offers insights into the complex relationships between 
knowledge, power, and policy.
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PREFACE
In the mid-1990s, the idea of environmental conflict enjoyed considerable 
popularity in foreign policy circles, especially in the United States. Its principle architect 
was Canadian political scientist, Thomas Homer-Dixon. He argued that scarcities of 
renewable resources such as cropland, fresh water and forests, induced in large part by 
population pressure, contribute to migration and violent intrastate conflict in many parts 
of the developing world. This conflict, in turn, can potentially disrupt international 
security as states fragment or become more authoritarian:
Fragmenting countries will be the source of large out-migrations, 
and they will be unable to effectively negotiate or implement 
international agreements on security, trade and environmental protection. 
Authoritarian regimes may be inclined to launch attacks against other 
countries to divert popular attention from internal stresses. The social 
impacts of environmental scarcity therefore deserve concerted attention 
from security scholars (Homer-Dixon 1994:40).
Homer-Dixon was first propelled into public view in 1993 when he co-authored 
an article on "Environmental Change and Violent Conflict" in Scientific American 
(Homer-Dixon, Boutwell and Rathjens 1993). A year later Robert Kaplan’s (in)famous 
article "The Coming Anarchy" popularized and sensationalized Homer-Dixon’s ideas. 
Proclaiming the environment as the most important national security issue of the twenty- 
first century, Kaplan presented West Africa as a nightmare vision of things to come: a 
hopeless scene of overpopulation, squalor, environmental degradation and violence, 
where young men are post-modem barbarians and children with swollen bellies swarm 
like ants (Kaplan 1994).
"The Coming Anarchy" seized the imagination of the liberal foreign policy 
establishment, including Vice President A1 Gore and President Bill Clinton. "I was so
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gripped by many things that were in that article," Clinton remarked in a speech on 
population, "...and by the more academic treatment of the same subject by Professor 
Homer-Dixon... You have to say, if you look at the numbers, you must reduce the rate of 
population growth" (State Department 1994).
A number of factors converged to make environmental conflict an idea whose 
time had come. The end of the Cold War was forcing a redefinition of security, and 
environmental problems, ranging from nuclear contamination to soil degradation, were 
added to the panoply of potential threats. Monitoring the environment also provided 
defense and intelligence agencies with a new rationale for the maintenance of expensive 
satellite and underwater surveillance systems (Deibert 1996).
While environmental conflict fit comfortably into the evolving field of 
environment and security, it interacted with other policy concerns as well. With the end 
of Cold War clientism, a series of 'state failures' in the Third World, notably in Africa, 
posed new challenges to the U.S. foreign policy establishment. In particular, the 
disastrous U.S. intervention in Somalia highlighted the need for a more anticipatory 
strategy of preventive defense, addressing the roots of political conflict before it 
exploded into all-out civil war. Homer-Dixon's model of environmental conflict 
provided the kind of causal reasoning policymakers were looking for. By emphasizing 
the role of migration in fomenting conflict, the model also meshed well with growing 
anti-immigrant sentiment in Washington, D.C.
However, no understanding of either the origins or impact of environmental 
conflict ideas would be complete without a consideration of the role of neo-Malthusian 
assumptions, actors and interests. Not only did Homer-Dixon's model of environmental 
conflict draw heavily on neo-Malthusian beliefs about the relationship between
17
population and the environment, but his work was supported by private population- 
oriented foundations and promoted by senior government officials in preparations for the 
1994 United Nations International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) 
in Cairo.
There is a party game where pieces of string are laced across a room to create a 
confusing web. Each person must follow their string to the end, untangling it from 
others along the way. This thesis follows the population thread, but the tangle is the 
heart of the story. Only by locating oneself in, around and through all the intersections 
of the different threads can one unravel the reasons why environmental conflict ideas 
came to enjoy so much legitimacy and influence in U.S. policy circles.
This process of unravelling has involved crossing disciplinary boundaries and 
utilizing a variety of methodological approaches, as described in the following 
introductory chapter. It has also necessitated a combination of different research 
methods. Along with more standard library and internet-based research conducted in the 
U.K. (London School of Economics, 1997-98) and the U.S. (Hampshire College, 1998- 
2002), I have collected documents from relevant institutions and attended meetings and 
conferences addressing environment and security concerns.1 While these methods helped 
me map the environment and security field, and to locate environmental conflict within 
it, they were not sufficient to understand the complex personal and organizational 
interactions which allow an idea to gain ascendancy. For this, archival research and 
interviews were essential.
In September 2000 Thomas Homer-Dixon generously allowed me to spend 
several days going through his extensive computer and print archives at the University of 
Toronto, which proved invaluable to understanding the evolution and impact of his three
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major projects. Geoffrey Dabelko, Director of the Woodrow Wilson Center’s 
Environmental Change and Security Project (ECSP), also helpfully opened project files 
to me in June 1999. In general, the ECSP has been a very important research resource. 
Its annual publication since 1995, the Environmental Change and Security Project 
Report, provides a guide to the latest environmental security issues and literature, as well 
as the governmental and non-governmental institutions involved in the field.
In order to understand how an idea comes to hold sway in policy circles 
necessarily entails listening to the perceptions of those engaged in the process. For this 
reason, a major part of my research involved interviews with key actors in the 
environment and security and related fields conducted from 1998-2002. I cast my net 
wide, interviewing approximately 70 people in government and multilateral agencies, 
research and policy institutes, foundations, universities, and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) in both the U.S. and Europe (for a list of interviewees, see 
Appendix A). The European interviews, which were conducted in 1998, provided an 
interesting outside perspective on the U.S. policy scene; for one thing, there tended to be 
less interest in and more skepticism about environmental conflict among the people I 
interviewed in the U.K., the Netherlands and the European Commission in Brussels.
I chose whom to interview on the basis of their known involvement and/or 
interest in environment and security concerns more generally and environmental conflict 
more specifically, or in the case of people outside the field, their capacity to shed light on 
knowledge production and policy processes. Although the list of interviewees is by no 
means exhaustive, I believe it represents a wide range of key actors and observers. 
Certainly, the interviews significantly deepened by understanding of the evolution of 
environmental conflict ideas and the nature of their impact on a variety of institutions.
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In my interviews I used a loosely structured approach in which I had a list of 
central questions but left room for spontaneity on both my own and the interviewee's 
part. The central questions I asked regarded the interviewee's perception of the linkages 
between environment and security; the extent of their knowledge of Homer-Dixon's 
work; and their views on why his work became important, how it impacted policy 
institutions, and whether or not it would continue to exercise influence as the field itself 
evolved and the political climate changed. I also tailored questions to the individual's 
institutional affiliation and experience. For example, I would ask an interviewee from 
the U.S. State Department how Homer-Dixon's ideas had impacted that institution 
specifically. Most interviews took from a half hour to an hour and were conducted in 
person, though eight interviews were done by phone. Although it is obviously an 
advantage to meet people in person, the phone interviews were lengthy and informative. 
I was also able to conduct two interviews with Homer-Dixon, one of which took place 
immediately after I had looked through his archives.
I took notes instead of using a tape recorder in the interest of a freer and more 
frank discussion. In several cases, people gave me interviews, or portions of interviews, 
off-the-record. In general, I have identified specific interviewees in the text when their 
identity is critical to the validity of the information or perspective, but otherwise I have 
used a description of their position (e.g. State Department official, senior foundation 
officer) when their exact identity is not required. This is in the interest of safeguarding 
privacy as much as possible, since it is impossible to know in advance just how sensitive 
certain information or views are. For date and location of any interviews cited in the text, 
the reader should consult Appendix A.
Subjectivity, of course, is an intrinsic part of the interview process, from the
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selection of interviewees to question choice to the biases of the particular interviewer in 
the interpretation and presentation of results. When I started the interview process, I 
worried that my background in population might bias my findings -- that I would be 
searching for the population thread even when it was not there or only played a minor 
role, or alternatively, that the people I interviewed would have already pigeon-holed me. 
Although I have been involved most of my career in reproductive rights advocacy, 
supporting women's access to high quality, voluntary family planning and reproductive 
health services, I am also a known critic of neo-Malthusian ideology and population 
control policies which undermine women's health and rights (e.g., Hartmann 1995).
In actuality, these did not prove major problems. As an interviewer, I found it 
easier to disassociate from my political subjectivities and to approach each situation with 
an open mind. To most people I was an anonymous PhD researcher and those who did 
know my population work often engaged in a more in-depth discussion because of it. 
The interviews challenged me to look beyond a narrow 'population determinism' in the 
evolution of the environment and security field in general and in the environmental 
conflict project in particular. This challenge remains throughout the thesis as I balance 
my focus on the influence of neo-Malthusianism with a broader analysis of the tangle of 
actors, interests and discourses which came together in the making of environmental 
conflict ideas. In my interviews I learned that many people do not explicitly see 
population as a defining factor, though it is implicit in many of their assumptions. In the 
U.S. policy context the very 'implicitness' of population is precisely what makes it so 
powerful; it is part and parcel of the American liberal world view.
This world view is also pluralist, however, and open to considering alternative 
perspectives. Thus, in the course of my research, I became enlisted in the Global
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Environmental Change and Human Security Project (GECHS) based in Canada. This 
project uses the notion of human security to bring issues of inequality, gender and 
political ecology into the environment and security field. It is also committed to 
encouraging more women and Southern researchers to enter the debate. The largely 
homogenous composition of die field to date (white and male) is starting to be a source 
of embarrassment.
As a result of my engagement with GECHS and growing acquaintance with 
others in the environment and security field, I found myself moving from 
researcher/interviewer to participant observer. This culminated in my attendance at a 
small International Studies Association Workshop on Environment and Conflict 
Research, co-sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson Center and the University of 
California, Irvine GECHS chapter in March 2000. With a number of key protagonists at 
the table, including Homer-Dixon, I found myself vacillating between wanting to take 
notes on the discussion for my thesis and actively participating in it. This blurring of the 
line is no doubt experienced by many graduate students doing research in a field of 
which they gradually become part. However, the situation was somewhat different for 
me since I had approached the field mainly as a critical outsider. For example, I had 
previously published an article critical of Homer-Dixon's model (Hartmann 1998). If the 
field was open enough to tolerate this criticism, or even welcome it, then what was my 
role now? The process of engagement has provided valuable insights not only as to how 
the field constructs itself, but as to how one might go about trying to change it.
In the end, the research process has taught me that there is no one clear way to 
investigate and comprehend how an idea, and its purveyor, become powerful. I have had 
to negotiate and balance multiple methodologies and subjectivities, including my own, to
22
untangle the tangle, and at the end of the day there are no doubt still loose threads. I offer 
the following account, not as the last word or only true story, but as the fullest and 
deepest understanding I was able to achieve with the tools at hand.
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Endnote to Preface
1 These include the 40th Annual International Studies Association (ISA) Convention, 
February 16-20, 1999, Washington, D.C.; the ISA Workshop on Environment, 
Population and Conflict Research, University of California, Irvine, March 18-19, 2000; 
and the Conference on Environment and Security: Charting the Way Forward, Center for 
the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster, London, March 15,2001.
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CHAPTER ONE
Methodological Hooks and Eyes:
Reflections on Knowledge, Power and Policy
Across many social science fields there is considerable interest in the complex 
relationship between knowledge, power and policy-making. In part, this trend derives 
from the critical insights of post-structuralism and constructivism which have thrust 
open the black Pandora’s box of agency in the production of knowledge. It is also a 
response to evolving institutional forms, such as transnational regimes, NGOs and 
advocacy networks, in an era of rapid globalization.
In this chapter I journey through a number of social science disciplines to find 
the methodological approaches which are most helpful in understanding the evolution of 
environmental conflict ideas and their impact on U.S. governmental and 
nongovernmental institutions. A set of four basic questions has guided my search for 
relevant approaches:
1) Can one understand environmental conflict as a discourse, both in the broader, 
dynamic Foucaultian sense of a power center, a bounded area of social knowledge which 
both constrains and enables thinking and action, and in the narrower linguistic sense of a 
narrative with a particular story line designed to appeal to policymakers as well as a 
broader public? How does environmental conflict interact with other past and present 
discourses on population, environment and security, as well as with North/South 
representations of race, gender, and immigration?
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2) Who are the key actors, and why do they achieve such prominence? Do they 
form an identifiable configuration, e.g. an epistemic community, discourse coalition or 
issue network? What does this tell us about the role of agency, including the financial 
power of private foundations, in the production of knowledge?
3) What is it about the historical moment that allowed such ideas to flourish, both 
nationally and internationally? Is environmental conflict an example of increasing 
"securitization" of the social and environmental spheres (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 
1998)?
4) What are the intentional and unintentional effects of environmental conflict 
ideas? Is there a certain 'strategic intelligibility' (Ferguson 1994) to their unintentional 
effects? Can one understand that strategic intelligibility only with the benefit of 
hindsight, or is speculation a worthy project, especially to determine potential sites of 
contestation?
Because there is no one over-arching methodological hook on which to hang all 
these questions, I have employed a variety of approaches, crossing back and forth not 
only between disciplines, but between postmodern, constructivist and political economy 
approaches. Fortunately, today the boundaries between them are less rigid; there is a 
general agreement that discourse matters in the study of knowledge, power and policy, 
though exactly what discourse is and how it matters is the subject of much debate. The 
danger of a pluralist approach is that one can get spread too thin, while the advantage is 
that one is able to come at one's material from a variety of different directions, with 
multiple insights. I have found the advantages to outweigh the disadvantages, especially 
since as most observers would agree, the relationship between knowledge, power and
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policy is by no means clear-cut and is clouded by complexity, uncertainty and 
contingency. Rather than ignore these factors, it is better to embrace them.
The chapter is divided into six parts which discuss the most relevant approaches I 
have gleaned from the literature. Part One considers Foucaultian notions of 
power/knowledge, such as the production of truth, bio-power and strategic intelligibility. 
Part Two explores the constructivist literature on ideas and policy and related concepts 
of agency. Part Three looks more specifically at the role of material interests, namely 
private foundations, in the production of knowledge in the United States. Part Four 
addresses the politics of representation, particularly the identification of 'threats'; Part 
Five examines how perceived threats actually get on the security agenda through the 
process of "securitization." The final part clarifies how these varied approaches inform 
the main body of the work and presents an outline of the following chapters.
/. IN  THE FOOTSTEPS OF FOUCAULT
Foucault's 'archeological' and 'genealogical' studies of power/knowledge formations 
have deeply influenced much subsequent research on how certain ideas or discourses 
not only come into being, but function in the world. In this thesis, I draw on three 
main aspects of Foucaultian theory: the political economy of truth, bio-power, and 
strategic intelligibility.
The Political Economy of Truth
"We are subjected to the production of truth through power," Foucault wrote, 
"and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth" (Foucault
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1980:93). Truth for him is a relative concept, the system of rules by which true and false 
are separated, which takes different forms in different historical periods. How truths are 
produced is a central concern of my work, and Foucault’s notion of a "political economy 
of truth" has relevance to understanding how environmental conflict became an accepted 
ideology.
Foucault identifies five major traits which characterize such a political economy 
in the present era: (1) 'truth' centers on "the form of scientific discourse and the 
institutions which produce it;" (2) there is a constant demand for truth "as much for 
economic production as for political power;" (3) it is widely circulated and consumed 
through apparatuses of education and information; (4) it is produced and transmitted 
under the dominant control of a few major political and economic institutions such as the 
university, army, and the media; (5) it is the subject of "a whole political debate and 
social confrontation," i.e. ideological struggles (131-2).
In terms of political strategy, the essential challenge to the intellectual is not 
criticizing the ideological contents of current truths, ensuring one's own scientific 
practice is guided by correct ideology or altering people's consciousness, but rather 
changing "the political, economic, institutional regime of the production of truth" (133). 
I would argue that all of these factors are required, and in fact move together as part of a 
larger political process. Nevertheless, the importance of understanding the "regime of the 
production of truth" in order to transform it is a point well-taken.
Discourse is central to the production of truth and the operation of power:
...in any society there are manifold relations of power which 
permeate, characterize and constitute the social body, and these relations 
of power cannot themselves be established without the production, 
accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse (93).
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Discourse must be studied on different levels: archaeologically in terms of its various 
elements, assumptions and internal logic, and genealogically in terms of the institutional, 
cultural and social and economic practices which give rise to it (Escobar 1984-85).
The particular instruments used in the formation of a knowledge or discourse are 
also important to consider; these "methods of observation, techniques of registration, 
procedures for investigation and research, apparatuses of control" (Foucault 1980:102) 
are part of die exercise of power. Technique, content and deployment of a discourse are 
in a sense analytically inseparable since they constantly interact. By extension, in terms 
of political strategy, it may be that by challenging a particular technique — a way of 
collecting or ordering data, for example — that one finds a thread that helps unravel the 
discourse or undermines the authority of those who produce it.
Foucault’s dynamic understanding of discourse is rooted in his similarly dynamic 
concept of power as a productive, not just repressive, network which runs through the 
whole social body (119). Power is employed through a net-like organization and 
individuals are its vehicles, not just its point of application. He argues for studying 
power where it is invested in "real and effective practices" and at its extremities, the 
points where it becomes "capillary", embedding itself in regional and local forms and 
institutions. Instead of starting from power’s center and discovering the extent to which 
it affects the base, he calls for an ascending analysis of power, working upward from its 
"infinitesimal" local mechanisms (99). While this approach recommends itself to certain 
kinds of research, e.g. certain anthropological and historical case studies, my approach is 
more descending or lateral in the sense of studying across institutions. Indeed, one could 
argue that studying "the political, economic, institutional production of the regime of
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truth'’ often involves an unapologetic focus on the centers of power.
However, in terms of identifying the impact of certain regimes of truth, it is 
necessary to look at who is at the receiving end of policy. Here Foucault's understanding 
of population and bio-power offers some important insights, especially since population 
figures so prominently in environmental conflict ideology.
Bio-power and Strategic Intelligibility
The development of the concept of population is central to Foucault's work, 
involving the changing relationship between what he calls the "species body" and the 
individual body. In the late seventeenth century the human body increasingly came to be 
seen as a machine, whose capabilities had to be disciplined, optimized and integrated 
into an efficient system of control. This "anatomo-politics of the human body" 
paralleled the development of a "bio-politics of the population," which focused on "the 
body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological 
processes: propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and 
longevity" (Foucault 1990:139). This marked the beginning of an era of "bio-power," of 
techniques of control over the individual and social body essential to the development of 
capitalism. Sex itself became a cmcial target, situated as it was "at the juncture of the 
'body' and the 'population'"(147).1
Although Foucault himself did not write explicitly on the environment, scholars 
following in his tradition have usefully incorporated his ideas of bio-power into the 
analysis of contemporary environmentalism. Rutherford maintains that current concerns 
with ecological problems and crises are an example of the bio-politics of population.
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This bio-politics has given rise to a mode of governmental rationality based on the 
institutionalization of new forms of scientific expertise, largely drawing on global 
systems ecology and its concern for the population-resources problem, as well as "new 
techniques for managing the environment and the population that can be termed 
'ecological govemmentality'" (Rutherford 1999:38). State-centric concepts of power 
must give way to an analysis of how regulatory science, and its expert bodies, not only 
legitimize certain state interventions, but perform "a role of epistemic policing, both by 
framing the definition of ecological risks and by certifying what is to count as 
scientifically acceptable knowledge of the natural world" (56).
Luke (1999) explores the dark side of this green govemmentality with more 
specific reference to the role of the state, especially American superpower, in the 
policing of the global environment. Historically, the development of ecology follows the 
emergence of demography as an administrative science; demography's statistical 
attitudes "diffuse into the numerical surveillance of nature, or Earth and its non-human 
inhabitants" (149). Indeed, modem ecology provides governments with the rationale to 
define all living organisms as endangered populations subject to managerial control. This 
control accelerates and is intertwined with the rapid expansion of global capitalism in the 
1970s. According to Luke,
To preserve the political economy of high-technology production, 
many offices of the American state must function as 'environmental 
protection agencies', inasmuch as they continue to fuse a politics of 
national security with an economics of continual growth, to sustain 
existing industrial ecologies of mass consumption with the wise use of 
nature through private property rights. Conservationist ethics, resource 
managerialism and green rhetorics, then, congeal as an unusually 
cohesive power/knowledge formation, whose actions are an integral 
element of this order's regime of normalization (151).
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While Luke and Rutherford focus on the environmental side of this 
power/knowledge formation, speaking more about aggregate body politics than 
individual bodies, feminist scholars have pointed out how the targeting of actual 
women's bodies in local (though nationally and internationally financed) population 
control programs is one of the most direct contemporary manifestations of bio-power 
(Richey 1999). Despite discursive shifts at the 1994 UN Population Conference in Cairo 
from population control to reproductive health and women's empowerment, population 
reduction, sometimes through coercive means, remains the central imperative of family 
planning programs in many countries (Hartmann 2002). Normalized through the science 
of demography and population planning, the control of women's fertility and sexuality 
has become the legitimate province of state authority.
The current linkage of population, environment and security could raise the 
stakes higher -- women's fertility, by causing environmental degradation and violent 
conflict, becomes a national security threat, justifying the need for greater discipline and 
surveillance. Because of the ostensible link between population, deforestation, and loss 
of biodiversity, for example, the United Nations Fund for Population Activities 
(UNFPA) recently called for the integration of reproductive health and family planning 
programs with park and forest management schemes (UNFPA 2001:8). A number of 
such schemes have used violent means to exclude local people from forest resources 
(Peluso 1993, Neumann 2002), raising the possibility of a direct link between coercive 
contraception and coercive conservation.
Anticipating such outcomes is an important element of what James Ferguson 
(1990) calls strategic intelligibility. In his book The Anti-Politics Machine Ferguson's
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main aim is not to present a critique of the dominant development discourse on Lesotho 
(although he does so along the way), but rather "to show that the institutionalized 
production of certain kinds of ideas about Lesotho has certain important effects, and that 
the production of such ideas plays an important role in the production of certain sorts of 
structural change" (xv).
Despite his use of the machine metaphor, Ferguson stresses that there is no 
mechanistic, deterministic relationship between the discourse of development in Lesotho 
and its practices and outcomes. Indeed, intentional development planning has many 
unintended consequences, which, with the benefit of hindsight, have a certain strategic 
intelligibility (20). Thus, rural development in Lesotho largely failed according to its 
own terms, but expanded bureaucratic state power in new ways and had the ideological 
effect of depoliticizing poverty and the state.
In using such an approach, there is a danger that the concept of strategic 
intelligibility will close a too perfect circle, leaving too little room for contingency and 
agency and allowing the logic of the present to explain the past. Nevertheless, it is a 
useful predictive tool, encouraging the researcher to focus not just on the intentional but 
unintentional consequences of a particular discourse and to identify future spheres and 
paths of influence and policy impacts. This is somewhat more difficult in the case of 
environmental conflict ideas since they are not as institutionalized as development 
planning. It is in the intersections with other more institutionalized endeavors, such as 
conservation and population control noted above, or military and intelligence activities, 
that one should look for the strategic intelligibility of environmental conflict ideas.
While these Foucaultian approaches offer important insights, they are not
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sufficient to understand the concrete mechanisms by which different actors, with 
differential access to power and resources, are able to create knowledge and influence 
public opinion and policy. Foucaultian theory is not agent-less, but it (ironically) tends 
towards a sort of systems analysis, reinforced by its own circulatory metaphors, where 
individual actors and subjects can get lost in the grand discursive scheme of things. 
Constructivism provides a more concrete view of agency, especially the critical role of 
expert communities.
II. CONSTRUCTIVISM AND THE POLITICS OF EXPERTISE
That knowledge is socially constructed is hardly a new idea, though in recent 
years the social sciences have turned a more critical inward eye to the complex processes 
of knowledge production, including the formation of expert communities. Much of this 
research has taken place under the broad umbrella of social constructivism. This part 
first looks at constructivism applied to both the natural and social sciences and then at 
the various types of expert communities identified in the literature: epistemic 
communities; advocacy coalitions; policy networks, communities and entrepreneurs; and 
discourse coalitions. It concludes with a discussion of the limitations of constructivism, 
particularly regarding the role of material interests and deep normative commitments and 
assumptions.
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From Natural Science to Trans-science
Constructivism has roots in the sociology of science, which in the 1970s turned 
its attention in a more systematic way to an exploration of how scientific theory, method 
and facts are constructed inside and outside the laboratory (Knorr-Cetina and Mulkay 
1983). According to Jasanoff and Wynne,
A constructivist account of science and technology seeks to 
understand the role of human agency and cognition, cultural discourses 
and practices, and social goals and norms in the making of scientific 
knowledge and technological products. Researchers acknowledge 
nature's part in controlling the production of scientific knowledge, but 
that part is considered less determinative and more complex than in other 
models of science (Jasanoff and Wynne 1998:17-18).2
While constructivism embraces a certain "epistemic relativism" that locates knowledge
in a specific time, place and culture, it eschews "judgmental relativism," the belief that
since all forms of knowledge are valid, they cannot be discriminated amongst (Knorr-
Cetina and Mulkay 1983:5).
In fact, by prying open and carefully analyzing scientific practice, one can argue
that constructivist scholars are enriching and sharpening it rather than throwing the
proverbial baby out with the bath water. They are opening some of the unchallenged
"black box" claims and techniques of modem science and discovering a history of
"uncertainty, people at work, decisions, competition, controversies" (Latour 1987:4).
Constructivist approaches have also been applied to the overlapping zone
between science and policy known as "trans-science," where often in the face of
uncertainty, scientists are called on to give answers to hard policy questions or legitimize
certain policy options (Jasanoff and Wynne: 1998). Not surprisingly, environmental
issues involving risk calculation and regulation often occupy this trans-scientific zone,
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and they are a prime subject of inquiry.
Constructivist analysis can be applied at many different levels, from laboratory 
observation and experiment, to peer review and the creation of scientific standards, to 
issue framing, agenda setting, and discourse analysis, to the formation of national and 
transnational expert communities, to actual policy choice and implementation (Jasanoff 
and Wynne 1998). The point is not only to "expose the contingent and relativistic 
character of knowledge," but to "illuminate how science nonetheless succeeds in 
acquiring and maintaining cognitive authority in a distrustful world" (Jasanoff 1990:12).
Useful in this latter regard is the concept of "boundary work," the process by 
which scientific communities establish legitimacy by drawing boundaries between who 
is acceptable and who is not, between scientific and lay knowledges, and between 
science and policy. "Boundary objects" meanwhile are issues, such as global warming, 
which occupy the intersection between scientific and other cultural domains. According 
to Jasanoff, the creation of new discursive boundary objects is an important way of 
stabilizing the role of scientific knowledge in policy formation (Jasanoff 1990, Jasonoff 
and Wynne 1998). Boundary objects are capable of drawing together a number of 
different research communities, with diverse institutional goals and commitments as well 
as epistemologies (Timura 2001).
Timura (2001) argues that the concept of environmental conflict is itself a 
boundary object. Its power derives in part from its ambiguity and vagueness, so that 
players "from all sides of the political spectrum" are able to enter the definitional 
debate, with some identifying ozone depletion and global warming as national 
security threats, others stressing nonrenewable resources like oil and minerals, and
36
still others like Homer-Dixon emphasizing renewable resource scarcity in the
generation of intrastate conflict:
While there are areas of convergence, the very vagueness of 
’’environmental conflict" has enabled such a large array of players to join 
debates. As more players come into contact with environmental conflict 
as the boundary object, the credibility of environmental security 
discourse increases (105).3
Social constructivism tends to more of a tool kit than an over-arching 
theory, and as such, it can be used by scholars of different ideological 
persuasions and disciplines and applied to the production of social science as 
well as natural science knowledges. Knorr-Cetina (1999) argues, in fact, that the 
methods and procedures of the natural scientist and social scientist are 
sufficiently related as to make comparisons possible. In the environmental field 
the distinctions tend to be even more blurred, for as Lash, Szerszynski and 
Wynne observe, a strong link exists between the kind of technocratic approaches 
towards environmental problems emerging from both the natural and social 
sciences. Since the 1987 Brundtland report (World Commission on 
Environment and Development 1987), potentially politically enlarging ideas 
such as sustainable development have narrowed into a global managerial 
paradigm: "Significantly, these managerial resources included the new resource 
of social science, conceived in identical epistemic clothing to the natural sciences 
— instrumental prediction and control" (Lash, Szerszynski, and Wynne 1996:4).4
One of the main achievements of constructivist research has been the 
identification and exploration of expert or knowledge communities in different 
fields and at different levels of the policy process. The focus on these groups
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stems from a number of broad developments. In disciplinary terms, these 
include the turn away from narrow rational actor and functionalist models of 
policy-making in the social sciences as well as the challenge to unitary state- 
centric analysis in International Relations. The shift also reflects changing 
political and economic realities, notably government’s need for outside expertise 
in an increasingly complex technological environment; the formation of 
international regimes at the official level and transnational advocacy networks at 
the civil society level; and changes in the organization of domestic politics.5 The 
following section considers these knowledge groupings in more detail.
Ties That Bind: Knowledge Communities
Epistemic communities, policy communities, advocacy coalitions, issue 
networks, transnational advocacy networks, and discourse coalitions are among 
the key knowledge groups identified in the constructivist literature. Although 
there is overlap between them, the diversity of forms reflects the fact that specific 
issue or policy areas differ widely in terms of the actors, interests and institutions 
involved (Haas 2001). Taking one step further, I would argue that one may find 
a diversity of fluctuating and overlapping formations within a specific field such 
as environment and security, depending on the stages of knowledge production, 
dissemination, and engagement with policymaking processes. Nevertheless, it is 
useful to examine each concept discretely, starting with the epistemic community 
approach.
Epistemic Communities: The term epistemic community was first
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coined by Knorr-Cetina, who has also written about epistemic cultures, "those 
amalgams of arrangements and mechanisms — bonded through affinity, necessity 
and historical co-incidence -- which, in a given field, make up how we know 
what we know" (Knorr-Cetina 1999:1). Peter Haas (1990,1992,1997) 
popularized the concept in the International Relations (IR) field with his work on 
the role of transnational experts in environmental regime formation in the 
Mediterranean basin. Haas describes epistemic communities as the "cognitive 
baggage handlers of constructivist analyses of politics and ideas." They are 
transnational, knowledge-based networks of experts in a particular issue area, a 
"principal channel through which consensual knowledge about causal 
connections is applied to policy formation and policy coordination" (Haas 
2001:11579). With the ability to exert influence on both national and 
international authorities, epistemic communities are at times able to overcome 
narrow state interests.
The concept of epistemic community has been criticized on several 
counts. Sikkink argues that external observers may impose a coherence upon 
such a community which is more imagined than real (Sikkink 1991). Litfin 
believes the concept does not adequately explain the source of the community's 
power, nor provide an adequate theory of knowledge. Exhibiting some of the 
flaws of functionalism and its variants, the approach "is fundamentally a theory 
of agency: knowledge-based experts exert power by virtue of their access to 
information. Power and discourse are thus properties -  rather than constitutive - 
- of subjects" (Litfin 1994:49).6 Nevertheless, she does acknowledge that the
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approach can provide insights into the concrete mechanisms by which
knowledge-based experts exert power.
However, it is not only how epistemic communities wield power that is
interesting, but how they come into being in the first place. What is often
missing from the literature is an adequate depiction of intentionality -- can
epistemic communities be intentionally created, and if so, by whom? Another
related question is whether they are a relatively recent phenomenon or not.
Epistemic communities are usually associated with a fairly narrow and
time-bound international agreement or regime. The following formations are
generally more engaged with long-term policy processes.
Policy communities, coalitions and networks: The concept of policy
community (or policy network) evolved primarily from the recognition that
semi-private institutions were often superseding more conventional democratic
instruments in public policy-making processes. Policy communities have
generally been defined in terms of their relative stability and shared views
(Richardson 2001); they are more institutionalized than epistemic communities
and more concerned with concrete mechanisms of governance rather than the
production of knowledge per se. They are "powerful client groupings" around
issues such as finance, industrial matters and transport (O’Riordan and Jordan
1996:74). Advocacy coalitions are a similar concept. According to Sabatier and
Jenkins-Smith (1993), they consist of
actors from a variety of public and private institutions at all levels of 
government who share a basic set of beliefs (policy goals plus causal and 
other perceptions) and who seek to manipulate the rules, budgets, and 
personnel of governmental institutions in order to achieve these goals
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over time (5).
Because of their more limited definition, the concepts of policy communities and 
advocacy coalitions have less relevance to the more diffuse formations found in the 
environment and security field.
Of more relevance is the notion of issue networks. Heclo describes them as 
looser "webs of influence," shared knowledge groupings which concern themselves with 
some aspect of public policy. Although participating individuals and organizations may 
possess a shared knowledge base, they do not necessarily agree. "Increasingly," Heclo 
notes, "it is through networks of people who regard each other as knowledgeable, or at 
least as needing to be answered, that public policy issues tend to be refined, evidence 
debated, and alternative options worked out -- though rarely in any controlled, well- 
organized way" (Heclo 1978:102, cited in Richardson 2001:110-111). While consensus 
is not necessary, issue networks can both include and exclude, helping to determine who 
has more legitimacy and access to power. O'Riordan and Jordan (1996) write that 
policy communities tend to form in situations where governments need the help of 
NGOs in implementing policy, whereas issue networks are found in more politicized 
issue areas where resource dependencies are not as clear. Policy communities can exist 
within issue networks, and since membership in a network is more flexible, there is more 
space for political contest and change.
However, in his study of the international population network and the creation of 
the 1994 Cairo consensus on population policy (see next chapter), Halfon argues that 
consensus plays a larger role in issue network formation and impact than is often 
acknowledged. His definition of consensus is broader and more complex than a simple
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notion of strategic agreement. "Consensus implies broad commitment to a network," he 
explains:
Since the network itself is complex, multiple and contradictory, 
the consensus is necessarily so. Neither singular or absolute, consensus is 
rather processual; it is continually under attack and renewal. A network 
facilitates the process of consensus production because it is both flexible 
enough to admit diversity yet disciplining: flexible because each node of 
a network is open to translation and reconfiguration; disciplining because 
a network gains strength from mutual reinforcement among elements 
(Halfon 1999:2).
Halfon shows how the concept of women's 'unmet need' for contraception served 
as a boundary object, allowing diverse agendas, from population control to reproductive 
rights, to be integrated in the Cairo project, with the end result of disabling more radical 
framings of women's empowerment. Thus, while entering a network may have 
advantages in terms of being able to effect change from within, it can also discipline or 
coopt critics, a point worth keeping in mind in terms of the environment and security 
field.
Advocacy networks, comprised mainly of activists, are the most overtly 
politicized network form. In their study of transnational advocacy networks working in 
the fields of human rights, violence against women, and the environment, Keck and 
Sikkink write that what is novel about them is how nontraditional international actors are 
able to organize strategically to create new issue areas and exert leverage over more 
powerful organizations and governments (Keck and Sikkink 1998:2). Although the 
environment and security field does not fit this description (its actors are more traditional 
and not activist in the advocacy sense), Keck and Sikkink's observation that networks 
"embody elements of agent and structure simultaneously" is pertinent. As "patterns of 
interactions between organizations and individuals," networks are structures, but
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attributed to these structures is an agency that "is not reducible to the agency of their 
components" (5).
It is partly through discursive practices such as framing that this common agency 
is forged and shaped. For some authors, the role of discourse is in fact the key element in 
transforming knowledge into power.
The discursive bridge: Discourse, with its multiple meanings, provides a 
somewhat shaky bridge between constructivist and post-structuralist understandings of 
knowledge/power. In her study of the 1987 Montreal Ozone Protocol, Litfin (1994) uses 
what she calls a discursive practices approach. While she draws on Foucault's notion of 
discourses as power centers, she employs a more limited definition of discourse as "sets 
of linguistic practices and rhetorical strategies embedded in a network of social 
relations" (3). She sets out to show how it was not simply 'objective' scientific facts 
marshalled by an expert community that led to the Montreal protocol, but rather a 
complex process of moving the discourse of precautionary action from a subordinate 
position to a dominant one and capitalizing on the compelling image of the ozone hole. 
The exercise of power in this setting relied on persuasion, not force, on the strategic use 
of evidence and argumentation.
Litfin acknowledges the role of certain key actors, "knowledge-brokers," who are 
able to translate the work of scientific and technical experts into language accessible to 
policymakers, the media and the public. However, she downplays the specific identities 
of these brokers, including their professional credentials and access to material 
resources. Instead, it is their discursive competence which gives them power: "More 
important than the specific identities of the agents of discourse is the content of
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discourse” (188). One wonders, however, if she is going too far in the faceless, nameless 
discourse-determinist direction. There is also a confusion at times between the more 
narrow linguistic sense of discourse and the Foucaultian conceptualization, between the
n
more concrete text and the more nebulous texture of power.
In his study of ecological modernization in the acid rain policy process in the 
U.K. and the Netherlands, Martin Hajer formulates the concept of "discourse coalitions." 
Comprised of a variety of actors such as scientists, politicians and activists with links to 
diverse forms of media, these coalitions are unconventional in that their members have 
not necessarily met nor do they share an explicit strategy. What unites them and gives 
them power is the fact that the "actors group around specific story-lines that they employ 
whilst engaging in environmental politics" (Hajer 1995:13).
Hajer defines discourse broadly as "an ensemble of ideas, concepts and 
categories through which meaning is given to phenomena" (Hajer 1993:44). These 
ideas, concepts and categories, meanwhile, can have diverse roots such as normative or 
analytic convictions and historical references to myths about nature. Discourse is both a 
tool with which to identify and construct problems and the context in which issues are 
understood. What he calls discourse structuration is the process by which a particular 
discourse becomes dominant; discourse institutionalization occurs when it becomes 
embedded in specific institutions, organizational practices or ways of reasoning. This 
institutionalization in turn encourages the reproduction of the discourse, as actors who 
have been socialized to work within such a frame "will use their positions to persuade or 
force others to interpret and approach reality according to their institutionalized insights 
and convictions" (46). Discourse coalitions are successful to the extent that they achieve
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both structuration and institutionalization of their discourse.
Additionally, Hajer (1993) makes the point that a particular discourse never 
exists in isolation, and that in the complex realm of environmental politics actors often 
use arguments from several different discourses. The common story line that brings a 
discourse coalition together is often composed of elements from different discourses 
which have a discursive affinity, i.e. they conceptualize the world in similar ways.
However, Hajer (1993) argues that members of a discourse coalition do not 
necessarily have to share "deep values" (48). There is something of a contradiction here, 
since the story lines that are so important to the discourse coalition approach may indeed 
be based on deep values. One wonders, in fact, if it is the story lines themselves which 
hold the coalition together, or the underlying deep values and/or 'mere' material interests 
of the actors. The discourse coalition approach also misses out on the question of 
strategic intelligibility: even if a discourse and its various story lines become embedded 
institutionally, is the result action on that set of particular issues, or some other outcome 
which is not specified in advance?
In highlighting how the argumentative structure of particular discourses acts as a 
catalyst for policy change, Litfin and Hajer are part of a larger community of scholars 
who believe the shape of ideas themselves deserves attention (Yee 1996). Narrative 
policy analysis, for example, focuses on that shape through the textual examination of 
the formation and use of concepts, including naming, labelling and binaries; tropes and 
other stylistic devices; framing; stories and narratives; and explicit and implicit rules of 
validation (Gasper and Apthorpe 1996). There is a well-developed literature in this field, 
particularly pertaining to international development, and there is no doubt much to be
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gained from the textual analysis of particular discourses.
However, there are also limitations to this approach. As Payne points out, the 
constructivist focus on how ideas are framed to be more persuasive in policy circles 
often fails to take into account the disparate power and access to resources of competing 
parties in 'frame contests.' (One can imagine a situation, for example, where success 
depends less on discursive competence than on competence in raising funds.) Payne 
also notes other 'distortions' such as the manipulation of frames by "deceptive, 
domineering, secretive or powerful advocates" (5), and the ability of certain frames to 
dominate because they draw on commonly accepted but harmful normative 
commitments such as xenophobia and racism — in other words, deep, but sometimes 
unacknowledged, values.
Although constructivism is not predicated on a level playing field, it tends not to 
pay adequate attention to both material interests and hegemonic ideologies in the politics 
of persuasion. It does a better job at painting the specifics of the foreground than 
elements of the deeper, and often darker, background. The following part fills in some 
of this necessary background by looking at the pivotal role of material interests, in the 
form of private philanthropic foundations, in knowledge production in the United States.
III. MONEY TALKS: THE ROLE OF PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS
Private foundations are a major link in the chain joining corporate, academic, 
public policy and government interests in the United States. In certain fields, such as 
population, they have served as the key catalyst in the creation of both an academic 
discipline and a public policy response. Yet until recently, in-depth scholarly attention
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to the role of foundations was relatively rare, and foundations themselves discouraged 
outside research into their internal affairs (Lagemann 1999). This is now changing 
because of increased social science interest in the production of knowledge, but the lag is 
noticeable. The challenge in researching the evolution and impact of environmental 
conflict ideas is making this particular Invisible Hand visible.
In his recent book on American foundations, Dowie (2001) divides the history of 
American foundations in the last century into three main periods: the first, prior to World 
War Two, focused on the advancement of formal knowledge, especially in the hard 
sciences; the second, post-World War Two, involved the foundations more directly in 
the formation of public policy, both national and international; and the third, starting in 
the 1960s, saw the foundations take a more proactive role in promoting their visions of 
social justice. These divides, of course, are somewhat arbitrary and certain patterns are 
common to all three.
One of the most illuminating studies of foundation involvement in formal 
knowledge production is Lily Kay's history of the Rockefeller Foundation, the California 
Institute of Technology and the rise of molecular biology, which spans both the first and 
second periods (Kay 1993). Financially, Rockefeller was a major contributor to the life 
sciences before World War Two, with a contribution equal to about two percent of the 
entire federal budget for scientific research and development. However, it was not only 
Rockefeller funds which led it to dominate, and indeed define, the field of biology, but 
its effectiveness in harnessing interdisciplinary cooperation through grants and 
fellowships coupled with its infusion of sophisticated technology. Kay argues that the 
foundation's conservative social and political beliefs, including identifying the gene as
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the site of social dysfunction, distorted the development of biology itself, leading to a 
physicochemical focus on proteins and mechanisms of upward causation and ignoring 
the role of downward causation and interactive processes between organisms and their 
environments.
Kay uses a Gramscian cultural hegemony framework to understand the 
mechanisms by which Rockefeller forged a scientific elite in its own interest. In the 
constitutive processes of consensus formation,
"power" includes intellectual, cultural, political and economic 
power; and mental life is not a mere shadow of material life. From this 
perspective the maintenance of hegemony does not require active 
commitment by an academic constituency (or by subordinates) to 
legitimate elite rule. Rather, the two reinforce each other in a circular 
manner to form a "hegemonic bloc" sustained by formal and informal 
systems of incentives and power sharing, particularly through half­
conscious modes of complicity (10).
Unlike many constructivists, Kay also pays heed to the "negative space" outside the
consensus where those with less fashionable views receive less support, while the
massive resources available to the chosen fields accelerates their pace and creates "a
sense of rapid progress and public excitement", which in turn reinforces the authority of
their knowledge claims (281).
Similar processes occurred in the social sciences, where in the 1920s private
foundation funding was critical in establishing scientism as the dominant approach.
Mimicking the natural sciences, scientism, with its emphasis on positivist methods and
quantitative techniques, sought the means to predict and control human behavior. In
1923 Rockefeller money launched the Social Science Research Council, which served as
the institutional base for building cooperation among the social science disciplines as
well as the catalyst for focusing them on scientism (Ross 1991, Kay 1993). In the U.S.
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as well as Britain, Rockefeller officials served a "gate-keeping" role; they did not 
consider funding proposals which emerged independently, but rather actively 
encouraged certain people who conformed to their views to apply and then guided 
proposal preparation. Moreover, in a practice which continues in the foundation world 
today, they often made their support for a proposal contingent on it getting funding from 
other foundations and agencies (Fisher 1982).
In the 1950s the Ford Foundation financed the behavioral revolution in American 
political science, moving the discipline away from political theory and normative 
questions toward empirical research on phenomena such as voting behavior. The basic 
goal of Ford's Behavioral Sciences Division was to contain social disorder through 
adjustments in individual behavior, thus staving off more radical change (Seybold 1982). 
Ford also invested heavily in international studies programs at this time, with the same 
behavioralist bias. Its institutional support for programs at major universities (Columbia, 
MIT, Harvard and Stanford, among them) ensured its influence, though its power was 
more far-reaching. In a similar vein to Kay, Seybold makes this observation:
[Ford's] strategic position within the knowledge-producing sector 
and its role as coordinator of research magnified its influence and 
permitted it to establish a loose kind of hegemony over research in the 
area. Over time, its mechanisms of control became increasingly subtle 
and unobtrusive as the institutional base, which it was instrumental in 
establishing, matured and gained some autonomy (295).
One of the goals of Ford's support of international studies was to produce policy
relevant research as well as a trained cadre of international affairs specialists to serve
government and corporate needs.9 This is representative of the second period of
American philanthropy when foundations became more actively involved in the
formulation and execution of public policy in what Lagemann (1989) calls "strategic
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philanthropy." The growing interest in public policy reflected more profound changes in 
the political environment in the U.S.; in the wake of both the New Deal and World War 
Two, public policy-making became a much more intentional and calculated effort across 
a wide variety of institutions, both at home and abroad.
In the 1960s Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society accelerated the technocratic 
approach to policymaking. Technically trained knowledge elites -- sometimes referred 
to as the new "technocratic class" or "action intellectuals" -- were given increasing 
power by the administration to define social problems and their solutions (Fischer 
1993).10 According to Fischer, policy research "became a growth industry for think 
tanks11, research institutes, and management consulting firms," setting into motion a 
"revolving door" linking them together with government agencies (25).
Foundations played a major role in funding policy research. For example, the 
Ford Foundation gave the public-private hybrid Brookings Institution, one of the most 
influential Washington-based think tanks, almost $40 million between 1955 and 1967 
(Dowie 2001). High-ranking foundation officials also served on the boards of many 
public policy organizations; such interlocking directorates are a key aspect of what 
Colwell (1982) calls "the interconnected foundation club" (430).
The rise of the liberal technocratic elite, operating largely free of public scrutiny, 
raised the ire of both the Left and the Right in the U.S., though ultimately the Right 
decided to pursue a similar strategy. In the 1970s conservative politicians and 
businessmen began to realize they needed their own intellectual policy elite to do battle 
with the liberals. With corporate and foundation funding, a multi-million dollar network 
of conservative think tanks, policy institutes and academic centers was established
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(Fisher 1982). By the time of Reagan's victory in 1980, the Republicans had caught up 
to the Democrats in terms of having a policy elite at their disposal. The net effect, 
according to Nielsen (1985), was "to fix more firmly in national affairs at the federal 
level the practice of placing certain key nonprofit organizations, including some 
foundations, in a strategic position in the processes of policy formation" (57). Ironically, 
many observers believe conservative foundations have done a more effective job of 
supporting their policy intellectuals than liberal ones (Dowie 2001).
This may be due in part to the pursuit of novelty which currently afflicts many 
liberal foundations, as they compete with each other to fund the latest fashion in issue 
area and drop those which seem outdated. Some of the larger foundations, such as the 
Pew Charitable Trusts, take a more proactive role, seeking to create issue areas 
themselves. Dowie (2001) notes that proactive grantmaking, in which foundation 
program officers or paid consultants determine how to address certain social, 
environmental and scientific problems, is becoming increasingly common, shifting 
power and decision-making from the nonprofit to the philanthropic sector. "Money has 
always talked, of course," he writes, "but under a regime of proactive grantmaking it 
more often tends to dictate" (95). In the battle of ideas, proactive grantmaking throws the 
power wielded by foundations into sharp relief.
The role of foundations will be explored in more detail in reference to the 
population field (Chapter Two) and Homer-Dixon's environmental conflict projects 
(Chapter Five). What this brief sketch indicates is that foundations are often deeply 
implicated in knowledge production in the U.S., helping to determine the direction of 
scholarly research, policy studies, and ultimately public policy itself. The hegemony
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they exercise is often subtle, so that those who benefit from their largesse are not even 
aware of their complicity. As gatekeepers, foundations not only let in, but keep out, 
helping to maintain the "negative space" outside the prevailing consensus. Foundations 
alone, however, do not comprise the deep background needed to understand the power 
of certain ideas. The politics of representation, the subject of Part Four, also sheds light 
on the processes of inclusion and exclusion.
IV. MAKING THREATS: THE POLITICS OF REPRESENTATION
Ever since the publication of Edward Said’s Orientalism in 1978, there has been 
increased attention to how the Third World "other" is culturally produced and 
represented in a wide range of texts, from the popular to the academic to the speeches 
and treatises of policy makers. (I use the term Third World in the thesis, along with 
North/South, even though I am aware of their limitations. The division of the world into 
these simple categories is actually an example of the politics of representation.) Of 
particular relevance to this project is how the "other" is not only produced but rendered a 
threat in what Lipschutz (1999) calls "the political economy of danger."
One of the ways this occurs is through the persistence of certain core negative 
stereotypes and myths. Karim (1997) defines topos (plural topoi) as the primary 
stereotype or reservoir of core ideas and images which functions "as the referential basis 
of interpretation and is essential in making a textual account seem coherent within a 
particular culture's norms" (153). Reinforcing topoi are "hegemonic myths," those 
"fundamental propositions or assumptions that are unquestionable within the context of a 
particular discourse" (Thompson and Rayner 1998:289). These clusters of core ideas,
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myths, images and stereotypes often serve to "naturalize” discourses of exclusion, 
making them seem common sense and apolitical. The goal of critical discourse analysis 
is to "denaturalize" them by revealing the relation of language to power and privilege 
(Riggins 1997b:2).
This concern with the politics of representation extends across different 
disciplines, with critical geography and geopolitics, critical anthropology, critical 
security studies, and feminist IR theory offering useful insights. The following 
discussion focuses on these keys insights as they will later figure in analyses of both neo- 
Malthusian and environmental security discourses.
Territories of Difference
In discourses of security, assumptions about the 'natural' order of things often 
include 'taken for granted' geographical categories and spaces (Dalby forthcoming 2002). 
Responding to the fact that geography as a discipline has often been "blind to the 
politics of its own gaze" (O Tuathail 1996:57), critical geography and geopolitics 
attempt to lay bare the construction of the spatial formulations of global politics. They 
challenge foreign policy makers and politicians' "reduction of complex geographical 
realities to simple strategic entities to facilitate discussion and political action" (Dalby 
forthcoming 2002: draft p. 7).
With the end of the Cold War, these spatial formulations have lost some of the 
simplicity of earlier eras. Between 1875-1945, for example, conventional geopolitics 
focused on natural resource endowments and geography as defining features of a state's 
global status and territorial ambitions, with parallels to Darwinian notions of biological
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competition and the survival of the fittest. During the Cold War years, geopolitics 
shifted away from geographical and environmental determinism to the central 
ideological conflict between capitalist and communist political and economic 
organizations and the "homogenization of global space into 'friendly' and 'threatening' 
blocs" (Agnew and Corbridge 1995:65). Natural idioms did not disappear, however. 
For example, the contagion metaphor, in which the spread of Communist revolution was 
depicted as "a natural epidemiological process" threatening to infect regions in the Third 
World as well as the U.S. itself, was widely used (75).
With the end of the Cold War, conventional geopolitical categories have become 
less fixed, and "the strategic geography of proximity and distance" has become more 
diffuse and less certain, with a consequent blurring of domestic and foreign policy (O 
Tuathail 1996:189). The decline of the old Cold War order, coupled with the rapid pace 
of economic globalization and the transition from Fordist to post-Fordist production 
processes, has led to the phenomenon of "deterritorialization." It is not that the world 
has become a borderless place, but no longer is the territorial state necessarily the key 
referent or site of power. However, as O Tuathail (1996) notes:
every deterritorialization creates the conditions for a 
reterritorialization of order using fragments of the beliefs, customs, 
practices and narratives of the old splintered world order...As one order 
of space unravels, new orders are deployed to retriangulate local 
foregrounds against global backgrounds into new productions of global 
space (230).
Gupta and Ferguson (1997) argue that the malaise associated with 
deterritorialization has had the result of making ideas of culturally and ethnically distinct 
places even more pronounced. This fetishism of the parochial (ancient ethnic hatreds in 
the Balkans, barbarian tribal practices in Africa, America as the true land of freedom12)
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exists in relationship to an equally fetishized global, where global security, global 
environment, the global economy are often invoked to mask continuing relations of 
dominance between North and South.
The salience of old topoi and myths, recapitulated and reconstituted into new 
articulations of national and global security, add a certain deja vu quality to current 
threat representation. With the disappearance of the Soviet Union as Enemy Number 
One, the race card in particular trumps all, as the heart of darkness returns to the Third 
World and there is "a continuing complicity with colonial representations" (Doty 
1996:170)13, whether in the form of the Islamic terrorist, Southern immigrants invading 
our borders, or the perils of overpopulation. Race also forms a critical link between 
external and internal threats, with the jungle of the black urban ghetto serving as the 
Third World within the First.
Most of all it is the dark-skinned immigrant -- whether so-called environmental 
refugee or economic migrant -- who is the lightening rod for malaise and fear. As 
Malkki notes, refugees have long been perceived as "an objectified, undifferentiated 
mass that is meaningful primarily as an aberration of categories and an object of 
'therapeutic interventions';" what is "natural" is sedentarism, and displacement is 
pathological (Malkki 1997:65).14
While refugees are aberrations, immigrants are dangerous. Throughout U.S. 
history successive waves of immigrants have been perceived as threats to both the 
cultural identity and security of the nation, and racial scapegoating has often been quite 
explicit. In his study of recent anti-immigrant rhetoric and policy, Shapiro argues this 
racism is now masked through reference to demographic concerns: "The strange bodies
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have become abstracted and assembled, the threat is to the U.S. demographic entity, a 
'population'" (Shapiro 1997:3).15
However, the "strange bodies" can also be strangely individualized and gendered 
too. In the U.S. the over-fertile Latina immigrant woman draining national resources is a 
symbol utilized by the Right; in Italy the figure of the African female prostitute 
represents dangerous "natural" sexuality out of control, a metaphor for the threat of 
immigrants to the nation's law and order and moral value system (Angel-Ajani 2000).
In international security circles, as we shall see, it is the process of 
demographically-induced migration itself which is the main threat, not just the identities 
of immigrants. Like transparencies, these various images of migration overlay each 
other, forming a particularly powerful meshing of racial, cultural and gender anxieties.
In studying the representation of threats, some texts are clearly more strategic 
than others, Kaplan's "The Coming Anarchy" (1994) being a case in point. Another is 
Lester Brown's 1994 report, "Who Will Feed China?," a neo-Malthusian analysis of how 
China's demand for food will likely lead to global food scarcity (Brown 1994). Boland's 
study of the report examines how it influenced numerous policy debates in both China 
and the U.S., even motivating the American intelligence community to investigate its 
claims through satellite data. "It is the processes of reinscription that makes strategic 
texts politically, economically, and thus ultimately materially significant," Boland writes 
(Boland 2000:71). Moreover, each reinscription takes into account not only the original 
question, in this case who will feed China, but interpretations advanced by other 
commentators, including those in the popular media. Studying the process of 
reinscription, then, is a more dynamic approach than simple textual analysis alone.
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In the politics of representation, one must also be attune to absences as well as 
presences, to what is not said but is implicitly understood. Feminist IR scholarship has 
much to offer in this regard.
Gender, Gender, Everywhere and Nowhere
Critical feminist scholarship has done much to challenge conventional notions of 
security on a number of different levels, including examining how private and public 
gender roles throughout society sustain national security institutions and ideologies 
based on masculinist prerogatives of control; broadening the concept of violence to 
include domestic violence as well as rape as a weapon of war; asking the fundamental 
question of exactly who and what is being secured by national and international security 
policies; and analyzing the implicit gender codes in security discourses (see, for 
example, Dalby 1997, Peterson 1992, Enloe 1989, 1993, 1996, 2000, Tickner 1992, 
Sylvester 1996). As Enloe notes,
The Cold War was created and sustained by the flows of 
gendered forms of power; so too now are its endings ~  at the centers, on 
the margins, along the borders. As in the previous international system, 
of 1946-89, so too today, those forms of power are not always easy to 
see, their contestations not always easy to delineate (Enloe 1996:198).
Enloe (1996) investigates these gendered forms of power primarily through what
she calls "an explicit political accounting" (200), which resembles Foucault's
investigation of the capillary action of power. She looks at the gendered norms which
sustain a certain military or security system not only in the board rooms but the
bedrooms and in the everyday practices of different social classes and their relationships
with each other. While my thesis does not take this approach, it is certainly an
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illuminating one, and it would be interesting to cast a critical gendered eye at the human 
relations which sustain the environment and security field, which is largely a Western 
male enterprise.
Instead my focus is primarily on the gendered content of environmental conflict 
theories, in which gender issues are conspicuous by their absence. This is not surprising 
since "the field of international relations is one of the last social sciences to be touched 
by gender analysis and feminist perspectives," and in fact, the discipline is defined "in 
terms of everything that is not female" (Tickner 1992:8,129). But how exactly does one 
locate those absences, listen to those silences?
In her study of the discourse of North American nuclear defense intellectuals and 
security analysts, Carol Kohn shows how their language is deeply gendered. Anyone 
who dares bring up the human realities behind the abstractions of death and destmction 
is considered a wimp; even tone of voice must be carefully modulated and dispassionate. 
"What gets left out," she writes, "is the emotional, the concrete, the particular, the 
human bodies and their vulnerability, human lives and their subjectivity — all of which 
are marked as feminine in the binary dichotomies of gender discourse" (Kohn 1993:232, 
also see Kohn 1987).
This concern for the particular and the subjective is also missing from the 
environmental security field, as we shall see. But it is less a strategy of cognitive and 
emotional distancing — after all, in comparison to hard-line defense intellectuals, many 
in the field are actually liberals seeking to redefine security -- than an unquestioned 
acceptance of certain stereotypes and assumptions about the Third World. Many of these 
assumptions are deeply gendered, such as the belief that population growth, a.k.a.
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women's fertility, is one of the main causes of poverty, environmental degradation, 
migration and conflict, or the implicit equation of the feminine with Realist notions of 
the unruly state of nature and the dangerous anarchy 'outside' (Runyon 1992).
While tackling these assumptions can help reveal hidden gender biases, it is also 
necessary to look more explicitly at the actual role of gender in the social and economic 
processes environmental conflict theory addresses, such as poverty and environmental 
decline. Here the challenge is to bring gender in a more empirical sense, to critique by 
informing, to not only deconstruct but reconstruct.
In conclusion, the politics of representation must take into account presences as 
well as absences in tracing and exposing the underlying assumptions which make certain 
people, places and phenomena into sources of danger and potential threats. One must 
move beyond text and language, however, to understand how certain perceived threats 
and not others become an object of actual security policy. As Gupta and Ferguson 
(1997) note, the politics of otherness are not reducible to the politics of representation 
alone, and critical discourse analysis only takes one so far in understanding -- and 
challenging -- very real policy outcomes, such as incarceration of illegal immigrants at 
the border. The next part looks at the process by which perceived threats actually end up 
on the security agenda.
V. FROM REPRESENTATION TO SECURITIZATION
. . ..there are not only struggles over security among nations, but also 
struggles over security among notions. Winning the right to define 
security provides not just access to resources but also the authority to 
articulate new definitions and discourses of security (Lipschutz 1995:8).
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This observation by Ronnie Lipschutz points to the competitive nature of the 
security field, where there are winners and losers in the battle to get certain threats on the 
security agenda. In the absence of old Cold War certainties, more players are allowed on 
the battlefield, but the number of winners is not necessarily more than before. What 
accounts for success and what for failure?
Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998) have developed the conceptual framework 
of "securitization" to elaborate the processes by which a particular issue or threat 
becomes an actual object of security policy. They start from the basic premise that 
security is a self-referential practice; it is not necessarily because something is an actual 
existential threat that it gets securitized. First, there needs to be a compelling argument 
(a "securitizing move") why a particular issue is an existential threat requiring 
emergency measures. For the agent, "the task is not to assess some objective threats that 
'really' endanger some object to be defended or secured; rather it is to understand the 
processes of constructing a shared understanding of what is to be considered and 
collectively responded to as a threat" (26).
Discursive competence in what the authors call "the grammar of security"16 
clearly matters, though the securitizing move is only half the story. For full 
securitization to occur there also needs to be an audience which is convinced of the 
argument and the establishment of emergency measures which could be taken to address 
the threat. Securitization, the authors stress, is generally not a positive phenomenon since 
it represents the failure to deal with issues as normal politics. It also tends to reinforce 
state and elite power. During the Cold War the most progressive and transformative 
strategy was to minimize high stakes security and to return contested issues to the
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political realm, unlike today where the trend is to broaden or maximize the security 
agenda. Desecuritizing issues which have been securitized may, in fact, be a worthy 
goal (Waever 1995).
Securitization is not limited only to the state level or conventional defense 
sectors. For example, Buzan, Waever and de Wilde to how intrasocietal violence is 
being securitized in many Western nations. 'Society' becomes the referent object to be 
protected, and extreme measures beyond normal police procedures are taken in the war 
against crime. Waever (1995) notes how in Europe this focus on societal security has 
the potential of legitimizing repressive measures against immigrants and refugees who 
are increasingly criminalized. Indeed, this is the case in Italy and also in the U.S.17
In the environmental sector, Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998) highlight the 
interaction of two different agendas: the scientific one, conducted mainly by scientists 
and research institutions outside government who define and predict threats, and the 
political one which involves governmental and intergovernmental decision-making 
processes and public policies to address environmental concerns. These overlap in the 
media and public debate, and "the scientific agenda underpins securitizing moves" (72). 
Certain scientific actors are also more politically engaged: "these actors will link up with 
the political actors who have specialized in relating to the field of science; thus a chain 
forms from science to politics without the two having to meet in their pure forms" (73). 
Here, the authors are considering mainly natural scientists; arguably, political scientists 
such as Homer-Dixon who have been actively engaged in environmental security 
debates can make the leap from the academy to politics with more ease and less risk.
The securitizing moves associated with environmental issues often revolve
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around perceived threats not just to the environment per se but to human civilization,
• • • • i gposed primarily by die explosive growth in world population and economic activities. 
The existence of an "international environmental epistemic community" which is the 
main drafter of threats means that securitizing moves mainly take place at the global 
systemic level. But while these securitizing moves may raise the profile of 
environmental issues and move them further into the realm of 'high politics,1 the authors 
believe that in general securitization has been limited at this level. Instead, "successful 
securitization has occurred mainly at the local level where the actual disasters take place 
and thresholds of sustainability are passed" (91). However, little concrete evidence is 
offered to support this claim, nor is the politics of expertise adequately interrogated -- for 
example, who determines when thresholds are passed and what are the forces 
responsible. Nevertheless, the authors may well be right that most securitization 
associated with the environment will play out on die local level, coercive conservation 
being a possible case in point.
In drawing the distinction between securitizing moves and actual securitization, 
and the different levels at which securitization takes place, this framework is quite useful 
for looking at the impact of environmental conflict ideas on policy. But like the other 
approaches described in this chapter, it is not sufficient unto itself. In particular, it 
neglects the unintelligible consequences of certain securitizing moves and the interaction 
between moves in different fields. For example, there are certain overlaps and synergies 
between "societal securitization1 and "environmental securitization," particularly where 
they reinforce fear and criminalization of immigrants. And it could be that 
"environmental securitization," even though it happens less in practice, is used as a
62
justification for policies of convergence where, for example, development and 
environmental aid is linked to foreign policy and defense objectives.
In the next part, I conclude by looking how the varied approaches explored in 
this introduction inform and guide the main body of the thesis.
VI. CONCLUSION
The following five chapters all address in some way the complex relationship 
between knowledge, power and policy as evidenced in the evolution and impact of 
environmental conflict ideas. Because neo-Malthusianism is such a strong influence, 
both in material and ideological terms, Chapter Two, "Malleability and Mappability: The 
Persistence of Neo-Malthusianism in the United States," examines how population 
control became an important feature of American foreign policy toward the Third World 
in the post-World War Two period. The chapter explores the central role played by 
private foundations in forging an academic and policy elite in the population field, 
creating a 'hegemonic bloc' which would come to exercise considerable power within the 
U.S. government and international institutions. However, the rise of neo-Malthusianism 
cannot be understood in material terms alone; its underlying assumptions, complexity of 
motives, and intersections with Cold War geopolitics, development planning, survivalist 
environmentalism, and women's rights have made it a particularly powerful discourse 
with considerable influence not just on policy but popular opinion. It is a living, 
breathing, constantly adapting discourse in the Foucaultian sense, constituted by specific 
agents but constituting them as well.
Chapter Three, "Tropical Tropes and Barren Slopes: Degradation Narratives and
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Environmental Security,” traces a particular neo-Malthusian narrative of the Third World 
in the evolution of the environment and security field and environmental conflict ideas. 
The belief that population pressures cause poverty and resource scarcities, which then 
induce migration and violent conflict, is an unexamined assumption in much of the 
literature. Along with related narratives such as the youth bulge, it exercises an 
important function in the post-Cold War production and representation of threats. It is 
less a discourse than a hegemonic myth or topos which naturalizes and homogenizes 
complex political and economic processes.
In Chapter Four, "Environmental Conflict: Wrong Turns on the Causal 
Pathway?," I tackle the degradation narrative head-on by presenting an in-depth critique 
of Homer-Dixon’s model of environmental conflict, which has become a strategic text. 
Unlike some post-structuralists, I do not believe it is enough to show how certain 
assumptions or discourses have come into being in order to discredit them. Instead, it is 
also necessary to show how they are empirically wrong and to point to alternative 
methods of analysis. Here I rely less on the approaches discussed in this chapter than on 
literature on the political economy of development, conflict and the environment.
Chapter Five, "Circumscribed Heterodoxy: An Account of Thomas Homer- 
Dixon's Three Major Projects," draws primarily on archival research and interviews to 
bring into focus the actors and interests which were essential to his success as well as the 
larger political climate in which his projects operated. In particular, it highlights the 
critical role of private foundations and powerful personalities in providing material 
support and policy venues. The chapter also addresses the phenomenon I call 
"circumscribed heterodoxy," in which the illusion of diversity can mask a politics of
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uniformity, both at the project and policy level.
Finally, Chapter Six, 'Truths and Their Consequences: Reflections on the Impact 
of Environmental Conflict Ideas," considers the intentional and unintentional 
consequences of Homer-Dixon's ideas in order to gain greater insight into the processes 
of knowledge production, diffusion and function. It analyzes the impact of 
environmental conflict ideas on key U.S. government and nongovernmental institutions 
and the nature of the knowledge communities which formed around them. It anticipates 
their future impact in relationship to evolving trends in threat representation and 
environmental surveillance and securitization. It concludes with some thoughts on the 
role of the critical intellectual in challenging powerful ideas and their present or potential 
effects. Acting as a critic, however, can sometimes make one complicit in the continued 
expansion of a discourse by reinforcing it as the essential referent. How one engages in 
criticism strategically is not only an intellectual but a political challenge.
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Endnotes to Chapter One
1-. One can of course argue that sex, particularly the control of female sexuality, resided 
at that juncture long before in so-called "traditional" societies; what distinguishes the 
modem period is the widespread dispersion and institutionalization of controls and their 
new-found scientific legitimacy.
2. This article is one of the clearest and most comprehensive I have read on the various 
social science approaches towards science and policy-making.
3. Timura contends that "this vagueness postulate" can be applied more generally to 
other environmental discourses. The environment itself has become a global "master 
narrative;" the endangered environment is seen as an object both threatened by human 
action and requiring human action to protect it (Harper 2001). "A central reason why the 
environment narrative has achieved its recent "master" status has much to do with the 
underdetermined, open meanings of many of its core concepts" (Timura 2001:105). For 
more discussion of environmental narratives, see the July 2001 issue of Anthropological 
Quarterly 74(3).
4. However, this is not so much a new relationship as an extension of an older one. In his 
history of U.S. policy elites, Smith notes that
social science inquiry, perpetually insecure about its scientific 
status, has historically been guided by a succession of metaphors drawn 
from the hard sciences. Those metaphors have both shaped the methods 
of investigation and held out the disputable promise that practical 
benefits would accrue from social research. Whether social scientists 
have seen themselves as comparable to medical researchers and public 
health doctors or to physicists and engineers, they have typically looked 
to the natural and physical sciences to borrow models for their work 
(Smith 1991:14).
5'. Regarding the latter, Fischer argues that Lyndon Johnson's Great Society ushered in a 
new period in American politics where liberal reform was professionalized and social 
science experts given a larger role in defining and articulating socio-economic problems 
and their solutions. Conservatives soon caught on to the power wielded by these 
supposedly 'apolitical' experts, and began a counter-offensive which entailed the 
establishment of a multi-million dollar network of think tanks, policy institutes and 
academic centers. Today, as a result, "the agenda for policy consideration is increasingly 
shaped and approved by the private deliberation of elites outside the government" before 
it enters die more formal political process (Fischer 1993:33).
6'. Debates over the extent to which actors constitute discourses and structures, or 
discourses and structures constitute actors, are also found elsewhere in the literature. In 
her 'social structural' approach, Finnemore (1996) explores how norms in particular can 
constitute, create and revise actors and interests. She argues that the constructivist
project needs more conceptual clarity, and should "provide substantive arguments about 
which norms matter, as well as how, where, and why they matter" (130).
7'. In his book on discourse analysis of French and British foreign policy on European 
integration, Larsen examines in more detail the different concepts of discourse, noting, 
for example, how a particular linguistic discourse can be part of a longer-term, broader 
discursive formation (a la Foucault) around certain societal themes. Because he 
undertakes more of a linguistic analysis of foreign policy discourses and focuses more 
on the state as an actor, his work is not as relevant to the formation of knowledge 
communities (Larsen 1997).
8 . See, for example, articles in Apthorpe and Gasper, eds. (1996) and Moore and 
Schmitz, eds. (1995). Geof Wood's earlier work on labelling in development policy 
(1985) is an important precursor to this work and moreover, more explicitly 
acknowledges power relations: the ability of some people to impose labels on others. 
Escobar (1995) brings a distinctive post-modernist eye to development discourse, though 
he and others writing in a similar vein have been criticized for not adequately 
recognizing the diversity of development discourses.
9. Ford built this cadre overseas as well. For an account of its role in Africa, see Berman 
(1982).
10'. According to Fischer (1993), this liberal reform strategy had five basic steps:
(1) a group of experts, mainly social scientists, is assembled by a 
reform-minded president; (2) the experts devote their time to defining 
and articulating a social or economic problem and spelling out the need 
for specific social reforms; (3) a larger group of journalists, 
philanthropists, and business leaders is then gathered to discuss the 
problem and to develop a consensus capable of broadening the reform 
coalition; (4) following these exchanges, a report is produced containing 
all the assumptions, information and arguments on which the reform 
program would be designed and implemented; and (5) finally, with 
considerable fanfare the report is communicated to the public as a reform 
agenda from the "pulpit" of the presidency and through the mass media 
(26).
n \ Stone (1999) defines think tanks as "independent (and usually private) policy 
research institutes containing people involved in studying a particular policy area or a 
broad range of policy issues, actively seeking to educate or advise policy makers and the 
public through a number of channels. Generally, these organizations are private bodies - 
- legally organized as charities or non-profit organizations -- but some are semi- 
governmental. These organizations are found at the intersection of academia and 
politics, and they often seek to make connection between ideas and policy" (3).
According to Stone, think tanks are becoming increasingly transnational, part of a global 
knowledge industry, but still beholden to a large extent on the support of private 
foundations.
12. Campbell (1998) argues that spatial notion of America as the land of freedom (and 
formerly frontier) has superseded a more complex historical understanding of the 
evolution of the nation. In the wake of the events of September 11, 2001, this reification 
of a unique spacial identity seems to be intensifying, not diminishing.
1 -i
'. Doty (1996) notes that despite the continuing salience of race, it has received little 
attention in mainstream IR scholarship.
14. Malkki (1997) explores further how these views of refugees are often reinforced 
through the use of botanical metaphors as part of the process of naturalization.
15. Racism is also masked by discussions of the different (and threatening) culture of 
immigrants. See, for example, van Dijk (1997).
16'. This "grammar of security" involves following the basic plot line of constructing an 
existential threat, projecting a point of no return, and elaborating a possible way out.
17\ Angel-Ajani (2000) has studied this phenomenon in Italy where the linking of race 
with cultural and national difference "leads to ideas that link particular forms of 
criminality to gender and country of origin, as if it is the nature of a person to commit a 
certain crime because of their cultural background or nationality" (343). In recent years, 
the Italian prison population as a whole has risen dramatically, with a rising proportion 
of inmates from outside the European Community. (Between 1991-92 alone, the figure 
rose from 5 percent to over 20 percent.) In the U.S. the two fastest growing prison 
populations are women of color and immigrants of color, and law enforcement is 
becoming increasingly militarized, with expanded cooperation between local and state 
policing agencies and units of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (Bhattachaijee 
2001).
1 8 r p |. The authors note, for example, that environmentalists have taken over the anti- 
nuclear lobby's concern about the possible loss of civilization. See Chapter Three for 
further discussion of this point.
68
CHAPTER TWO
Malleability and Mappability:
The Persistence o f Neo-Malthusianism in the United States
We reached the west bank of the river [in Dhaka] at 
dusk...The sand swarmed with people. Rockefeller said nothing for at 
least twenty minutes. He stood beside an over-turned oil drum, 
confronted by the chaos so remote from the orderly presentations on the 
56th floor of the R.C.A. building. Here at last was what he had come to 
see, the plain reality of the so-called "population explosion." No 
statistics, no high-flown sentiments, no handsomely-illustrated brochures 
or predictions of disaster for mankind; just a lot of people pushed down 
to the edge of a warm river.
"The numbers," he said, "the sheer numbers of it...the 
quality, you see, goes down."
— Lewis Lapham, 1963 
(cited in Harr and Johnson 1991:81-82)
For the last four decades, population control has been a remarkably stable feature 
of US foreign policy toward the Third World. Fear of overpopulation has also shaped, 
and continues to shape, the world view and environmental consciousness of many 
Americans. The power and persistence of neo-Malthusianism are all the more striking 
given the shaky theoretical and empirical foundations on which it is based.
Challenges to neo-Malthusianism have come from the Right and the Left, from 
feminist and Third Worldist movements, but none have proved strong enough yet to 
dislodge it from U.S. foreign policy and public opinion. Even during the administrations 
of Ronald Reagan and George Bush, Sr., when the anti-abortion movement accelerated 
its attack on international family planning assistance and the libertarian Right declared
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population growth a neutral phenomenon, population control continued to be a priority 
of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). In fact, it may be that 
opposition from the Right gave neo-Malthusianism a new lease on life by allowing it to 
appear progressive by comparison.
Neo-Malthusianism has an almost religious power in the United States. It may 
lack a church, but it has numerous well-funded institutional organs, both private and 
public, to practice and spread the faith not only domestically, but around the world. On a 
conceptual level, it has developed a canon which is strict enough to resist challenges, but 
malleable enough to adapt to new constituencies and issues. It has also generated 
images and tropes which resonate deeply in the psyches of its believers. If God is not on 
its side, Nature surely is. Eve is black, primitive, and pregnant, and her reproduction is 
the Original Sin.
There is no simple explanation for how neo-Malthusianism rose from the status 
of a minor social movement in the beginning of the 20th century to a major public policy 
concern after World War Two. Numerous histories have been written about this 
progression, and my intent in this chapter is not to reinvent the wheel. Instead, I attempt 
to tease out the central actors, interests, and ideas which have made neo-Malthusianism 
such a dynamic discourse, in the multiple senses of that word. It is also a highly 
mappable discourse; it can be traced on to almost any social issue.
The chapter is organized into seven parts. Part One presents a short history of the 
diverse interests that came together to form the neo-Malthusian movement before World 
War Two. Part Two considers the consolidation of demography as a policy science and 
why methodologically neo-Malthusianism was able to take root in American social
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science. Part Three charts the successful rise of the population establishment, and Part 
Four addresses why American environmentalism, both ideologically and strategically, 
has been so influenced by neo-Malthusianism. Part Five looks at changing neo- 
Malthusian perceptions of women, with particular reference to the 1994 U.N. 
International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD). Part Six considers 
neo-Malthusianism in the current era of declining population growth, and Part Seven 
offers some concluding remarks.
Since it is impossible to cover all this ground in great depth, I am purposefully 
concentrating on those aspects of the history which shed the greatest light on the origins 
of the degradation narrative and the environment and security field, the subject of the 
next chapter.
/. QUALITY AND QUANTITY
One of the reasons neo-Malthusianism is such a malleable and mappable 
discourse is that the word 'population' itself has no one fixed meaning. Duden charts its 
evolution from a 'verbal noun'- "the generative, homesteading action of real people 
populating a territory" — at the end of the nineteenth century to its eventual designation 
as an aggregate, statistical entity, human or non-human, animate or inanimate, which can 
be observed and studied according to certain mles of probability in both the natural and 
the social sciences (Duden 1992:147-9).
Because animals, plants and people can all be classified and observed as 
populations, and because population is fundamentally to do with reproduction, 
population is a term which allows biological and social processes to co-mingle and 
conflate. It is also loose enough to embrace issues of both quality and quantity. It is this
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interaction between quality and quantity which characterizes the rise of the neo- 
Malthusian movement in the U.S. in the first part of the 20th century.
As Hodgson (1991) notes, concerns about population which rose in this period 
were as much about value considerations as demographic trends. More important than 
the fear of overpopulation per se was the fear of the changing composition of the 
American population. He uses the founding meeting of the Population Association of 
America (PAA) in December 1930 as a lens through which to view the diverse 
ideological trends which came together, somewhat uncomfortably, under one tent. He 
identifies four main factions: the immigration restrictionists, who worried that a new 
generation of non-Anglo-Saxon immigrants would alter the American 'character'; the 
eugenics movement which blamed a whole range of social ills on heredity and sought to 
limit the breeding of the unfit (and increase the breeding of the fit); birth control 
advocates such as Margaret Sanger; and population scientists from diverse academic 
disciplines.
There was considerable overlap between these factions. Immigrations 
restrictionists were often eugenicists, the birth control movement itself had abandoned its 
feminist roots for an alliance with the eugenics movement (Gordon 1977), and many 
population scientists were not immune from eugenic and racist thinking. What Hodgson 
terms "biological Malthusianism" was more prevalent at this time than neo-Malthusian 
worries about the aggregate impact of population growth on resource availability. As the 
Caldwells write, "It was the differential rate of reproduction by social class and 
supposedly related inherent characteristics of intelligence and character that had brought 
most of the real professionals to the study of fertility" (Caldwell and Caldwell 1986:7).
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The New York University sociologist, Henry Pratt Fairchild, a leading academic racist of 
the period, became the PAA's first president (Donaldson 1990:20), and the mission 
statement adopted at the first meeting called for dealing with America's population 
problem "in both its quantitative and qualitative aspects" (Hodgson 1991:9), language 
which remains to this day.
The relative weakness of neo-Malthusianism in this period was due to a number 
of factors. Barrett notes the difficulty of overcoming a long history of belief in the 
power of a large population. This problem could not be surmounted until collective 
welfare became defined as an aggregate of individual welfare and economic well-being 
made the main measure of national strength (Barrett 1995:34). The neo-Malthusian 
movement was also initially weaker in the U.S. than in Europe, and in the U.S. the 
economic and sexual radicalism of some of the early birth control proponents did not 
appeal to academic and policy elites, nor to the suffragist movement which wanted to 
present itself as socially acceptable. The famous American radical Emma Goldman 
supported a sort of socialist neo-Malthusianism, urging the working class to use 
contraception in order to restrict the reproduction of new workers and thereby increase 
its negotiating power with the capitalists. Like Goldman, Margaret Sanger's support for 
birth control was initially framed in radical terms, and included calls for sexual liberation 
(Hodgson and Watkins 1997, Gordon 1977).
Lack of suffragist support, coupled with increasing state repression against 
socialists before and during World War I, helped to dissipate this radical tendency in the 
American birth control movement. However, concern for the welfare of the poor, 
especially poor women, remained a recurring theme. The eugenics movement was much
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more successful in securing establishment patronage; its funders included the Carnegie 
and Rockefeller foundations and the wealthy Kellogg and Harriman families. World 
War One further eroded support for neo-Malthusianism because governments wanted to 
increase their birth rates to compensate for heavy human losses and to rebuild national 
strength (Barrett 1995:138).
To build their fledgling movement, more conservative neo-Malthusians made an 
alliance with Margaret Sanger's "birth controllers," and they joined forces in 1922 to 
hold the Fifth International Neo-Malthusian and Birth Control Conference which 
included representatives from Asia. Birth control was presented as a way to increase 
living standards in the poorest and most congested parts of the region. Attendees also 
advocated a "negative eugenics" in which contraception could decrease the number of 
"defectives" from inferior stocks (Barrett 1995:140).
In order to obtain what Barrett calls "world-polity endorsement" for their cause 
(162), neo-Malthusians began to move away from individual welfare arguments for 
population control towards rationales based on security and 'scientific' management. The 
delegates at the Fifth International Conference directed an appeal to the League of 
Nations to form a commission to study birth control because population pressure "was 
one of the principal and most fruitful causes of war" (142). This reasoning largely 
derived from the concept of Lebensraum, the notion that population pressure could force 
nations to expand beyond their borders to find adequate living space (Wilmoth and Ball
1992). American demographer Warren Thompson warned in 1929 that population 
pressures in Japan, Italy and Germany could cause another war (Donaldson 1990).
Future neo-Malthusian conferences framed population in a 'scientific' light,
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discussing, for example, how to determine a scientific "population optimum" and the 
nature of the relationship between population and resources. This emphasis on science 
led neo-Malthusians closer to eugenic interests, since at the time eugenics was the main 
'scientific* venue for population studies. In 1928 the Milbank Fund provided support for 
the formation of the International Union for the Scientific Investigation of Population 
Problems (IUSIPP), after which no further international neo-Malthusian conferences 
were held. In 1935 IUSIPP organized a conference in Berlin which was largely 
sympathetic to the eugenic theories of the Third Reich. The president of the meeting, 
Eugene Fischer, ended his introductory speech with a rousing tribute to Hitler (Barrett 
1995).
Received wisdom has it that the Nazi atrocities ultimately discredited eugenics 
and that its influence greatly diminished in the post-World War Two period. However, 
in her study of the Rockefeller Foundation and the rise of the new biology, Kay argues 
that eugenic ideas of selective breeding continued to remain central to the elite vision of 
scientific and social control of human behavior after the war, and still exert considerable 
influence today. "Dredged from the linguistic quagmire of social control, a new 
eugenics, empowered by representations of life supplied by the new biology, came to 
rest in safety on the high ground of medical discourse and latter-day rhetoric of 
population control" (Kay 1993:277).
A number of prominent post-war population alarmists, notably William Vogt and 
Garrett Hardin, openly espoused eugenic ideas. "There seems to be little danger of 
society's being deprived of something valuable by the sterilization of all feeble-minded 
individuals," Hardin wrote in his 1949 biology textbook (Hardin 1949:612, cited in
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Chase 1977:374). More recently, Hardin has received funding from the Pioneer Fund, 
the major financier of eugenics research in North America (Hardin 1993). Scientific 
racism did not die during World War II, it only went into hibernation (Chase 1977), and 
in fact, today it is still operative in certain conservative population and environment 
circles (Bhatia 2002, Southern Poverty Law Center 2002).1
As Furedi notes, apprehensions about population quality often exist in a 
"dynamic relation" with concerns about population quantity (Furedi 1997:19). I would 
also argue that these apprehensions are often implicit, even if not explicitly stated, in 
much neo-Malthusian literature. It is important not to lose sight of this in considering the 
rise of neo-Malthusianism as a major policy concern.
II. DEMOGRAPHY AND SCIENTISM
In the aftermath of World War Two, the political climate became far more 
favorable to the spread of neo-Malthusian ideas. While the expansionary drive of the 
Axis powers gave some credence to the concept of Lebensraum, the nuclear bomb at 
least partially put to rest the belief that military strength is mainly a function of 
population size (Barrett 1995).2 Decolonization, the New Deal legacy of social 
planning, and the need to rebuild war-shattered economies and create new mechanisms 
of global governance, such as the U.N. and the Bretton Woods institutions, all fostered a 
new culture of modernization in which concerns about demographic trends figured more 
prominently. Meanwhile, it was objectively the case that population growth rates were 
rising in many countries, particularly in Asia, and the 'baby boom' was beginning in the
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U.S. Increasingly, neo-Malthusian concepts concerning the relationship between 
population and resources became the primary perspective on population (Barrett 1995).
In recent years a body of critical literature has emerged on the evolution of 
demographic transition theory and its key role in moving neo-Malthusianism from the 
margins of the U.S. foreign policy establishment into the corridors of power. This 
literature also provides important insights into the critical interface between academia 
and public policy in the U.S. and the role of strategic philanthropy in the creation of 
expert communities.
Transitioning the Demographic Transition
Although earlier versions existed before World War Two (Szreter 1993, 
Hodgson 1983), demographer Frank Notestein at Princeton University is largely 
regarded as the father of modem demographic transition theory. Notestein was based at 
the Office of Population Research (OPR) at Princeton University, which was to become 
a key institutional link between academic demography and population policymaking.
The OPR was founded in 1936 with the help of the millionaire eugenicist 
Frederick Osbom who secured funding from the Milbank Fund. Later patrons included 
the Carnegie Corporation, and especially in the post-war years, the Rockefeller 
Foundation (Ross 1998, Szreter 1993). From its inception, the OPR was focused on the 
demographic dimensions of foreign policy issues, and during the war the U.S. State 
Department was its most important client (Szreter 1993).
In the early 1940s, Notestein and fellow demographer Kingsley Davis articulated 
a version of demographic transition theory closely tied to the process of industrialization. 
In the first stages of industrialization countries were likely to experience rapid
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population growth since fertility remained high while mortality levels fell due to rising 
living standards and technological and infrastructural improvements. As 
industrialization and modernization proceeded, fertility levels would also decline 
because of urbanization, changing family structures, consumerism, individualism and the 
decline of fatalism. Notestein first publicly presented this theory in 1944 to a meeting 
of planners concerned with the problems of organizing postwar food supplies and trade. 
Like Rostow’s stages of growth, the theory fit well with the imperatives of a liberal, 
democratic, free-market reconstructionist strategy: Westem-style industrialization was 
the key to solving the deep economic and political problems faced by poor countries 
emerging from the yoke of colonialism (Szreter 1993). Grounded in U.S. triumphalism, 
it was an optimistic formulation,
a recipe for promoting the development of Asia, Africa and Latin 
America that confirmed both the superiority of the Western way of life -  
after all, it was this, the demographers argued, that had brought fertility 
rates down — and the wisdom of exporting Western practices to the less 
fortunate parts of the world (Greenhalgh 1996:37).
Within the space of a few years, however, the theory underwent a major 
transformation. By the early 1950s, Notestein and colleagues began to identify rapid 
population growth in poor countries as a serious brake on development, and fertility 
control as a prerequisite for, not consequence of, successful industrialization. The focus 
shifted from social change and the structural determinants of fertility to individual 
reproductive behavior. Peasants were discovered to be rational beings who just needed 
appropriate instrumentalities to reduce their family size (Hodgson 1983).
Why this transformation took place is a subject of much discussion among 
historians of demography. Szreter underlines the importance of a trip Frank Notestein
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made to the Far East in 1948 as part of a team sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation, 
after which he came to believe in government-sponsored birth control policies. Even 
more influential, Szreter argues, were the victory of the Chinese Revolution and the 
testing of the first Soviet atomic bomb in 1949: "In the course of late 1948 and 1949, 
those in the United States still dreaming of a globe emerging from colonial servitude into 
a regime of liberal democratic free trade were awakening to a nightmare, experiencing a 
strong sense of loss of control in a dangerous and alien world" (Szreter 1993:676).
The U.S. policy establishment now began to consider underdevelopment in 
peasant societies such as China as creating conditions conducive to Communism, and 
wanted to find ways to alleviate those conditions as rapidly as possible. The old model 
of industrial gradualism no longer worked. Hodgson notes that once the Soviet Union 
became the enemy, it was also difficult to sustain the initial version of demographic 
transition theory since the Soviet Union was the prime example of planned and rapid 
industrialization (Hodgson 1988:46).
Most observers agree that the transition in transition theory has to be viewed in 
light of the tension between demography as an academic discipline and policy science. 
Neither version of demographic transition theory holds up very well to historical 
research and empirical scrutiny, yet both exercised tremendous influence.
Demeny explains how historically demography has always bridged the gap 
between social science and social engineering since it originated in the art of "political 
arithmetic" and its main base has been government agencies interested in statistical 
information (Demeny 1988:10). However, how it got from there to playing the role of 
"handmaiden in family planning programs" (24) has to do with the close connections
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between corporate wealth, private foundations, government agencies and academic 
centers in setting the U.S. policy agenda. The creation of the Princeton OPR itself is a 
prime example of this phenomenon.
Demeny and others me the way American demography, with a few exceptions, 
sacrificed academic rigor and objectivity to the needs of its paymasters. This partly 
results from institutional insecurity: originally, demography was not an academic 
discipline and had to construct itself as a science. Without assured support from the 
academy, it became dependent on its major clients -- governments, foundations and 
international agencies — for funding. According to Greenhalgh, "demography has had to 
operate primarily as a policy-relevant field, tailoring its work, and its theories, to the 
needs of its clientele’s agenda for action" (Greenhalgh 1996:31). With the advent of the 
Cold War, that agenda was increasingly framed in terms of crisis, especially in Asia, and 
crisis research, as Hodgson notes, favors policy research over stricter academic treatment 
(Hodgson 1983:2).
The new version of demographic transition theory helped provide the ideological 
rationale for U.S. intervention in Third World population issues. In turn, the growth of a 
"population establishment" provided numerous career opportunities for demographers 
and the funding necessary to set up academic/policy centers for population teaching and 
research in a number of U.S. universities as well as overseas (see Part Three). This 
symbiotic relationship mitigated against critical thinking. In the scathing words of 
Demeny, demography's subservience to population orthodoxy and the family planning 
industry generated research "that the sponsor already knows to be revealed truth. 
Research so characterized is an oxymoron" (Demeny 1988:29).
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Yet even if demography had been more independent, there were elements in its 
construction as a science which would have probably proved compatible with neo- 
Malthusianism. In fact, many of the assumptions and methods of mainstream American 
social science lent themselves well to the new population orthodoxy.
Madness in the Method 
In her book on the origins of American social science, Dorothy Ross identifies 
scientism as one of its central flaws. "What is so marked about American social science 
is the degree to which it is modeled on the natural rather than the historical sciences and 
imbedded in the classical ideology of liberal individualism" (Ross 1991:xiii). Positivist 
scientific method became the chief mode of inquiry, an approach which ensured distance 
from political controversy and encouraged production of knowledge geared toward 
prediction and control. At the same time history was transformed into 'natural history', a 
history of cycles, types and species, and metaphors of nature were used to describe 
human actions. As noted in the previous chapter, foundation investments, particularly 
from the Rockefeller Foundation, strengthened the professional base of scientism.
As one of the most quantitative social sciences, demography was heavily infused 
with scientism. Szreter analyzes how the "covering laws" school of thought influenced 
Notestein and the field in general. This deductivist school
assumes that all relevant initial conditions circumscribing the 
subject of study can be specified in advance and it can therefore be 
conceived as a closed system. The methodology is then capable of 
yielding calibrated information on the mutual cause and effect 
relationships between the entities in the system. It recognizes no 
distinction in principle between the scientific study of social and of 
natural phenomena. It asserts that explanation and prediction are 
essentially two sides of the same coin, and therefore to explain gives the 
power to control (Szreter 1993:690).
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Mainly employing techniques of statistical association, which became ever more 
possible and popular with the development of computer technology, this approach led to 
a seriously circumscribed, ahistorical view of fertility change conducive to neo- 
Malthusian over-simplification; it was not capable of dealing with "radically 
indeterminate phenomena and relationships" such as values, motives and social roles 
(692). Its strength was its kinship with policy science and its utility to policymakers 
seeking quantifiable predictive information on which to base interventions. Elements 
of American political science also lent themselves well to neo-Malthusianism. Its 'natural 
history' approach to social systems gave rise to simplistic typologies: the modernizing 
elites, the traditional peasants, the urban mobs. In keeping with elitist theories of 
democracy, personalities and cultures were viewed as the main obstacles to change, not 
economic and political institutions. Yet change itself was problematic. Failing to 
acknowledge that the rise of capitalism in the West had led to intensified social conflict, 
mainstream American political scientists were deeply hostile to mass-based political 
movements in the Third World. Their conservative vision of liberal democratic 
equilibrium did not include mass participation.
This fear of participation had both qualitative and quantitative dimensions. 
American political scientists tended to view the mobs and masses as largely 
undifferentiated, irrational and politically untrustworthy. Only the elites, who were 
called upon to manage social change, had positive political agency. The increasing 
numbers of the unruly masses, meanwhile, threatened the adequacy of political 
institutions to contain their demands (Gendzier 1985). Hence, fear of the masses could 
easily translate into concerns about population growth.
82
Although economists proved somewhat more resistant to neo-Malthusianism 
(Furedi 1997), critics pointed to a "a powerful cult of population control" emerging in 
the profession in the 1960s (Wilbur 1979:55). This 'cult' had three central hypotheses: 1) 
the rate of growth of population and per capita GNP are inversely related; 2) large 
expenditures on preventing births make sense economically; and 3) investments in 
population control are much more productive than investments in direct production. 
Although these hypotheses were later challenged, they exercised considerable influence 
on aid agencies and made their way into many introductory textbooks on development 
economics.
According to Wilbur, methodologically, economics has certain limitations which 
allowed neo-Malthusianism to take hold in the discipline to the extent that it did. Like 
other American social sciences, economics is heavily influenced by natural science: 
hypotheses are deduced from a theory or model, and then predictions based on the 
hypothesis are tested against empirical evidence. But unlike natural scientists, 
economists are insulated from the failure of their predictions by the ceteris paribus clause 
and by fact that researchers can always blame their data or massage it if the results do 
not come out right.
The structure of neo-Malthusian theory makes it even harder to prove its 
propositions false:
Its survival and attractiveness derive from the theory's tendency 
to shift from interesting empirical, though false or misleading, 
propositions to true, though empty tautologies. For example, from the 
truism that population growth is limited by food supply, Malthus 
deduced the empirical proposition that population growth is regulated by 
the food supply. However, when confronted with evidence that the food 
supply was actually growing faster than population, he retreated to a 
comparison of potential differences: in the long run population has a
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tendency to grow faster than the means of subsistence. Thus an apparent 
falsification can always be sidestepped by comparing a long run abstract 
potentiality (population growth) with concrete data (food supply, per 
capita GNP, etc.)...This ability to avoid falsification (empirical refutation) 
certainly accounts for some of the continued vitality of Malthusianism 
(Wilbur 1979:58).
Wilbur also notes how ideologically, the combination of neo-Malthusianism with 
competitive economic theory led to a focus on individual and household behavior: 
people are poor because they made the wrong fertility choices, and therefore, economic 
institutions are not to blame.
While the field of demography was its main site, the cross-disciplinary appeal of 
neo-Malthusianism helped it become part of more general development theory, which in 
turn had its own normative and methodological predispositions towards the focus on 
population (see next chapter). Scholarly success boosted political success and vice 
versa, as neo-Malthusianism came not only to reside in the ivory tower but the White 
House. The creation and influence of the politically powerful population establishment 
is the subject of Part Three.
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III. THE RISE OF THE POPULATION ESTABLISHMENT
Numerous accounts of the formation of the population establishment have been 
written from a variety of perspectives (e.g., Barrett 1995, Demerath 1976, Donaldson 
1990, Gordon 1977, Mass 1976, Piotrow 1973, Warwick 1982). Rather than try to 
reproduce that history, here I highlight the key processes which made population into a 
major public policy concern in the U.S., processes which are also relevant to the 
evolution and impact of environmental conflict ideas. These are: 1) strategic 
philanthropy and institution building; 2) message dissemination; 3) mappability; 4) 
organizational diversification; and 5) the convenience of mixed motives.
Strategic Philanthropy and Institution Building
Private foundations, most notably Rockefeller and Ford, were instrumental in 
setting up the initial institutional structure of the population establishment. After World 
War Two, both John D. Rockefeller III and the Rockefeller Foundation became deeply 
involved in the Princeton OPR, centering their interest mainly on the Far East (Szreter
1993). When the foundation proved more reluctant to become directly involved in 
fertility control, JDR III pushed ahead, calling a meeting of thirty prominent U.S. 
conservationists, Planned Parenthood leaders, demographers and development experts to 
a population conference in Williamsburg, Virginia in 1952. At this conference the 
Population Council was bom, ultimately merging demographic, contraceptive and policy 
research into one premier institution.
During the 1950s, the Ford Foundation concentrated its population assistance on 
the Council, providing about half of this budget until the mid-1960s. Ford created its 
own official Population Program in 1963, though before that time it had started to give
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family planning aid to India. According to the Caldwells, India played a unique role in 
promoting interest in population issues. Not only did the country have a sophisticated 
census system, but neo-Malthusian ideas had a long history there and had taken root 
among the Indian elite. Presiding over the Sixth International Conference on Planned 
Parenthood in Delhi in 1959, Nehru emphasized India's population problem and the need 
for a major family planning effort (Caldwell and Caldwell 1986, Caldwell 1998). In 
1952 India became the first country in the world to launch an official family planning 
program.
The most enduring contribution of the Ford and Rockefeller foundations to the 
population field was the successful creation of an international academic and policy elite 
invested in fertility reduction as a national development strategy. One does not have to 
be a conspiracy theorist to recognize the way this network of experts was intentionally 
created. Foundation money spawned the establishment of population centers at major 
U.S. universities. These centers existed in a semi-autonomous relationship with more 
traditional academic departments such as sociology. Recipients of funding included the 
Universities of Michigan, Wisconsin, Chicago and North Carolina; Johns Hopkins and 
Harvard public health schools; the London School of Economics and Political Science; 
and the Australian National University. Population centers were also set up in a number 
of developing countries, though the main trend was to bring foreign students to the U.S. 
on fellowships. The availability of fellowships directed U.S. students toward the 
population field as well (Caldwell and Caldwell 1986).
This strategy proved highly successful. Many of the experts who played decisive 
roles in persuading their governments to embrace neo-Malthusian policies had studied in
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Ford Foundation-funded population centers. While the courses offered there persuaded 
students of the urgent need to reduce birth rates, the centers also
quite clearly developed a ’hidden curriculum.' The interaction 
between students and faculty and between students themselves, as well as 
the very fact of the programs, led most students into a stronger feeling 
that they had possessed on arrival that they were part of a movement to 
reduce fertility levels. Some also saw it as a new and successful 
profession but even they almost always experienced ideological 
conversion...(Caldwell and Caldwell 1986:140).
Greenhalgh (1996) is far more critical of the population centers than the 
Caldwells. While the centers' independent stature within the university permitted 
demographers to blend academic and applied research, their relative isolation reduced 
the possibility of contact with other scholars and intellectual developments in the social 
sciences. For example, most demographers were not exposed to critiques of 
modernization theory in the late 1960s and 1970s. The centers also allowed donors to 
channel funds to Third World family planning efforts in a more surreptitious manner, 
thereby avoiding charges of U.S. imperialism.
While private foundations were instrumental in creating the institutions of 
"ideological conversion," they also were adept at packaging and promoting the message 
so it appealed to a broader audience.
Message Dissemination
Most large private philanthropies in the U.S. are very skilled at the art of the 
report, and the population field is no exception. An early example is the report produced 
at the end of the Rockefeller team's trip to East Asia in 1948, which was distributed 
widely to government officials, foundation directors, military officers and leading
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academics. Written in subdued scholarly language, the report nevertheless conveyed a 
sense of crisis about the growing problem of population pressure in the region. As 
Sharpless notes:
This scenario became a common ritual throughout the 1950s.
There would be a number of foundation-sponsored "demographic 
missions" to Third World countries led by prestigious demographers.
The U.S. government, while keeping its distance, would quietly assist 
them in their passage. They would meet with high-level officials 
highlighting the importance of the "population problem." They would 
return home to produce a report which would be distributed free of 
charge to the policy making elites in the United States and overseas 
(Sharpless 1997:181).
The power of such reports lies in the shrewd way they condense and shape research 
findings and present policy recommendations while appearing to be academically 
rigorous and objective. A number of the reports produced by Homer-Dixon's projects 
fall in this category (see Chapter Five).
The 'expert proclamation' was another way the population message was 
disseminated to a wider policy audience. In 1960, for example, scientists from 19 
countries, 39 Nobel Prize winners among them, issued an alarmist statement calling for 
the U.N. to lead the population control cause in order to stave off a new Dark Age of 
Malthusian misery and war (Barrett 1995).
Such reports and statements were not sufficient, however, to build the kind of 
broad popular consensus necessary to sustain massive and long-term U.S. investment in 
population control in the Third World. That, according to Wilmoth and Ball, depended 
on the coverage of population issues by popular magazines, newspapers and other forms 
of media. Their study of the population debate in American popular magazines from 
1946-1990 highlights the remarkable rise in articles about the "threatening" aspects of
population growth, which peaked in the mid-1960s. By contrast, the percentage of 
articles which took a more neutral stand or viewed population growth as advantageous 
declined. Interestingly, many of the articles were either written by or cited the work of 
prominent demographers such as Kingsley Davis, Philip Hauser and Irene Taeuber 
(Wilmoth and Ball 1992); the population centers created at American universities served 
as a source of ideas for journalists and authors (Caldwell and Caldwell 1986).
While there was a certain intentionality to the way the neo-Malthusian message 
was crafted and spread, the ease with which it could be mapped on to other areas of 
concern, especially the Cold War, was also a key to its success.
Mappability
Discourses of danger have long been a feature of U.S. foreign policy, although as 
David Campbell argues, the precise source of danger and the identities it is believed to 
threaten have changed over time. The articulation of danger through foreign policy 
helps to create "an imagined political community" at home and to secure the identity of 
the state (Campbell 1998:12-13). Fear and loathing of the 'other' forges a bond between 
the chosen people.
The last chapter considered threat representation in the post- Cold War era, in 
particular the focus on refugees and immigrants. While the enemy -- the Soviet Union 
and other Communist states -- was more clearly defined during the Cold War, "the 
absence of order, the potential for anarchy, and the fear of totalitarian forces or other 
negative elements -- whether internal or external -- that would exploit or foster such 
conditions" (Campbell 1998:30-31) more generally undergirded U.S. foreign policy.
Framed in terms of crisis or apocalypse, neo-Malthusianism mapped well onto
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Cold War discourses of danger, a fact which did not escape its proponents. There was an 
element of opportunism involved in the use of Cold War rhetoric to build support for 
population control. For demographers eager to get involved in the policy arena, it 
expanded the market for their ideas (Greenhalgh 1996), and it also helped to justify the 
need for public funding of the population enterprise (Sharpless 1997, Furedi 1997).
Yet opportunism alone cannot explain the synergy between neo-Malthusian and 
Cold War ideologies. Furedi argues that concern with differential fertility rates between 
groups, countries and regions, combined with the state’s demand for security, gave 
demography its geopolitical dimension ("strategic demography"). According to him, the 
main form that concern took after World War Two, and still takes today, is fear of the 
rising populations of Southern countries. The Cold War "allowed this threat to be made 
more intelligible to a larger audience than before" (Furedi 1997:68), yet the threat was 
not always acknowledged explicitly. He maintains that neo-Malthusian arguments about 
the relationship between population growth and poverty were used to obscure the goals 
of strategic demography.
Certainly, one can find many examples of differential fertility fears in the Cold 
War literature. Demographer Kingsley Davis warned that "superior population growth 
will join territorial expansion in increasing communism’s share of the world." China in 
particular was a menace, with its "ocean of humanity" driven by a communist elite, 
potentially making it "the strongest contender for world leadership" (Davis 1959:108- 
110, cited in Wilmoth and Ball 1992:647).
Yet one can over-emphasize the role of differential fertility. Rather than making 
nations strong, the more common argument, supported by revisionist demographic
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transition theory, was that population growth would impede the modernization process. 
This in turn would weaken countries, making them more susceptible to communist 
influences. There were two ways to fight the Cold War: military strength and 
modernization, and population control figured prominently as a strategy to accomplish 
the latter. India, particularly, became a test case, where it was hoped the combination of 
democracy, economic growth and family planning would stave off revolution (Ross
1998). Population control also figured in securing U.S. access to Third World raw 
materials and markets, since this access would be imperiled by population-induced 
disorder (Donaldson 1990).
Neo-Malthusian arguments, in fact, were increasingly deployed to mask the 
structural inequalities which gave rise to disorderly opposition movements. Especially 
in the latter stages of the Cold War, population growth was identified as a major source 
of political instability because it drained government resources, caused rural to urban 
migration, led to 'youth bulges' in the population (and young unemployed men were the 
tinder for political extremism) and left governments with little other choice than to 
become authoritarian to control restive populations (see, for example, Population Crisis 
Committee 1983).
Family planning also figured centrally in domestic Cold War cultural 
constructions. The white, middle-class, suburban family, managed by a modem 
housewife who efficiently controlled her fertility, was portrayed as a major defense 
against the evils of communism. When transferred to the Third World context, family 
planning similarly became part of the spread of "modem attitudes" which would foster 
economic development and thwart communist support (Sharpless 1997).
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Opportunistically or not, neo-Malthusianism mapped well onto the Cold War, 
helping to transform and shape that map into a broader, gendered geography of social 
control which has survived the fall of the Berlin Wall. By the time the U.S. government 
became officially involved in population control in the 1960s, that map hung securely on 
the wall.
Organizational Diversification
While private foundations and Cold War ideology helped propel neo- 
Malthusianism into U.S. foreign policy circles, its ultimate success as a publicly funded, 
bureaucratic enterprise lay in the way it became embedded in diverse U.S. government 
branches and agencies. This occurred through a combination of factors, including the 
legitimation provided by the high-level Draper Committee; the growing cultural 
acceptance of birth control; strategic appointments in the State Department; 
Congressional hearings; the involvement of national security agencies; and the 
institutional home provided by the USAID's population program.
In 1958 the Eisenhower administration set up the President's Committee to Study 
the United States Military Assistance Program, under the leadership of William H. 
Draper, Jr., a white collar World War Two general who later administered postwar 
assistance to Germany and served as undersecretary of war and of the army. However, 
Draper was not just a senior civil servant, he was also a rich investment banker whose 
partners came from the highest echelons of the U.S. establishment. So too did the 
members of the Draper Committee, as it came to be called (Ross 1998).
Although the Draper Committee was initially charged with studying U.S. foreign
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military aid, it expanded its purview to consider non-military assistance and the 
economic and political situation in recipient nations, including the role of population 
growth. Population entered the deliberations through two routes. The first was a 
committee report, "The Population Explosion," by R.R. Adams. Adams was influenced 
by Princeton-trained demographer Ansley Coale and his colleague Edgar Hoover's book, 
Population Growth and Development in Low-Income Countries, funded by the World 
Bank (Donaldson 1990). Coale and Hoover claimed that rapid population growth 
decreased the share of a country's economic resources devoted to savings and 
investment, and thus had a deleterious effect on economic growth (Furedi 1997). 
Adams' report warned that by curtailing development, rapid population growth could 
cause political instability and "international class war" (Donaldson 1990:23).
The second major influence was Hugh Moore, the colorful president of the Dixie 
Cup corporation who believed rapid population growth threatened American corporate 
control of Third World raw materials because of the likelihood that it would lead to 
communist takeovers and chaos. Moore published an alarmist pamphlet to this effect, 
The Population Bomb, which was widely distributed. Although many professional 
demographers and foundation officers found Moore's inflammatory prose distasteful, the 
pamphlet succeeded in reaching a policy audience, becoming assigned reading at the 
State Department's Foreign Service School, for example. As Sharpless writes, Moore 
"brought the rarefied discourse of the professional demographer into the public arena, 
cut away all ambiguity, and made population growth a strategic issue of serious 
importance" (Sharpless 1997:194).
On the day the Draper Committee was established, Moore sent Draper a cable
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that warned: "If your committee does not look into the impact and implications of the 
population explosion, you will be derelict in your duty" (cited in Piotrow 1973:37). 
Draper took the advice to heart. In July 1959 at a White House press conference 
publicizing his committee's final recommendations, he made a dramatic presentation 
with an alarming map of world population growth in the background. The committee 
advised that the U.S. government fund population research as part of its Mutual Security 
Program, and that aid be given to those "developing countries who establish programs to 
check population growth" (cited in Mass 1976:41).
Although the Draper report had a major impact in policy circles, influencing the 
Ford Foundation, for example (Caldwell and Caldwell: 1986), President Eisenhower 
himself was not easily persuaded. "Birth control is not our business," he declared in 
December of that year. "I cannot imagine anything more emphatically a subject that is 
not a proper political or governmental activity or function or responsibility" (cited in 
Green 1993:303).
Eisenhower's views reflected the fact that culturally, birth control was still a 
taboo subject in the U.S., although the situation was soon to change. In the late 1950s 
reproductive scientist Gregory Pincus developed the birth control pill with initial funding 
raised by Margaret Sanger, who wanted a "simple, cheap contraceptive to be used in 
poverty-stricken slums and jungles, and among the most ignorant people" (cited in 
Seaman and Seaman 1977:62). Beginning in 1960, the pill was marketed by the 
pharmaceutical firm G.D. Searle, and two years later the Lippes Loop IUD was 
introduced. The availability of these technologies gave a boost to the population field; 
here was a quick technical fix for high fertility (Hartmann 1995). Their availability also
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helped relax conservative social mores around contraception; the era of 'sexual 
liberation1 was on the horizon in the U.S.
The Kennedy administration proved more receptive to the idea of U.S. 
population assistance. In 1961 it appointed Roger Barnett as State Department 
population advisor. Barnett recommended funnelling population assistance through the 
U.N. and fostered closer relations between the State Department and private population 
interests, including the Ford Foundation, the Population Council and General Draper 
who was now a lobbyist for the cause. Barnett's appointment marked the beginning of a 
close relationship between the State Department and the population lobby, a relationship 
which would prove important to Thomas Homer-Dixon's political success (see Chapter 
Five).
USAID was also established in 1961. Despite the efforts of Senator J. William 
Fulbright to secure Congressional approval for USAID population research and funding, 
the agency did not have an explicit population control program until the Johnson 
administration (Donaldson 1990).
In 1965 President Johnson proclaimed in his State of the Union Address that he 
would "seek new ways to use our knowledge to help deal with the explosion in world 
population and the growing scarcity in world resources" (cited in Green 1993:305). 
(Johnson would increasingly use food scarcity arguments to justify population 
assistance.) Soon after, USAID alerted its mission directors abroad that it would 
entertain funding requests from host governments for family planning programs. From 
this time on population control gathered a rapid momentum in the U.S. government; by 
1967 USAID was giving $35 million annually in population assistance. It is still the
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largest single funder in the field.
In addition to allocating these funds, Congress held hearings on the population 
issue. From 1965-1968, Senator Ernest Gruening's subcommittee on Foreign Aid 
Expenditures convened hearings, "during which a steady parade of politicians, 
population experts, priests, public health physicians, and professors made the problems 
of rapid population growth more visible to Congress and more acceptable for public 
discussion" (Donaldson 1990:38). Since that time, Congress has played a vital role in 
sustaining population assistance even in the face of tough anti-abortion opposition, partly 
because of pressure from private population lobby groups (Hartmann 1995).
During the same years the State Department held a series of high level briefings 
in which prominent demographers and family planners advised top government officials. 
These briefings were organized by the department's population advisor, Philander 
Claxton, who played a similar role in the Nixon administration (Green 1993). Population 
control enjoyed considerable bipartisan support, allowing for a continuity of actors and 
strategies through the Johnson, Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations. Its bureaucratic 
entrenchment during this period — in USAID, the State Department, and Congress — is 
no doubt one reason it was able to survive the later challenges of the Reagan and Bush 
administrations.
Population issues also became a matter of concern for national security agencies. 
In 1974 Nixon instructed the National Security Council (NSC), the highest body within 
the executive branch authorized to plan and implement foreign policy, to undertake a 
study of the impact of world population growth on U.S. security interests over the next 
25 years. Written mainly by Philander Claxton and completed in 1974, the NSC's
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population study, known as National Security Study Memorandum 200 (NSSM 200), 
was never formally approved by the Nixon administration, though its key findings were 
incorporated in another National Security Decision Memorandum, NSDM 314 (Green 
1993, Information Project for Africa (IPFA) 1991a).
NSSM 200 was less focused on the internal effects of population growth in 
developing countries than with its external impact on U.S. strategic interests. The 
document stressed how population pressure could undermine U.S. access to needed raw 
materials and lead to a preponderance of youth, who were more likely to become radical 
and attack targets such as multinational corporations. "Conflicts that are regarded in 
primarily political terms often have demographic roots," it stated (cited in IPFA 
1991a: 10). Concerned to mask U.S. strategic motives, the report recommended that:
The U.S. can help to minimize charges of an imperialist 
motivation behind its support of population activities by repeatedly 
asserting that such support derives from a concern with: (a) the right of 
the individual to determine freely and responsibly their number and 
spacing of children...and (b) the fundamental social and economic 
development of poor countries...(cited in IPFA 199 la: 17).
In addition to family planning, it suggested that "minimal levels of education,
especially for women" and "education and indoctrination of the rising generation of
children regarding the desirability of smaller family size," could have a long term
positive effect on fertility rates (cited in IPFAa:22). The report also identified 13 key
countries where die U.S. had a special interest in population/security issues: India,
Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nigeria, Mexico, Indonesia, Brazil, the Philippines, Thailand,
Egypt, Turkey, Ethiopia and Colombia.
In 1975 President Ford approved the subsequent NSDM 314 report and charged
the NSC Ad Hoc Group on Population Policy, under the leadership of the new State
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Department population advisor, Ambassador Marshall Green, with its implementation. 
All U.S. ambassadors were notified about NSDM 314, "and their views were solicited 
on how effectively host governments were dealing with population issues" (Green 
1993:311). In 1977 a Select Committee on Population was formed in the House of 
Representatives. Green writes that this committee and its hearings broadened awareness 
of population issues in Congress and elsewhere, "and were taken into account by the 
NSC Ad Hoc Group on Population Policy" (311). The NSC group remained active until 
it was disbanded by the Reagan administration.
Although defense and intelligence agencies may have helped to decide which 
countries to target for population control (most of the 13 countries listed in NSSM 200 
were major recipients of population assistance), it is unclear how much they were 
actually involved in the design and implementation of USAID-supported family 
planning programs. Collaboration between USAID and national security agencies is not 
unknown. During the Vietnam War especially, many USAID programs were directly 
linked with the war effort. At the same time the agency was greatly increasing its 
support for population control (Donaldson 1990). Some observers argue that USAID- 
funded population communications programs initiated in the 1980s are in fact a form of 
psychological warfare (IPFAb 1991).
The sensitivity of the birth control issue, however, probably mitigated against the 
direct involvement of security agencies in population programs. Indeed, the main 
strategy was to channel aid to private and multilateral organizations in order to avoid 
charges of U.S. cultural imperialism. As Ambassador Marshall Green candidly put it:
In all of our assistance, we would do well to maintain a low 
profile. It is probable that we will have to work more and more through
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international organizations and private voluntary groups since these non- 
U.S. government entities are rather widely preferred in countries now 
entering the family planning field (Green 1976).
By the early 1970s USAID was contributing over half the budget of UNFPA and the
International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF). Neo-Malthusianism was not only
successfully dispersed throughout the U.S. government, but within international
institutions as well, achieving the status of a global discourse (Barrett 1995, Richey
1999).
The Convenience of Mixed Motives
While its strategic applications and inclusion in a diverse range of public and 
private institutions help explain the staying power of neo-Malthusianism, it has also 
benefited from the convenience of mixed motives, in particular concerns for both 
individual and collective welfare. Many 19th century neo-Malthusians argued for birth 
control as a way to improve the living standards of the poor, and later as a means to 
emancipate women. While changing shape over time, this social reform aspect of neo- 
Malthusianism never disappeared, and in fact, would prove to mesh well with post- 
World War Two development prerogatives in which raising per capita living standards 
was the sine qua non of national strength (Barrett 1995). Family planning could kill two 
birds with one stone: it could increase individual incomes and at the same time hasten 
economic development.
In practice, however, the tension between individual and collective welfare goals 
proved difficult to resolve and created fissures within the population field between those 
who supported voluntary family planning and those who endorsed more coercive means. 
What if the model rational peasant proved irrationally disposed to a large family size?
99
What if despite all the surveys that showed a high demand for contraception, many poor 
women would not use it? For the hardliners in the field, it became a question then of 
goading or forcing people to use birth control for their own and their nation's good 
(Hartmann 1995).
Yet even as population programs escalated their use of high pressure methods, 
rationales based on individual welfare flourished. In the early 1960s individuals were 
portrayed as the beneficiaries of population control programs because of anticipated 
improvements in living standards, but by the end of the decade the emphasis changed. 
As the result of the new global discourse on individual rights,
access to family planning was framed as a new basic human 
right. The depiction of individuals and women in the 
population/development discourse moved from rational agents to be 
convinced of choices, to citizens with rights to make decisions about 
family size (Barrett 1995:239).
To navigate the tricky territory between rights and obligations, the Plan of Action 
endorsed at the 1974 World Population Conference in Bucharest proclaimed that "All 
couples and individuals have the basic right to decide freely and responsibly the number 
and spacing of their children." That responsibility takes into account "the needs of their 
living and future children, and their responsibility towards the community" (U.N. 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs 1975). This language is open to various 
interpretations. The freedom to act "freely" ceases to be meaningful, for example, when 
acting responsibly means conforming to the demographic goals of government 
population programs which ostensibly represent the interests of the "community" 
(Tomasevski 1994).
At the 1974 U.N. international population conference in Bucharest, the
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population field was also forced to navigate the troubled waters of North-South relations. 
In their call for a New International Economic Order, many Southern countries 
challenged the neo-Malthusian reasoning that population growth was the main cause of 
underdevelopment, pointing instead to Northern economic and political domination of 
the South. Moreover, they resuscitated the unrevised version of demographic transition 
theory, arguing that "development is the best contraceptive." However, development in 
this instance was not just defined as industrialization, but redistribution of resources 
between North and South. The failure of past development efforts necessitated a new 
approach at the national level too: meeting the "basic human needs" of the poor for food, 
shelter, health care, etc.
Because of the social reform tradition, more liberal neo-Malthusians were able to 
rise to the occasion at Bucharest. This included John D. Rockefeller HI himself, who 
had undergone something of an ideological conversion and was now supporting 
women's rights. A new consensus emerged: meeting people's basic needs would 
simultaneously help bring about development and lower birth rates, and family planning 
would be an important component of the basic needs integrated "package" of services. 
The question that was carefully avoided by elites from both North and South, of course, 
was why the basic needs of the poor were not being met in the first place; deeper 
structural inequalities such as disparities in land ownership were conveniently left out of 
the discussion (Hartmann 1995).3 The equity language of Bucharest succeeded, at least 
temporarily, in reducing the tension between individual and collective welfare goals -- 
here was a win-win recipe par excellence where mixed motives only enhanced the 
flavor, and population control appeared to be a progressive enterprise.
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By the end of the 1970s the population establishment had achieved considerable 
success, marked by its substantial academic base, attraction of both private and public 
funds, representation in a diverse range of institutions, and ability to adopt and 
disseminate multiple and shifting rationales for population control. However, in the next 
decade it faced new challenges, beginning with the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980. 
In the face of conservative opposition, fresh alliances and rationales were required to 
sustain the neo-Malthusian enterprise. The most important, and lasting, of these was the 
link between population and the environment.
IV. ENTER THE ENVIRONMENT
Although the close strategic alliance between U.S. population and environmental 
organizations dates from the 1980s (Crane 1993), neo-Malthusian influences on the 
American environmental movement have a longer and deeper history. This part 
addresses that history first, then explores the nature of the contemporary political 
alliances forged between population and environment organizations.
People as the Enemy 
According to Wilmoth and Ball (1992), framing the population issue in 
environmental terms was probably the single most important factor in building a public 
consensus for population control in the U.S. However, this framing would not have been 
so successful if it were not for the peculiar character of American environmentalism, in 
which conservationism, the wilderness ethic, and discourses of survivalism have all lent 
themselves to neo-Malthusian assumptions about the relationship between people and 
nature.
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Social Darwinism and neo-Malthusianism have a long tradition in Western 
conservationist thought (see Arnold 1996). In the U.S., conservationists, and in particular 
conservation biologists, have been some of the most outspoken and extremist advocates 
of population control.4 In the late 1940s two prominent conservationists published books 
which warned of the pressures population growth was putting on natural resources, both 
in the U.S. and overseas: Our Plundered Planet by Fairfield Osborn and Road to Survival 
by William Vogt. Vogt's book was an instant bestseller, despite, or perhaps because of, 
its dire predictions of imminent famine, even in Europe, and its eugenic prescriptions, 
which included sterilization bonuses for the feckless indigent (Chase 1977). It greatly 
influenced a young conservation biology student at the University of Pennsylvania, Paul 
Ehrlich (Chase 1977, McCormick 1989).
In 1967, the Sierra Club commissioned Ehrlich, who was now a professor at 
Stanford University, to write a book on population. The result was The Population 
Bomb, which became one of the best-selling environmental books ever (McCormick 
1989). "The battle to feed all humanity is over," Ehrlich, a master of apocalyptic 
language, claimed. "In the 1970s the world will undergo famines -- hundreds of millions 
of people will starve to death" (Ehrlich 1968:Prologue). From that time on, Ehrlich had 
a major impact on public perceptions of population issues; he was the most frequent 
author on the subject in major American popular magazines, with Lester Brown, the neo- 
Malthusian founder of Worldwatch Institute, another contender (Wilmoth and Ball 
1992).
The same year that The Population Bomb hit the market, the ecologist Garrett 
Hardin (1968) published his famous essay "Tragedy of the Commons" in Science. While
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some critics took issue with his harsh view of human nature and ahistorical analysis of 
the destruction of the commons, his eugenic sympathies largely went unnoticed. In a 
sense, both Hardin and Ehrlich were following a tradition established earlier in the 
century when the field of biology was the main locus of population research. Although 
Ehrlich was not a eugenicist like Hardin, he shared with him a world view unmuddied by 
the complexities of social science and in which the reproductive behavior of the poor 
masses was likened to that of pond weed or caterpillars. Early on, like Hardin, he also 
advocated policies of triage, such as no longer shipping food aid to countries where the 
food-population balance was hopeless (Chase 1977).
This particular conservationist view of people as the enemy of nature was 
reinforced by the wilderness ethic. Cronon describes the unique place the idea of 
wilderness holds in the American psyche, both as a romantic, sublime, quasi-religious 
force and as a vehicle for frontier nostalgia. "For many Americans," he writes, 
"wilderness stands as the last remaining place where civilization, that all too human 
disease, has not fully infected the earth" (Cronon 1995:70). It is one of the main 
foundational stones of American environmentalism.
The ways in which wilderness is constructed have a number of problematic 
outcomes. The ahistorical myth of wilderness as "virgin" land obscures the systematic 
forced migration and genocide of its original Native American inhabitants. It leads to a 
dualistic and simplistic vision of humans versus nature, the parochial philosophy of an 
urban middle and upper class far removed from the daily rigors of living off, and with, 
the land. At the same time, by locating nature in the far-off wild, it allows people to 
evade the responsibility for environmental protection closer to home (Cronon 1995).
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The wilderness ethic, Cronon argues, is also a peculiarly bourgeois and 
masculine form of anti-modernism. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the model 
of the mgged frontier individualist informed the conservation efforts of men like 
Theodore Roosevelt who came from the highest echelons of American society.5 As 
Cronon writes:
The very men who most benefited from urban-industrial 
capitalism were among those who believed they must escape its 
debilitating effects. If the frontier was passing, then men who had the 
means to do so should preserve for themselves some remnant of its wild 
landscape so that they might enjoy the regeneration and renewal that 
came from sleeping under the stars, participating in blood sports, and 
living off the land (78).
Men like Roosevelt not only sought the purity of the wilderness, but the purity of the 
race, fearing the 'race suicide' resulting from fertility decline among white, educated 
women and the influx of immigrants from non-Nordic nations.
Accounts of the early history of modem American environmentalism typically 
extol the virtues of a few well-known men who fought for wilderness protection at the 
turn of the century. The story is often presented in terms of the difference between John 
Muir, the aesthetic naturalist and preservationist, and Gifford Pinchot, the pragmatic 
professional conservationist who had a more utilitarian approach to wilderness use. By 
making wilderness the main referent, these histories ignore other contemporary urban- 
based, socially-oriented forms of environmentalism, such as the municipal house­
keeping movement, led by women and focused on sanitation, public health and nutrition 
(Athanasiou 1996). This privileging of the wilderness narrowed the scope of what is 
considered environmental activism, and reinforced white, wealthy male dominance of 
the movement, a trend which continues (see Seager 1993).
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The wilderness ethic is also geographically parochial, blinding many Americans 
to the complex ways in which people relate to the land in other countries and cultures 
(Guha 1989). It is hostile to sedentary agriculture and by extension to Third World 
peasants, glorifying only hunter gatherers (Cronon 1995). No wonder then that it fits 
well with many neo-Malthusian conceptions. At its most extreme, it leads to a kind of 
’’deep ecology" which is deeply antagonistic to poor people. Several prominent deep 
ecologists have called for substantial and rapid reductions in human population, by as 
much as 90 percent. Some favor stringent population control measures, while others 
believe in letting AIDS run its course in Africa and blocking famine and disaster relief 
(Seager 1993).
Another powerful influence on American environmentalism is what Dryzek calls 
the discourse of survivalism. Its basic story line is that "human demands on the carrying 
capacity of ecosystems threaten to explode out of control, and draconian action needs to 
be taken in order to curb these demands" (Dryzek 1997:34). Beginning in the late 1960s, 
this discourse helped to set the apocalyptic tone of American environmentalism.
The most well-known articulation of this philosophy is the MIT study 
commissioned by the Club of Rome, published as the best-selling book The Limits to 
Growth in 1972 (Meadows et al 1972). Using computer simulations, this book argued 
that if existing trends in population growth, pollution, industrialization, food production 
and resource use persisted, limits to growth would be reached within a hundred years, 
leading to catastrophe. Despite a number of contemporary critiques of die study's 
methods and findings, including its failure to adequately take into account the possibility 
of technical progress (McCormick 1989), the ideological momentum of survivalism
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could not be stopped.
Because survivalism is concerned with aggregates, particularly aggregate 
amounts of resources and human population, it does not lend itself well to a 
disaggregated, time and site-specific analysis of the dynamics of resource use. 
Moreover, it tends to favor authoritarian and hierarchical forms of social control. 
"’Populations,' be they national, global, or class-specific, have no agency; they are only 
acted upon, as aggregates to be monitored through statistics and controlled by 
government policy" (Dryzek 1997:35). It is elites who have agency, especially experts in 
population biology, ecology and systems analysis, and the government officials who 
implement their recommendations.
Dryzek argues that although survivalism generally does not fare well in the real 
world of government practices, it has impacted population policy, providing a rationale 
for draconian measures such as those employed in China. It has also greatly influenced 
popular consciousness of the population issue by reinforcing and making 'scientifically' 
credible the Malthusian gloom and doom scenario. Combine Ehrlich's The Population 
Bomb with The Limits to Growth and you have a "potent scarcity cocktail," a term 
coined by Andrew Ross (Ross 1996:25).
Why were so many Americans ready and willing to swallow this particular 
cocktail? There is a certain ironic logic in the fact that the country with the most 
profligate consumption and waste levels has been the most obsessed with planetary 
resource limits (and the least willing to do anything about them). Psychologically, 
concerns about scarcity perhaps reflect a certain Puritan guilt at profligacy.
Sandilands argues that the idea of environmental limits is all tied up with limits
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to pleasure and sex; sex is conspicuous by its absence in most population discourses 
(Sandilands 1999). When it is mentioned, the inference often is that women's sexuality 
is out of control. In The Population Bomb, for example, Ehrlich argued that women use 
their year-long sexuality in order to entice men into staying in family groups, and the 
resulting uncontrolled biological "urges" lead to overbreeding (cited in Jaquette and 
Staudt 1985).
Ross (1996) makes the point that concerns about natural scarcities parallel the 
manufacturing of social scarcities essential to competitive capitalist regimes. The 
grossly unequal division of wealth in a society of resource abundance and waste 
demands an ethic of social scarcity to explain poverty. In the public consciousness, 
supposed limits to growth in social welfare expenditures become intertwined with the 
notion of environmental limits.
Related to survivalism, public concern also mounted over limits to urban growth 
in the U.S., framed in terms of "overcrowding" and its supposed ill effects: congestion, 
housing shortages, pollution, lack of recreational space, and social pathologies such as 
crime and sexual deviance. Overcrowding segued easily into anxieties about population 
growth and immigration. It helped to shift the geographic focus from the Third World 
and bring the population issue back home to the U.S. in the 1960s (Wilmoth and Ball 
1992).6
Survivalism's popularity in the late 1960s and 1970s is linked to other 
contemporary social and political currents, such as the counter-culture's critique of 
materialism and economic growth, and very real fears of nuclear apocalypse. In a sense 
the discourse of limits was absorbed into the larger groundswell of citizen activism; on
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college campuses few saw a contradiction in placing promotional materials from Zero 
Population Growth side by side with anti-war literature.
Chase argues that neo-Malthusianism actually deradicalized the student 
movement in the U.S and diverted attention away from the real causes of environmental 
degradation. "People Pollute" became the new catchy slogan, rather than "Corporations 
Pollute." Meanwhile, the generous contributions of men like Hugh Moore facilitated the 
shift. Concerned that the organizers of the first Earth Day in 1970 were neglecting 
population, Moore funded a major propaganda blitz on college campuses, featuring the 
work of Ehrlich (Chase 1977).
The wilderness ethic and survivalism both help to explain neo-Malthusianism's 
ideological success. However, it is questionable whether its impact on American 
environmentalism would have been so strong and enduring if it were not for political 
developments in the 1980s when environmental pessimism met its match in New Right 
comucopianism.
The Politics of Either/Or
Like Limits to Growth, the Carter administration-commissioned Global 2000 
Report to the President, released in 1980, warned of serious social and ecological 
consequences if current population and resource use trends continued. The report never 
enjoyed much of an impact, however, since that same year Ronald Reagan became 
president. Reagan not only was hostile to the philosophy of limits, but to the very idea 
of government regulation of the environment.
Instead, New Right economists such as Julian Simon and Herman Kahn had his 
ear. In the Resourceful Earth they challenged the Global 2000 Report, arguing that
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economic growth, human ingenuity and technical progress were likely to make the world 
a better place, not worse (Simon and Kahn 1984). Simon had already proclaimed 
elsewhere that population growth produces the "ultimate resource," skilled, spirited and 
hopeful people, who, provided they live in an unfettered market economy, can come up 
with the new ideas to make the system work (Simon 1981).
Simon and Kahn's ideas heavily influenced the official U.S. Policy Statement for 
the 1984 U.N. International Conference on Population in Mexico City. In a major 
reversal of U.S. policy, the document depicted population growth as a "neutral 
phenomenon," which has become a problem only because of too much "governmental 
control of economies" and an "outbreak of anti-intellectualism, which attacked science, 
technology and the very concept of material progress" in the West (cited in Hartmann 
1995:35-36). At the Mexico City conference, the Reagan administration also bowed to 
the growing strength of the anti-abortion movement. It launched a major attack on 
abortion rights, denying U.S. funds to any private organization which performed or even 
just counselled women about abortion.
Population and environment groups had already been working together before 
the Mexico City conference. In 1974 the Sierra Club hired its first population program 
director, and the National Audubon Society launched its own program in 1979. In 1981 
Audubon sponsored a national conference on population, which became the springboard 
for the Global Tomorrow Coalition, a network of over 100 population and environment 
groups (Hartmann 1995). However, the threat the Reagan administration posed to both 
international population assistance and environmental regulation drove the two camps 
even closer together as they sought to expand their constituencies and bolster their
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presence on Capitol Hill (Crane 1993).
Coming under increasing corporate influence, the mainstream environmental 
movement was even more receptive to this alliance than it might have been otherwise. 
Population was a convenient cause, a way to divert attention from the lack of strong 
activism against industrial polluters. In their 1986 report, An Environmental Agenda for 
the Future, the 'Group of Ten' top U.S. environmental leaders proclaimed human 
overpopulation as the root cause of environmental problems (Dowie 1995).
The alliance between population and environment groups has not always been an 
easy one. It has tended to benefit population groups more than environmental ones, 
since the former have not taken on the broader environmental agenda. Moreover, 
environmental groups risk being attacked by anti-abortion supporters because of their 
support for population assistance (Crane 1993). Yet the population-environment 
coalition has gained in strength and is still very active today. While ideologically 
American environmentalism was already predisposed toward neo-Malthusian 
assumptions, the population-environment coalition spread the message far and wide, so 
that it is probably not an exaggeration to say that most Americans who are concerned 
about global environmental degradation still believe population growth is the main 
culprit.
Once again, private foundation funding was, and remains, instrumental to the 
existence and effectiveness of the population-environment coalition. Population money 
has enabled many of die larger environmental groups to set up and maintain population 
offices within their organizations. In 1990, for example, population advocacy became 
the most highly funded program in the Sierra Club. Some of this funding has come from
111
foundations explicitly interested in restrictive immigration policies (Dowie 1995). As 
we shall see later, population funding has also played a vital role in supporting the 
environment and security field.
In addition to their domestic efforts, U.S. population and environment groups 
have worked to influence international environmental organizations such as the 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN). During preparations for the 
1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, their aggressive efforts backfired, however. Not 
only did many Southern countries oppose the idea that population growth posed the 
biggest threat to the global environment, but the transnational women's health movement 
mounted a strong challenge to population control policies. At Rio feminist activists 
vocally criticized demographically-driven family planning programs, calling instead for 
access to safe, voluntary contraception and abortion as basic rights. They also identified 
structural adjustment, militarism, and wasteful and unjust production and consumption 
patterns as the key culprits in environmental degradation — not population growth. Their 
critique was incorporated into a number of documents, including the nongovernmental 
Women's Action Agenda 21 and the NGO Treaty on Population and the Environment 
(Hartmann 1995).
The population-environment coalition tried hard to portray the feminist critique 
as playing into the hands of the Vatican, a problematic strategy since the feminists were 
outspokenly in favor of reproductive rights. The politics of either/or were proving 
harder to sustain in the face of a progressive, feminist anti-neo-Malthusian analysis 
which was at once pro-choice and environmentalist. Bringing the feminists on board 
would be the next test of neo-Malthusianism's malleability and mappability.
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V. THE WOMAN QUESTION
As reproducers, women have long been central to population policies, but more 
as objects than subjects. "Nowhere is the link between individually-disciplined bodies 
and national 'development' more explicit than in the discourse of population as it is 
presented to Third World women," writes Lisa Richey in her study of family planning in 
Tanzania (Richey 1999:4). In the global population discourse, overpopulation is the 
problem, family planning the solution, and 'local' women the recipients of these services. 
Yet, there is a certain paradox "in defining family planners as 'modem' women, yet not 
actually constituting them as knowing, active subjects," capable of making their own 
fertility choices (24).
This paradox has long haunted the population field which has held very 
traditional views of women (Kabeer 1995). In her review of articles involving women in 
the journal Demography from 1964-1993, Susan Watkins found that:
If all we knew about women was what we read in the articles on 
fertility, marriage and the family, we would conclude that women are 
primarily producers of children and of child services; that they produce 
with little assistance from men; that they are socially isolated from 
relatives and friends... We would learn even less about men (Watkins 
1993:553).
At the height of population crisis rhetoric in the late 1960s, these traditional mothers 
became "targets" in the "Holy War" against population growth (Watkins 1993), not only 
in the pages of Demography, but in the aggressive contraceptive promotion campaigns 
launched by USAID (Jaquette and Staudt 1985, Hartmann 1995).
By widening the scope of the population-development debate, the 1974
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Bucharest conference helped inspire a somewhat broader view of Third World women. 
Concurrently, social science research was pointing to the fertility-reducing effects of 
improving women's status through education, employment, etc., inspiring a new round 
of income generation projects in the development field (Kabeer 1995). Although this 
approach at least acknowledged women as workers, the kind of employment generated 
was generally low-pay and home-based; the main goal was to reduce fertility rather than 
truly empower women. In addition, Jaquette and Staudt note how the increasing 
involvement of social scientists in population policies "reinforced rather than challenged 
the hierarchical bureaucratic relationships that were institutionalized under the medical 
approach" in the early years of the USAID population program (Jaquette and Staudt 
1985:225).
The limited success of this instrumentalist approach, coupled with the persistence 
of target-driven family planning programs, helped kindle feminist opposition to 
population control policies in the 1980s. Within the population field, feminist reformers 
fought the target approach, introducing the concepts of the "user's perspective" and 
quality of care into the family planning lexicon. Outside, women's health activists 
protested the dumping of dangerous contraceptives such as the Daikon Shield IUD 
overseas and the lack of attention to health and safety issues in both contraceptive 
research and distribution (Hartmann 1995). The more radical among them also linked 
neo-Malthusianism with U.S. imperialism (e.g. Mass 1976).
At first the population establishment took little note of the opposition building 
within the women's movement, partly because the movement was diverse enough that it 
was possible to listen selectively to feminist voices (Hodgson and Watkins 1997).7 Yet
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by 1994, a substantial segment of the women's movement had joined with the population 
establishment to forge the 'Cairo consensus' proclaimed at the ICPD in Egypt that year. 
This consensus maintains that rapid population growth is still a major cause of poverty 
and environmental degradation, but that women's empowerment and reproductive health 
programs are the solution to high birth rates, instead of the top-down, target-driven and 
often coercive population programs of the past.
There are many reasons for the creation of the Cairo coalition between feminists 
and the population establishment: the latter's poor showing at the Rio Earth Summit, 
noted above; the growing strength of the transnational women's movement; the 
mounting threat posed to international family planning and women's rights by anti­
abortion and fundamentalist forces; and a new generation of personnel, many of them 
young women influenced by feminism, entering the population field. It is also true that 
the Cairo consensus was carefully orchestrated, mainly with U.S. funds, in another 
example of strategic philanthropy.
Private philanthropic funding brought national and international women's groups 
into the consensus process, though a few powerful U.S. organizations, such as the New 
York-based International Women's Health Coalition, dominated the scene. Feminist 
groups with a more radical critique of neo-liberalism tended to be marginalized, 
inhabiting the "negative space" outside the consensus, and reproductive health issues 
were privileged over social and economic ones (Silliman 1999; Hartmann 1995,2002).
The Pew Charitable Trusts, the largest environmental grantmaker in the U.S., 
meanwhile channelled over $13 million to environmental groups to produce massive 
amounts of neo-Malthusian propaganda in advance of the ICPD; religious leaders,
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foreign policy specialists and academic researchers such as Thomas Homer-Dixon were 
also recipients of Pew's largesse. The other main players were the U.S. State 
Department through the office of Timothy Wirth, Undersecretary for Global Affairs, the 
UNFPA, and Ted Turner of the powerful Turner Broadcasting System (Hartmann 1995). 
"It was American leadership above all which drove the Cairo process along," stated 
Nafis Sadik, UNFPA director and ICPD Secretary General (cited in Hodgson and 
Watkins 1997:504).
The Cairo consensus was a remarkable political feat, uniting feminists with neo- 
Malthusian environmentalists and family planners. It is still too early to tell who got the 
most out of the bargain. The Cairo Program of Action has no doubt opened up important 
space for feminist reform of the population field (see Haberland and Measham 2002), 
but it is foundering on a number of internal contradictions. Because it is firmly situated 
within the neoliberal model of development, with its emphasis on the free market, 
privatization and the dismantling of the state's welfare functions, the Cairo health and 
empowerment agenda has the flavor of pie in the sky. It is difficult to build reproductive 
health services on the foundation of deteriorating or non-existent public health systems 
(Richey 2002); in the context of growing economic inequality and instability it is 
similarly hard to 'empower' women (Petchesky 2000). In fact, the Cairo empowerment 
strategy is largely instrumental like the income generation project before it. Its main 
approach is education for girls to delay the age of marriage, and micro-credit as the 
solution for poverty.
Bureaucratic inertia, inadequate funding, and the persistence of demographic 
targeting also militate against effective implementation of the Cairo program. Even after
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Cairo, USAID's main rationale for population assistance remained the reduction of 
population growth (Center for Reproductive Law and Policy 1998), and a number of 
countries (India, Mexico, Indonesia, China) continue to use high pressure tactics to get 
women to accept sterilization or long-acting contraception (Hartmann 2002). Most 
observers, inside and outside the population field, acknowledge that to date the 
implementation of Cairo has been disappointing (see, for example, Women's 
Environment and Development Organization (WEDO) 1999, Forman and Ghosh 2000; 
for a more optimistic view, see Haberland and Measham 2002).
Discursively, the Cairo consensus exchanges the coercive population control 
methods of the past for a notion of self-disciplined female reproductive behavior through 
the correct 'choice' of modem contraception, which will help women help themselves, 
their children and the nation (Richey 1999). This new woman is a boon to the market 
economy: she can consume more commodities because she has fewer children and she 
saves corporations money by requiring less maternity benefits. Her self-regulation aids 
her in managing her family's adjustment to the instability and unpredictability of latter- 
day capitalism. The Cairo consensus is part of what Sandilands calls "reproductive 
structural adjustment":
In structural adjustment, countries are to produce themselves 
according to a capitalist productive logic; in reproductive structural 
adjustment, women and men are to produce themselves according to 
profoundly normative discourses about appropriate gender relations and 
family structures (Sandilands 1999:88).
The Cairo emphasis on the rational choice of the individual woman fits well with 
neoliberal prerogatives, although the contradiction is that the state is still needed in most 
places to provide and enforce population programs.8 Population programs may, in fact,
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be one of the last bastions of state intervention in social 'welfare'. Furedi notes the irony 
of the current mushrooming of population policies in direct proportion to the declining 
commitment to social and economic transformation (Furedi 1997). Unwilling or unable 
to invest in the costs of social reproduction, the state concentrates on limiting women's 
reproduction.
These contradictions and ironies have not been lost on many feminists, who are 
doing a good deal of soul-searching about their involvement in the Cairo consensus and 
the deleterious effects of neoliberalism on women's health and lives (Petchesky 2000). 
However, although it is difficult to work with the population establishment, it is also 
difficult to work without them. What critics like Furedi fail to acknowledge is that many 
women want access to birth control, and sometimes the only way to get that access is 
through population programs. In many countries the rise of fundamentalist forces is 
putting that access ever more at risk. Pragmatically, it is better to try to reform 
population programs, the logic goes, than to do away with them altogether.
It is unclear how long the alliance between feminists and neo-Malthusians will 
hold. The election of President George W. Bush, Jr. in 2000 has led to a renewed assault 
on international family planning by anti-abortion forces, which could keep the alliance 
together out of necessity. At the same time neo-Malthusians might reckon that if they 
were "unencumbered by alliances with feminists, their ability to negotiate with social 
conservatives would be enhanced" (Hodgson and Watkins 1997:509). Whether or not 
the alliance holds, the language of women's empowerment and reproductive health 
embodied in the Cairo consensus is now a vital part of neo-Malthusian discourse. It 
provides increased legitimacy to the discourse in liberal circles, since now it is possible
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to be for women's rights and population control at the same time. Indeed, one ostensibly 
reinforces the other.
While the Cairo consensus has resolved, at least partially and temporarily, the 
woman question, neo-Malthusianism in the present moment faces other serious 
challenges, not the least of which is declining population growth worldwide. Part Six 
considers the current directions neo-Malthusianism is taking in response to a changing 
demographic and political environment.
VI. NEO-MALTHUSIANISM IN  AN ERA OF DECLINING 
POPULATION GROWTH
It is now common knowledge in demographic circles, though not necessarily in 
popular ones, that the 'population explosion' of the last century is over. Population 
growth rates are declining worldwide more rapidly than anticipated even a few years 
ago. Since 1965, the world's annual population growth rate has fallen from 2.04 percent 
to 1.2 percent. According to the U.N.'s high, medium and low projections, world 
population will reach either 10.9, 9.3, or 7.9 billion people in 2050 and then will start to 
level off. The medium variant of approximately 9 billion is most commonly accepted 
(U.N. Population Division 2000a).
Along with this decline in population growth there is a growing convergence 
between the average family size in developed and developing nations. As Wilson (2001) 
notes, "we are moving into a world where the distinction between developed and 
developing nations is of greatly diminished relevance to fertility" (166). He estimates 
that today the median individual lives in a country where on average women bear
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slightly more than two children in their lifetime; by 2050 a majority of the world’s 
people may live in countries where fertility is below the long-term replacement level. 
Indeed, there is growing concern about the possibility of a "population implosion" 
(Eberstadt 2001).
Perhaps the ultimate test of neo-Malthusianism's malleability and mappability 
will be its ability to respond to the phenomenon of declining population growth. One 
can already identify several broad trends:
First is demographic exceptionalism in the form of concerns about countries 
which still have high fertility rates, particularly the nations of sub-Saharan Africa and the 
northern states of India (Wilson 2001). Richey (2001) argues that sub-Saharan Africa, in 
fact, has become the primary focus of international population policy, with its emphasis 
on contraceptive delivery as the main vehicle with which to drive birth rates down. The 
result is a new "global consensus on the lessened peril of over-population, while 
maintaining the demographic imperative for interventions in Africa" (5).
There is a certain tragic irony that reducing fertility in Africa remains a central 
focus of health policy, when the region is the hardest hit by the AIDS epidemic.9 The 
neo-Malthusian resolution to this contradiction is the observation that even with the 
devastating impact of AIDS, populations of the most affected countries, with the 
exception of South Africa, are still expected to be larger by 2050 than they are today 
(U.N. Population Division 2000a).
Second are continuing concerns with population distribution. Eighty percent of 
the world's population now lives in developing countries, and this figure is likely to rise 
to 90 percent in 2050. This is largely due to the phenomenon of demographic
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momentum. Even though fertility levels are falling in developing countries, there is a 
continuing increase in the number of women of childbearing age as a legacy of past high 
fertility levels (U.N. Population Division 1999). The shrinking proportion of the Western 
population gives rise to what Amartya Sen calls "fears of being engulfed," especially by 
Third World migrants (Sen 1994:63). The more conservative strain of neo- 
Malthusianism blames population pressures for driving immigration.
A third and related trend is the concern about population ageing. The 
combination of below-replacement level fertility and higher life expectancies in a 
number of developed countries has led to a growing proportion of elderly in the 
population; the U.N. estimates that the median age in developed countries will rise from 
38 in 2000 to 46 in 2050. Population ageing is associated with a host of social and 
economic problems, including maintenance of social security systems, rising health costs 
and declines in productivity (U.N. Population Division 2000b). According to the U.N., 
the two possible solutions to population aging are increasing immigration and increasing 
fertility, both of which run counter to the neo-Malthusian creed.
A growing tension exists between Western "fears of engulfment" and the need 
for immigration to countermand population ageing and to expand the labor force. As the 
U.N. notes:
The volumes of immigrants that would be necessary to prevent 
population decline are relatively small in demographic terms. However, 
even in the short term, these levels of immigration are often considered 
politically and socially unacceptable. This is a major drawback, since, 
empirically, immigration seems to be socially less acceptable where local 
fertility is lower, which is also where it is needed the most. In the long 
term, the accumulated number of immigrants required to prevent 
population decline would result in a population with a large proportion of 
persons of foreign origin, which is widely considered politically and 
socially unacceptable (U.N. Population Division 2000b:2).
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As this passage illustrates, population concerns are increasingly taking on an ethnic 
dimension in the continuing dynamic interface between population quantity and quality 
issues.
In the face of these changing and confusing demographic realities, neo- 
Malthusianism has displayed a tendency to retreat into past certainties regarding the 
negative relationship of population growth to poverty10 and particularly, the 
environment. In the case of the environment, there is a general acknowledgement of the 
complexity of population-environment relationships, but then a fall back into a simplistic 
dualism, wherein global environmental degradation is blamed on overconsumption in 
the North and population growth in the South.
Not surprisingly, policy prescriptions tend to focus on the latter in the form of 
fertility reduction. The UNFPA's State of the World Population 2001. for example, 
blames deforestation and global climate change primarily on population growth and 
promotes averting births as a solution for the negative environmental externalities to 
childbearing (UNFPA 2001). Another common neo-Malthusian assumption is that 
reducing fertility buys more time for coming up with ways to cope with environmental 
stress (see UNFPA 2001, Global Science Panel 2002). The fundamental emphasis on 
population control is meanwhile obscured by frequent references to the empowerment of 
women and reproductive health. It is a win-win world where "by moving towards 
gender equality and the empowerment of women, reproductive choice also promotes 
environmental conservation" (UNFPA 2001:10).
Such an analysis lets Northern governments and elites (and Southern ones too) 
off the hook for environmental degradation, while at the same time casting them in the
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positive role of gender-sensitive conservationists and family planners. It is in fact this 
link with women that has given neo-Malthusianism environmentalism a new lease on 
life in liberal circles, a lease, one might add, helpfully financed by foundation funds. For 
example, the Packard Foundation, now the second largest private philanthropy in the 
U.S., has spent millions of dollars ($13 million alone in 2000) on a five year "PLANet" 
campaign to forge a coalition between prominent population, environment and family 
planning organizations. The campaign includes full page advertisements in major media 
outlets asserting that meeting women's family planning needs will save the rain forest 
(Hartmann 2002; see next chapter). Another reason for the persistence of neo- 
Malthusian is the continued power of the degradation narrative, which identifies 
population growth and poverty as the driving forces behind environmental degradation 
and migration in the South. This powerful narrative, the subject of the next chapter, has 
enjoyed enormous staying power since colonial times and is the primary link today 
between population, environment and security concerns.
In short, the malleability and mappability of neo-Malthusianism, along with its 
institutional strength, may allow it not only to survive, but continue to flourish even in an 
era of declining population growth. Time will tell how successfully it maps on to 
globalization and its associated woes — growing disparities in wealth, environmental 
decline, immigration, and even war, terrorism and violent conflict. One thing is for 
certain: the map makers will not rest idle.
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VII. CONCLUSION
This chapter has explored a number of the reasons why neo-Malthusianism has 
come to be such a powerful and persuasive discourse in the U.S. The dynamic 
interaction between population quality and quantity concerns, in particular the role of 
eugenics, helps explain how the neo-Malthusian movement grew in the first half of the 
twentieth century. After World War Two, the establishment of demography as a policy 
science and the receptivity of American social science to neo-Malthusian assumptions 
were important precursors to the rise of a private/public population establishment in the 
1960s and 1970s. The enormous success of this establishment, in terms of its impact on 
national and international policy and public opinion, can be attributed to the role of 
strategic philanthropy in institution building, the effective way messages were framed 
and disseminated, the mappability of neo-Malthusianism onto the Cold War, its 
organizational diversification within the U.S. government, and the convenience of mixed 
motives and rationales.
American environmentalism, with its strong emphasis on die wilderness ethic 
and survivalism, proved particularly receptive to neo-Malthusian ideas. This receptivity 
helps explain how population and environment groups were able to form a coalition in 
die 1980s when both faced increasing political opposition from the Right. Neo- 
Malthusians also sought an alliance with feminists, culminating in the 1994 Cairo 
consensus. This consensus, though still fraught with contradictions, has given neo- 
Malthusianism increased legitimacy in liberal circles.
Today, faced with the reality of declining population growth, neo-Malthusianism
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is characterized by concerns about demographic exceptionalism, population distribution 
and ageing and their implications for immigration policies, and linkages between 
population growth, poverty, environment and security. While none of the above factors 
alone explain the remarkable power of neo-Malthusianism, taken together they shed 
light on the key actors, interests and ideas which have sustained it over the course of the 
last century and into the present one.
Endnotes to Chapter Two
1. For example, along with Hardin, well-known eugenicist J. Philippe Rushton is on the 
advisory board of the journal Population and the Environment, and it is edited by 
evolutionary psychologist Kevin MacDonald. MacDonald, who has testified on behalf 
of Holocaust denier, David Irving, believes liberal immigration policies in the U.S. are 
the result of a Jewish plot (Bhatia 2002). Another well-known figure in the anti­
immigrant population and environment movement is Virginia Abemethy, who 
disapproves of racial mixing and is now associated with the racist organization, Council 
of Conservative Citizens (Southern Poverty Law Center 2002).
2‘. This belief did not die completely. Hans Morgenthau wrote in 1967 of the continuing 
importance of large population size to a country's ability to age war (Morgenthau 1967); 
military regimes in Latin America also used this rationale to support pronatalist policies.
’. Furedi (1997) argues that the Bucharest consensus essentially abandoned the linkage 
between population and economic growth, leading to a new redistributionist rationale for 
population policy based on the belief that rapid population growth was now an obstacle 
to the redistribution of income, not to the rise of per capita incomes per se. Micro- 
economic studies ostensibly showed that lower fertility contributed to greater equality, 
and that family planning could therefore advance equity goals. Despite the shift in 
argumentation, however, the concern with population growth remained.
4'. For the role of conservation biology more generally in reinforcing prejudices against 
poor farmers and herders in the Third World, see Guha (1997).
5. For more on the intersection of the frontier and wilderness ethics, see Arnold (1996).
6'. Today one of the main strategies of the anti-immigrant movement is to blame urban 
and suburban sprawl on immigrants, though there is little correlation (see Rivlin 2002).
7 . According to Hodgson and Watkins (1997), Reagan's election in 1980 might have
fostered a closer alliance, but feminists were not all together unsympathetic to Reagan's 
critique of neo-Malthusianism while the population establishment was not willing to 
mount a forceful defense of abortion rights.
8\ However, privatization of family planning services is now accelerating, and many 
women's groups are now receiving donor funds to provide direct reproductive health 
services. Observers worry that these groups are being drawn into the neoliberal agenda 
(Petchesky 2000, Silliman 1999).
9‘. See Richey (2001) for a description of how by skewing health priorities, the focus on 
reducing women's fertility can undermine efforts to address AIDS in Africa.
10'. See, for example, the edited volume on Population Matters by Birdsall, Kelley and 
Sinding (2001) and the review essay by Ahlburg (2002). Richey (2001) points out how 
in the volume, Birdsall and Sinding attribute high fertility in poor families to a kind of 
market failure, analogous to pollution.
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CHAPTER THREE
Tropical Tropes and Barren Slopes:
Degradation Narratives and Environmental Security
In the spring of 1998 I conducted my first round of interviews on environmental 
security in the Netherlands. My first appointment was with an official with the 
Directorate-General for Environmental Protection in the Hague. After coffee, we toured 
the state of the art, energy-efficient office building which housed the ministry. As time 
went on, I realized a comedy of errors had landed me an appointment with the wrong 
man. He was a specialist on noise abatement standards and was not familiar with the 
concept of "environmental security." Asked to attempt a definition, he replied with 
"avoiding danger to life in the case of a major environmental accident." He was 
optimistic about the potential for technology development and transfer and did not 
subscribe at all to neo-Malthusian views of Third World populations destroying the 
environment. "More people can lead to less degradation," he told me.
Although I had spoken with the wrong man, this interview was a useful 
introduction to the fact that environmental security is not on everyone's mental map, and 
moreover, that it is open to multiple interpretations. These range from crisis management 
during a chemical or nuclear accident, to cleaning up toxic wastes on military bases, to 
inter-state 'water wars', to international cooperation on climate change, to population 
explosions and the mass exodus of environmental refugees, to name but a few.
Just as varied are the motives behind the concept's deployment. A European
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Union (EU) space program official told me environmental security was a code word for 
"the crossover between the military and the environment," particularly the use of military 
satellites for environmental surveillance. Another EU official said it highlighted the 
threat North African migrants posed to Europe. An IR scholar cynically noted that it 
was the outgrowth of Cold War intellectuals looking for new raisons d'etre and sources 
of funds.
Members of the U.S. intelligence community described it as a forecasting 
method to better prepare for peace-keeping missions, a mechanism for drawing NGOs 
into the information-sharing process, and "a packaged way of providing a systematic 
rationale for paying attention to the Third World with the collapse of the Cold War." 
Others similarly believed it was a benign way to bring Third World development, 
environment and women's rights issues to the attention of policymakers. "Anything that 
gets us out of frozen security speak gets us a nice gain," remarked a senior foundation 
official. Perhaps the most apt comment of all was that like the term sustainable 
development, environmental security is essentially "an empty vessel you can fill."
Expanding the metaphor, one might say that the cup now runneth over. 
Although most observers agree that interest in environmental security peaked in the mid- 
1990s in the U.S., it has generated a voluminous literature which shows no sign of 
slowing to a halt. Furthermore, the idea is currently taking off in British defense and 
foreign policy circles, and there are moves afoot, spearheaded by the German 
government, to create an international environmental security council.
Aside from its multiple interpretations and uses, environmental security has 
proved such a sturdy vessel for several key reasons. It fits well with the academic and
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policy enterprise of redefining security in the aftermath of the Cold War, as well as with 
increasing international interest in the ramifications of Global Environmental Change 
(GEC). As such, it appeals to both natural and social scientists, though most scholarship 
on the subject has come from the IR field. Within IR, it is a paradigm transcender, 
diffuse enough to embrace multiple views of the state and to attract both Realists and 
non-Realists. For critics, it has proved a useful term to react against, though in the 
process many have been drawn into the epistemic fold.
Its appeal is also due to the strong neo-Malthusian assumptions in much of the 
literature, which mesh so well with Hobbesian visions of scarcity and anarchy and 
reinforce conventional Western views of the relationship between population and 
resources in the Third World. Prominent in the literature are what I call "degradation 
narratives," whose basic story line is that population pressures and poverty cause 
environmental degradation and resource scarcities, which can then induce migration and 
violent conflict. Or as Vaclav Smil puts it: "eroding slopelands = environmental 
refugees = overcrowded cities = political instability = violence" (Smil 1997:108). This 
story line was in existence before environmental security became popular, and no doubt 
will survive its passing. However, it has played a very important role in sustaining the 
enterprise and expanding its audience.
This chapter looks at the field of environment and security primarily through the 
lens of degradation narratives and the ways in which they naturalize fundamentally 
social, economic and political processes. Part One traces the origin of these narratives in 
the colonial period and their incorporation into the concept of development and 
sustainable development. Part Two examines the evolution of the environment and
129
security field within the larger project of redefining security during the Cold War and the 
role of survivalism and degradation narratives in that project. Part Three analyzes how 
the narratives have been incorporated into liberal visions of stewardship and 
environmental security and conflict theories in the post-Cold war period. Part Four 
explores related narratives such as the dangerous rain forest, migrating microbes, the 
youth bulge, women's uncontrolled fertility, and water wars, while Part Five offers some 
concluding remarks.
My intention in this chapter is not to do the widest possible inventory of the 
environment and security field -- that would be a thesis by itself — but to focus on one 
important dimension, the degradation narrative, that has profoundly shaped the field's 
understanding of the dynamics of poverty, environmental degradation and violence in 
the South. In rejecting the degradation narrative, the Dutch official with whom I spoke 
was the exception, not the mle.
/. THE DESTRUCTIVE PEASANTRY:
THE EVOLUTION OF THE DEGRADATION NARRATIVE
The belief that poor peasants are responsible for most land degradation in the 
Third World is a primary assumption of the degradation narrative whose roots reach 
back to the colonial era. While colonial administrators and scientists had significant 
differences of opinion on the causes of tropical environmental degradation (Grove 1995), 
in many places peasant agricultural practices were blamed for soil erosion, deforestation 
and desertification. This phenomenon has been well documented in the case of Africa.
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In areas of settler agriculture in eastern and southern Africa, for example, land 
expropriation policies "demanded both the creation of a conceptualization of the African 
peasant as 'backward' and 'inefficient', and the privileging of environmental knowledge 
based on Western experience" (MacKenzie 1995:102). Critical to this process was the 
silencing of local agricultural knowledge systems, particularly gender-based ones.
There were a number of biases in colonial understandings of African 
environmental change. Chief among these were the idea of a 'climax vegetation 
community,' an ostensible causal link between devegetation and declining rainfall, and 
the notion of carrying capacity in which a given set of ecological conditions can support 
only a fixed number of people and livestock. These ideas were grounded in a conception 
of ecological equilibrium, in which environmental change was a linear deviation from an 
idealized norm (Leach and Meams 1996).
The idealized norm in turn was influenced by the perceived 'value' of the 
resources in a given environment. Since in Africa professional foresters valued the 
closed-canopy or gallery forest most highly, any conversion of it by local people was 
seen as 'degradation.' Yet, as Leach and Meams point out,
such conversion may be viewed positively by local inhabitants, 
for whom the resulting bush fallow vegetation provides a greater range of 
gathered plant products and more productive agricultural land. Thus the 
same landscape changes can be perceived and valued in different ways 
by different groups; what is 'degraded and degrading' for some may for 
others be merely transformed or even improved (12).
The extent of degradation in Africa was (and still is) often overstated not only 
due to value bias, but faulty scientific methodologies. The exclusion of historical data 
on landscapes, for example, led to speculative projections about the past which 
romanticized previous environmental conditions. Or conditions at a particular time were
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assumed to be representative of an abiding state of affairs. For example, the low 
population densities found in East African savannahs at the beginning of the 20th 
century were viewed as the norm by colonial administrators, but in reality they were the 
result of a severe depopulation of humans and livestock as the result of recent war, 
famine and disease (Leach and Meams 1996).
In areas that clearly became degraded, such as the Ukambani Native Reserves in 
Kenya, colonial administrators blamed overpopulation of people and livestock even 
though the origins of the problem were largely external, involving, for example, the 
expropriation of lands by European settlers, disruption of traditional land tenure and land 
use systems, and unfavorable integration within the national and global economy 
(Rocheleau et al 1995). In the 1920s and 1930s European settlers mounted a campaign to 
depict African agriculture as a scourge on the land. "The African people have never 
established a symbiotic relationship with the land," stated a witness before the Kenyan 
Land Commission. "They are, in the strict scientific sense, parasites on the land, all of 
them" (cited in Rocheleau et al 1995:1042).1
This image of not only a backward, but a destructive peasantry carried over into 
post-World War Two development thinking. The notion of a singular, ahistorical 
peasantry itself is part of a larger process which Escobar terms "discursive 
homogenization," in which the poor are constituted as universal subjects, with little 
regard for differences outside of certain vague client categories such as malnourished, 
small farmers, landless laborers, etc. (Escobar 1994:53,106). Meanwhile, "discourses of 
hunger and rural development mediate and organize the constitution of the peasantry as 
producers or as elements to be displaced in the order of things" (107).
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Neo-Malthusianism assumptions became increasingly prominent in these 
discourses from the 1960s on, serving as a common explanation, for example, for 
famines in Ethiopia and the Sahel (Franke and Chasin 1980). These famines meanwhile 
generated a media and NGO image industry which enforced old colonial perceptions and 
depicted Africans either as war-like and unstable, or as passive, helpless victims in need 
of Western charity. These images were also gender stereotyped, with men shown as 
decisive and aggressive and women and children as weak, unprotesting victims of 
circumstance (van der Gaag and Nash 1987).
Within large international agencies like the World Bank, degradation narratives 
came to serve as a rationale for both rural development and population control 
interventions. A World Bank publication on sub-Saharan Africa noted:
The pressure of population is causing desertification to accelerate, 
because it forces people and their livestock farther into the marginal 
grassland. The productive capacity of land is failing because of shorter 
rotations, soil erosion and overgrazing. Growing population also raises 
the demand for fuelwood and cropland, and the resulting deforestation 
increases runoff and erosion, lowers ground water levels, and may further 
reduce rainfall in arid areas (World Bank 1989:22, cited in Williams 
1995:158).
Ignoring the great variety and complexity of African agricultural practices, the Bank 
characterized them mainly as slash and bum and nomadic livestock raising, both of 
which became destructive under conditions of rapid population growth. The solutions 
set forward were the introduction of Green Revolution technologies, privatization of land 
rights, and contraceptives — all requiring Western finance and expertise. Meanwhile, the 
Bank neglected the ecologically damaging impact of the mechanized, chemical-intensive 
farming it was promoting (Williams 1995).
In his case study of Lesotho, Ferguson similarly notes the use of such generic
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narratives by development agencies to frame the country's problems and the agencies' 
solutions (Ferguson 1994). Emery Roe has coined the phrase "crisis narrative" to 
describe the stereotypical population/scarcity scenarios applied indiscriminately to 
different African countries and designed to justify the intervention of Western 
development agencies. Crisis narratives read as follows:
The birth rate of [fill in name of country] is rising; human and animal 
populations bound forward exponentially; overutilization of the country's scarce 
resources accelerates; the government tries to create jobs but is less and less able 
to do so; rural people pour into the cities and the government's rural development 
policies are helpless in stemming the tide; political unrest becomes explosive, 
while politicians and civil servants grow ever more venal; and unless something 
is done to reverse this process [fill in name of country] will become another 
basketcase...(Roe 1995:1065-1066).
Such narratives are not limited to Africa. In Nepal, Thompson charts and challenges the
creation of the myth of "the ignorant and fecund peasant" who not only destroys the
mountain environment but causes devastating floods downstream (Thompson 2000).
Degradation narratives have persisted despite important challenges from within
the development field. One of the earliest was Ester Boserup's book The Conditions of
Agricultural Growth (1965), which argued that population growth was the driving factor
behind agricultural revolutions and increases in productivity. In 1987, Blaikie and
Brookfield's book Land Degradation and Society offered a systematic analysis of the
causes of land degradation across regions and time periods, challenging the common
hypothesis that population pressure on resources was chiefly to blame. Instead, the
authors called for a regional political ecology approach which would address the
complexity and specificity of land use practices, focusing in particular on the social and
economic constraints faced by 'land managers.'
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While this critical literature had an impact on the development field, it had little 
influence on the emerging concept of sustainable development in the late 1980s. 
According to Adams, this is because the roots of sustainable development were not in 
development theory, but rather in Northern environmentalism with its quite limited 
understanding of Third World political economy and ecology (Adams 1995). The 
concept of sustainability linked three important discourses: the global environmental 
crisis, neo-Malthusianism, and "the terrifying map of global inequality" (Peet and Watts 
1996:2). Superimposed on rural areas of the Third World, this meshed well with the 
degradation narrative, albeit with a slightly different twist.
Liberal sustainable development advocates were more willing to acknowledge 
the role of social and economic disparities, such as unequal land distribution, in the 
creation of rural poverty, so on first inspection their analyses appeared more sympathetic 
to the poor. As their argument proceeded, however, these inequalities would fade from 
view. The poor made themselves even poorer by having too many children, setting in 
motion a vicious downward spiral of increasing poverty and environmental degradation. 
"[I]t is through population that inequality and expropriation work their impact on the 
environment," wrote Paul Harrison.
They confine the oppressed to a smaller area, and artificially 
boost population density. Natural population growth goes on to feed that 
density, and worsens the problem. In most countries population growth 
is now the main factor pushing people into marginal areas (Harrison 
1992:131).
The main policy implication of this analysis is that family planning is the solution to 
both poverty and environmental degradation; women’s fertility is at the center of the 
population, development and environment triangle (Hartmann 1997).
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In the mid-1980s sustainable development incorporated the notion of 
'environmental refugees' into its lexicon, expanding the degradation narrative in the 
process. Black (1998) points to the diverse motivations behind the concept. Clearly, 
environmental degradation and disaster can spur migration when they undermine 
people's livelihoods, but this has long been the case. The particular interest in 
'environmental refugees' beginning in the mid-1980s can be attributed to Northern 
policymakers' interest in depoliticizing the reasons for population displacement so as to 
weaken refugee claims for political asylum, as well as more benignly, to 
environmentalists' desire to focus policy attention on environmental degradation issues. 
Certainly, some of the main proponents of the 'environmental refugee' concept are 
environmental scientists, Norman Myers being a case in point (Black 1998).
Myers has claimed (without any substantive evidence) that there are 25 million 
environmental refugees in the world, mainly from sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, 
China, Mexico and Central America, people who "can no longer gain a secure livelihood 
in their homelands because of drought, soil erosion, desertification, deforestation and 
other environmental problems." Their numbers will likely expand as "increasing 
numbers of impoverished people press ever harder on over-loaded environments" 
(Myers 1995:1). Myers identifies population pressure as central to the process: in many 
cases environmental refugees can be viewed as "population pressure" refugees (63).
Such views of environmental refugees not only reinforce the neo-Malthusian 
assumptions of the degradation narrative, but help expand it to include violent conflict as 
the tragic end to the story. As Black (1998) notes, whatever the precise number and 
definition of environmental refugees,
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a common feature of the literature is to talk of 'millions' of 
displaced people, and their dramatic impact on host regions, such that 
regional security is threatened. The image is one of misuse or ovemse of 
the environment leading to progressive decline in the resource base, and 
possibly contributing to further dramatic (and unintended) environmental 
collapse. Environmentalists and conflict specialists see common cause in 
talk of'environmental refugees'; even if the linkages between conflict and 
refugees remain to be proven (23).2
As we shall see, the displacement and movement of marginalized people form 
the main link between the degradation narrative and (insecurity concerns: their 
migration to other rural areas incites ethnic tensions; their young unemployed sons 
gravitate to political extremism in already overcrowded cities; and when they cross 
international borders, they threaten national social and cultural cohesion. Part Two 
addresses the ways in which the degradation narrative, with its focus on both the 
destructive peasantry and destructive migrants, intersected with the broadening of 
security during the Cold War.
II. UPPING THE ANTE: POPULATION, ENVIRONMENT 
AND RETHINKING SECURITY DURING THE COLD WAR
In order to understand how the degradation narrative interacted with the 
rethinking of security during the Cold War, Part Two first considers the relationship 
between military and non-military approaches to national security in the U.S. This is 
followed by an examination of the survivalist neo-Malthusian assumptions found in 
prominent challenges to conventional security thinking. These assumptions in turn 
helped pave the way for the acceptance of the degradation narrative in environment and 
security circles in the period leading up to the end of the Cold War.
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From Throw Weights to Development Aid
There has never been a clear consensus on what exactly 'national security1 means 
(Romm 1993). Especially during the first decade after World War Two, American 
security intellectuals thought of the subject in much broader terms than nuclear 
deterrence. Security was considered one among several important values; scholars noted 
the trade-off between pursuing military strength and expanding economic welfare and 
individual freedom. Moreover, in the pursuit of national security, non-military means of 
statecraft were of equal importance to military ones (Baldwin 1996).
The Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of Europe similarly embodied a broader 
vision of security, in which economic development and political stability were the key to 
fending off Soviet advances. This was also the rationale behind the land tenure, 
educational and political reforms the U.S. occupying forces implemented in Japan, South 
Korea and Taiwan. However, die successes of the Marshall Plan and more inclusive 
concepts of national security "were soon smothered by the series of military exigencies 
that defined the beginning of the Cold War," as national security became a matter of 
quantifiable military parity between the U.S. and Soviet Union (Evans et al 2000:13-14).
In Vietnam, however, brute military force proved insufficient to win a war 
against a popular guerilla army, causing men like Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of 
Defense under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, to reassess "the essence of 
security." On the eve of his career transition to World Bank president, McNamara wrote 
that although military might was essential, the stability of rich nations was affected by 
the stability of poor ones, and in the long run the latter was a function of development: 
That is obvious enough in the case of those impoverished nations
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whose people are seething with growing frustrations, nations racked with 
famine and disease and the cruel pressures of expanding populations on 
diminishing resources...How many twilight wars of insurgency — wars 
feeding on the frustrations bom of underdevelopment -- the affluent 
nations will be content to witness before they take the only sensible steps 
possible to cure the malady at its source...They will reach a point of 
realism at which it becomes clear that a dollar's worth more of military 
hardware will buy less security for themselves than a dollar's worth more 
of developmental assistance (McNamara 1968:160-162).
McNamara's realization was less an epiphany than a change in emphasis. While
military parity, or superiority, vis a vis the Soviet Union was the top priority during the
Cold War, the U.S. government also used development assistance to advance its strategic
interests. It frequently channeled 'Food for Peace', for example, to politically volatile
urban middle classes in countries like Bangladesh in order to secure their allegiance to
U.S.-backed regimes (McHenry and Bird 1977). And as we saw in the last chapter, there
were various security rationales behind population assistance: population control would
expedite modernization in the Third World, serving to stave off the Communist menace,
help secure U.S. access to vital raw materials, and decrease the number of potentially
radical disaffected youth. During his tenure at the World Bank, McNamara himself
made population control a central element of development planning.
In contrast to dropping bombs, the development assistance strategies of U.S. 
Cold War foreign policy may appear more benign, but there was no dearth of evidence 
of their ill effects, especially when combined with counter-insurgency (e.g. McCoy 
1971; Fitzgerald 1972). What was 'developed' was usually the economic and political 
power of friendly elites, while the living standards of the poor stagnated or declined. 
Leftist scholars and activists took up these issues, relating them not only to Vietnam but 
to U.S. policies in Latin America (e.g. Galli 1978), but their critiques of modernization
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theory and foreign aid had remarkably little effect on the subsequent rethinking of 
security by peace and anti-nuclear advocates.
There are a number of possible explanations for this. Many members of the anti­
imperialist left were either unwilling or unable to engage with the foreign policy 
community, with the brief exception of the Carter administration which was initially 
more open to critical voices, especially in regard to human rights. The idea of reforming 
the national security apparatus seemed a naive proposition, especially when many 
activists were targeted by that same apparatus through harassment, phone-tapping, etc. 
(Churchill and Vander Wall 2002). Meanwhile, within the academy, their critiques had 
difficulty permeating the narrow disciplinary boundaries of IR and even the nascent 
Peace Studies field, where knowledge of development debates and controversies remains 
underdeveloped still today.3
There was also a difference of focus. Whereas the left targeted the American 
state, those rethinking security on a conceptual level were going global, influenced by 
survivalist environmental discourses such as limits to growth. In the process many of 
them unquestioningly accepted neo-Malthusian explanations of resource scarcity, 
environmental degradation and conflict. As the next section illustrates, the result was the 
reinforcement of Third World stereotypes by what were seemingly progressive critiques 
of Cold War concepts of national security.
Population and Planetary Danger
One of the first works that took a global environmental approach to redefining 
security during the Cold War was Princeton University professor Richard Falk’s This
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Endangered Planet (1971), in which he presented the war system, population pressure, 
scarcity of resources, and environmental overload as the four main dimensions of 
"planetary danger." "In many ways population pressure underlies the entire crisis of 
planetary organization," Falk wrote, citing Hitler’s call for Lebensraum. "It is simplistic 
to conclude that population increase as such causes war," he went on to say, "but it 
builds the conditions whereby violence is likely to play a larger and larger role in the 
internal and external affairs of states." Falk claimed, for example, that population- 
induced migration toward urban areas encourages repressive systems of government and 
extremist revolutionary strategies of violence (155-6). It is noteworthy that Falk was 
writing at the height of the Vietnam War.
Six years later Lester Brown of the Worldwatch Institute explicitly called for a 
redefinition of national security. He warned that world oil reserves were shrinking, 
biological systems deteriorating, and population pressure destroying the resource base. 
His causal chain presages later logics of environmental conflict which naturalize 
economic and political dynamics:
The military threat to national security is only one of many that 
governments must now address. The numerous new threats derive 
directly or indirectly from the rapidly changing relationship between 
humanity and the earth's natural systems and resources. The unfolding 
stresses in this relationship manifest themselves as ecological stresses 
and resource scarcities. Later they translate into economic stresses -- 
inflation, unemployment, capital scarcity and monetary instability. 
Ultimately, these economic stresses convert into social unrest and 
political instability (Brown 1977:37).
On the positive side, Brown called into question the disproportionate amount of
resources spent on armaments, but at the same time he reinforced a dismal Malthusian
view of a famine-stricken, ecologically degraded Third World.4
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Meanwhile, in more traditional foreign policy circles the oil crises of 1973 and 
1979, and more general concerns about vital resource shortages, led strategic analysts to 
move beyond purely military definitions of security (Frederick 1999). However, the 
assumption was that if necessary, military means would be employed to secure resource 
access, such as the Carter administration’s Rapid Deployment Force for the Middle East 
(Dalby 1999). Lipshutz and Holdren argue, however, that the problem of access to 
resources did not exercise a major influence on U.S. foreign policy (Lipschutz and 
Holdren 1990).
The impetus to redefine security also came from the anti-nuclear and 
disarmament movements. In 1982 the Independent Commission on Disarmament and 
Security Issues (known as the Palme Commission) endorsed the concept of "common 
security" — the idea that the annihilating potential of modem warfare was such that 
security could only be assured by states recognizing their mutual vulnerability and 
pursuing mutual cooperation and disarmament (Dalby 1992).
Within some sectors of the peace research establishment there was a synergy 
between concerns about nuclear war and neo-Malthusian environmental survivalism. 
Arthur Westing is a case in point. Westing is more generally known for advocating 
"comprehensive security," in which military, economic, social and environmental 
security are inter-dependent and cannot be achieved separately from each other (Sooros 
1997). However, he also held extreme views on population control. In his book Cultural 
Norms. War and the Environment (1988) he maintained that population growth was the 
main cause of environmental exhaustion and warned that "the huge mismatch between 
human population numbers and availability of natural resources" helped provide "the
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support and impetus for the acceptability of war" (5). He called for drastic population 
control measures such as giving each adult a "child-right chit" entitling the holder to 
have only one child; in overpopulated countries (those whose development indicators 
were unfavorable compared to developed nations) there would be only one chit for every 
two adults (153). In a strange parallel with tradeable pollution permits, these chits would 
be transferable and negotiable commodities within nations. The fact that Westing's 
'child-right chit' scheme appears to have elicited little or no critical reaction in the peace 
and environment literature indicates just how acceptable coercive population control 
measures were considered at the time.
While Falk, Brown and Westing's views of planetary danger did not specifically 
embrace the degradation narrative, they helped establish population pressure on the 
environment as a major security concern. It was not such a cognitive leap from there to 
the degradation narrative. In fact, each helped reinforce the other in the period leading 
up to the end of the Cold War.
Elevating the Degradation Narrative
One of the first articles on redefining security to make that leap was IR scholar 
Richard Ullman's influential piece in the prestigious journal International Security 
(Ullman 1983). Taking a different tack from the globalists, Ullman tied the extension of 
security to the traditional Realist view of the state. He argued that defining national 
security in purely military terms causes states to ignore other more harmful dangers, thus 
reducing their total security. Among the possible dangers, he mentioned interruptions in 
the flow of critically needed resources, a drastic deterioration of environmental quality
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due to sources inside or outside a state, and domestic urban conflict possibly fomented 
by "the presence of large numbers of poor immigrants from poor nations" (Ullman 
1983:134). These dangers become a national security concern when they threaten 
drastically and over a short period of time to degrade die quality of life for a state's 
inhabitants and narrow the range of policy options available to the government and 
private organizations (133).
Ullman's article espoused a version of the degradation narrative based on 
firewood:
As third world villagers cut down more and more forests in their 
search for fuelwood, the denuded land left behind is prey to erosion.
Rains carry topsoil away, making the land unfit for cultivation. The 
topsoil, in turn, silts up streams in its path. Meanwhile, the fuel-short 
villagers substitute dung (which otherwise they would use for fertilizer) 
for the wood they can no longer obtain, further robbing the soil of 
nutrients and bringing on crop failure. Unable to sustain themselves on 
the land, many join the worldwide migration from the countryside into 
cities.
These cities meanwhile are "forcing grounds for criminality and violence" (141). He 
concluded that population growth in the Third World is a national security concern since 
it is bound to degrade the quality of life and limit the options available to "governments 
and persons in the rich countries" (143).
Our Common Future, the 1987 report of the U.N. World Commission on 
Environment and Development, elevated the degradation narrative to the status of 
received wisdom and drew an even closer connection to violence. Chaired by the former 
Prime Minister of Norway, Gro Harlem Brundtland, the commission is known for 
putting sustainable development on the international policy map.5
The report takes a conventional neo-Malthusian view of population pressure
144
contributing to poverty and resource depletion by slowing rises in living standards and 
exceeding the carrying capacity of the land (World Commission on Environment and 
Development 1987). In turn it identifies poverty as a major cause of environmental 
degradation:
Those who are poor and hungry will often destroy their 
immediate environment in order to survive. They will cut down forests; 
their livestock will overgraze grasslands; they will overuse marginal 
land; and in growing numbers they will crowd into congested cities (28).
The agents of poverty in effect become the poor through the destruction of their own
local environments; in sub-Saharan Africa in particular there is a "vicious cycle of
poverty leading to environmental degradation, which leads to even greater poverty" (31).
The forces that generated poverty in the first place are thus removed from the picture.
Although the Brundtland report distinguishes nuclear war as the gravest danger
to the environment and security, it identifies environmental stress as an important source
of conflict, noting in particular the destabilizing effects of "environmental refugees." It
accepts analyses by USAID that Haitian emigration is due to environmental degradation,
and that the causes of the war in El Salvador are as much environmental as political,
resulting from resource distribution problems in an "overcrowded" country (292). It uses
the language of national security threats (6), and advocates the use of the most
sophisticated surveillance technology to establish an early warning system to monitor
indicators of environmental risk and conflict, such as "soil erosion, growth in regional
migration, and uses of commons that are approaching the thresholds of sustainability"
(302).6 In this sense, it presages more recent developments in environmental
surveillance and securitization (see Chapter Six).
While rethinking security in environmental terms is largely viewed as a Western
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enterprise, the Soviet leadership most strongly promoted the concept of environmental 
security in the late 1980s in the wake of the Chernobyl disaster. At the 1988 U.N. 
General Assembly Mikhail Gorbachev and Eduard Shevardnadze proposed "an 
international regime of ecological security" as well as an implementation plan, although 
they met with little support from other U.N. members (Sooros 1997:239). Dalby argues 
that the Soviets, in fact, undertook a major rethinking of their security policy from the 
mid-1980s, favoring political over military means of navigating the superpower 
relationship. This, in turn, significantly contributed to the "unraveling of the Cold War 
system," calling into question the Western triumphalist story that the West won because 
of the superiority of its institutions and security policies (Dalby 1997:12-13).
It was the Western triumphalist story which triumphed, however, as the fall of 
the Berlin Wall supposedly signaled the end of history. However, the end of history was 
also a beginning of sorts: in foreign policy circles rethinking security moved from the 
realm of marginal to the realm of necessity. The collapse of the Evil Empire created a 
vacuum that needed to be filled.
One of the first to heed the opportunity was Jessica Mathews, then Vice- 
President of the World Resources Institute (WRI), who had also served on the Carter 
administration's National Security Council. WRI was founded in 1982 with funds from 
the Mac Arthur Foundation, and one of its first projects, spearheaded by Mathews, was 
exploring the "U.S. Stake in Global Resource Issues" (Lipschutz n.d.). The project 
produced a book edited by Janet Welsh Brown, In the U.S. Interest (1990), which linked 
population, environment and conflict in the Third World directly to U.S. national 
security.
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Looking forward to a post-Cold War policy climate, Mathews herself wrote in 
Foreign Affairs that "The 1990s will demand a redefinition of what constitutes national 
security." In the 1970s, she argued, the U.S. had been forced to acknowledge its 
economic interdependence, but now resource, environmental and demographic issues 
also no longer fit with old unilateralist assumptions and institutions. "Environmental 
strains that transcend national borders are already beginning to break down the sacred 
boundaries of national sovereignty, previously rendered porous by the information and 
communication revolutions and the instantaneous movement of global capital," she 
commented (Mathews 1989:162).
Mathews proposed a wide reform agenda, including a new era of U.S. 
multilateral diplomacy, more effective international regulatory regimes and more 
sustainable economic growth and technological development. She also advocated more 
support for family planning since, like others before her, she identified population 
growth and resource depletion as major causes of political unrest, authoritarian 
government, external subversion and the creation of environmental refugees (168).
Although there was nothing very new about Mathew's analysis, the article 
appeared in the right venue at the right time; her commitment to global environmental 
security and multilateralism served to "coax policymakers away from conventional 
realist positions" on national security based on military force (Matthew 1995:18). 
However, in terms of the understanding of environmental issues, what they were coaxed 
towards left much to be desired.
By the end of the Cold War, survivalism had succeeded in inspiring apocalyptic 
fears of the destructive capacity of Third World reproducers, while the degradation
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narrative provided the causal logic that linked them directly to poverty, environmental 
degradation, migration and violence. Part Three looks at the evolution of the post-Cold 
War environment and security field in this light.
III. WHOSE ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY?
The end of the Cold War extended the concept of security in what Emma 
Rothschild calls a geometry of "dizzying complexity." The concept of security has been 
extended downwards from nations to groups and individuals, upwards to the 
international system and biosphere, and horizontally to include not just military but 
"political, economic, social, environmental, or Tiuman' security." And finally, the 
responsibility for maintaining security has been extended in multiple directions to the 
institutions of civil society as well as to various levels of government from the local on 
up (Rothschild 1995:55). The politics of extending security were substantially different 
in the 1990s than the decades before, writes Emma Rothschild, because they "engaged 
the theorists as well as the critics of military establishments" (Rothschild 1995:59).
In this extension of security, the environment and security field occupies pride of 
place. It grew so much in the 1990s that now there are not only many different 
definitions of environmental security, but also different opinions about how one should 
go about categorizing those definitions. "It is only at a very high level of generality that 
one can speak of environmental security as a clear and distinct concept appropriate to the 
entire world," Richard Matthew notes. According to him, environmental security has 
three main characteristics: it is a condition in which environmental resources are used 
sustainably, there is fair and reliable access to them, and competent institutions exist to
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manage the crises and conflicts associated with environmental scarcity and degradation 
(Matthew 1999:13).
He goes on to identify four different conceptualizations of environmental 
security. The deep ecology approach focuses on the security of the entire planetary 
environment, the human security approach on the social justice dimensions of 
environmental access, and the national security approach on greening the military, 
environmental surveillance, and conflict prediction, prevention and resolution. The 
rejectionist approach meanwhile opposes the linking of environment and security 
because environmental change seldom poses a conventional security threat and security 
agencies are the wrong institutions to manage environmental problems (Matthew 1999). 
Here Matthew is referring mainly to the work of Daniel Deudney (e.g. 1991) who 
strongly articulated the rejectionist approach.
Thomas places concepts of environmental security on a continuum between 
narrow and broad interpretations, depending on their perspectives on the scope of policy 
change (whether it is simply rhetorical, or involves either limited or deeper institutional 
reforms); policy implementation (top-down or bottom-up); the role of the state 
(sovereignty preserving or eroding); the position on information access (secretive or 
open); and the larger understanding of security (whether it is viewed negatively, as the 
absence of external threats, or positively, so as to include concerns such as equity and 
environmental justice). He concludes that so far the U.S. national security establishment 
has employed a more narrow interpretation, favoring secrecy, for example, over sharing 
environmental data with a wide range of civilian institutions (Thomas 1997).
For Barnett environmental security is a contested idea rather than a theory or
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discourse. While his book set outs to find the meaning of environmental security, he 
begins with a definition of environmental insecurity as "the vulnerability of people to the 
effects of environmental degradation." Environmental degradation is in turn "a function 
of resource- and pollution-intensive forms of development coupled with poverty-driven 
rapid population growth" (Barnett 2001:17,12). Barnett positions the various 
interpretations of environmental security on a continuum between a positive 
peace/proactive policy and a negative peace/reactive policy, where the former refers to 
the "absence of structural violence manifested as the uneven distribution of resources" 
and the latter "the absence of direct violence that causes physical harm" (4).
While viewing environmental security as a "contested idea" rather than a 
discourse makes for a more clear-cut taxonomy, it does not adequately recognize the 
synergy between different interpretations which play out in real world real politics. I 
would argue that environmental security has become a discourse in the broad, dynamic 
Foucaultian sense of a power center, a bounded area of social knowledge which both 
constrains and enables thinking and action. Many of its various interpretations, whether 
left or right, narrow or broad, or ostensibly at odds with each other, are tied together by 
certain common normative assumptions and hegemonic myths regarding population 
growth and the environment. Arguably, these constrain thinking, even as they enable 
certain actions and actors. Even the most well-known rejectionist argument against 
linking environment and security (Deudney 1991), which came to define the opposition, 
did not critique its neo-Malthusian suppositions.7
In the following sections, I look at some of these key normative assumptions and 
hegemonic myths, starting with the identities of "us" and "them" and their crude
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demographic representations. The discussion then focuses on the first and second waves 
of environmental conflict research, the interpretations advanced by military and 
intelligence analysts, and whether or not human and ecological security concepts 
challenge the prevailing orthodoxy of the degradation narrative.
Establishing the 'Us': Universalism, Stewardship and Superpower
In his book Earth in the Balance, written before he became vice-president, A1 
Gore remarked that:
[T]he task of restoring the natural balance of the earth’s 
ecological system is both within our capacity and desirable for other 
reasons -- including our interest in social justice, democratic government, 
and free market economics. Ultimately, a commitment to healing the 
environment represents a renewed dedication to what Jefferson believed 
were not only American but universal inalienable rights: life, liberty and 
the pursuit of happiness (Gore 1993:270).
In this passage Gore expresses a central assumption of U.S. post- Cold War
environmentalism: that American values are in fact universal, and that the pursuit of free
market capitalism is the road to both personal happiness and planetary health. Gore goes
on to call for a "Global Marshall Plan" to address the environmental crisis, the first
strategic goal of which is stabilizing population growth.8
Since its first inceptions, much of the environmental security literature has been
seeped in such American and Western universalism. It is "we" who define what is
wrong with and good for the global environment. No doubt this "we" has a multiple
personality which includes more traditional national security strategists as well as those
who want to reach beyond the narrow confines of the state to embrace a greener,
multilateralist foreign policy. In either case, however, "we" are on a mission.
151
In more liberal circles this mission is known as "stewardship." According to this 
reasoning, the U.S. has a triple responsibility as the world's premier superpower. It must 
not only maintain its military and economic strength, but exercise stewardship through 
foreign aid, NGOs and the private sector to address potentially destabilizing problems in 
the Third World, such as resource scarcities and widening gaps between rich and poor. 
While acknowledging that Cold War strategies of containment "sometimes" were at 
variance with social stewardship objectives, advocates believe those contradictions no 
longer exist (Mazur and Sechler 1998:20). Stewardship is a win-win approach, in which 
neo-liberalism and American hegemony are instrumental to human development and 
environmental improvement.
That it is our mission, and not necessarily that of others, is helpfully obscured by 
the language of globalism, including that of global environmentalism change (GEC). 
The dominant construction of GEC is a Western, state-centric one, with "crass neo- 
Malthusianism" as the subtext (Saurin 1996:77). Its
hegemony manifests itself in the uncritical -- and indeed 
profoundly anti-social and anti-historical -  acceptance of the estimation 
of environmental impacts from the aggregation of individual impacts, 
quite regardless of the highly differentiated social origins of that change 
(81-82).
GEC is defined in terms of aggregate physical outcomes -- the amount of greenhouse 
gases released or water polluted — and studied in terms of the international (inter-state) 
institutional responses to these phenomena, ignoring the capitalist processes of 
expropriation, production and exchange which often generate environmental degradation 
in the first place (Saurin 1996).
Moreover, environments everywhere are deemed part of the 'global commons'
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and thus in need of global, centralized control (Hawkins 1993). This control is largely 
vested in the hands of Western governments and conservation agencies, with 
environmental stewardship translating into the right to use or support police powers for 
environmental protection in other lands. For example, according to conservationist John 
Oates (1999), it is appropriate for foreigners to subsidize policing costs of nature 
protection in developing countries if the area is regarded as "internationally significant" 
and local agencies cannot foot the bill (240). Luke (1999) argues that this represents a 
new stage of'enviro-discipline': A powerful nation state like the U.S.
is no longer empowered simply to defend its territory to protect 
its population...it must now also identify and police the surroundings in 
all of its many operational environments, to guarantee ecological 
stability, biological diversity and environmental interdependence. 
Because some states are more sustainable than others, their survival 
imperatives may become guide-lines for environmental colonialism 
(147).
The language of global environmentalism can also obscure different cultural 
perspectives on environmental problems, so that they become, in the words of Michael 
Redclift, "like a cultureless language, an Esperanto of the mind, that speaks to everybody 
and therefore, ultimately, to nobody" (Redclift 1997:14). However, speaking to nobody 
has its virtues because nobody speaks back.
The liberal stewardship "we" found in so much of the environmental security 
literature largely favors increases in American foreign aid and "democratization" in the 
Third World. While this is preferable to conservative isolationism, the summons to 
American universalism has a dark side too. "For such universalism to take root," Stoett 
notes, "the image of a frightening outside world must first be created" (Stoett 1999:19). 
Or as a senior foundation officer bluntly told me, "People will get more aid if they are
153
perceived to be dangerous than if they are pitied.”
Campbell argues that articulation of outside threats, and their representation as 
"alien, subversive, dirty or sick,” have long been fundamental to American foreign 
policy. They not only help sustain an aggressive military posture, but reinforce the need 
to secure the state against domestic sources of instability: "...resistant elements to a 
secure identity on the 'inside' are linked through the discourse of 'danger' with threats 
identified and located on the 'outside"'(Campbell 1998:3,68). With the end of the Cold 
War, Campbell writes, articulations of danger now focus on the Third World, 
particularly on disease, migration, and other population issues.
Furedi (1994) shares a similar view. The end of the Cold War has sparked the 
resurgence of a more open imperialist culture, with the Third World replacing the Soviet 
Union as the main threat to Western stability. At the same time it is harder to build a 
coherent Western identity because of significant domestic poverty and social malaise. 
"In these circumstances, Western politicians seek to gain moral authority through 
highlighting their relationship with other morally 'inferior' societies” (114); non-military 
problems in the Third World, notably overpopulation, are recruited to sustain the siege 
mentality. This "evolution of anti Third World ideology towards crude demography" 
means that "simply through the elementary act of reproduction, Third World peoples 
now threaten Western culture and societies" (118).
Certainly, this "crude demography" plays a major role in creating the "them" in 
the more sensationalist of the environmental security literature.
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Establishing the 'Them1: Fear, Loathing and Homogeneity
No one has done more currently to create the crude version of "them" than 
journalist Robert Kaplan. His 1994 Atlantic Monthly article "The Coming Anarchy," 
which proclaimed the environment as the most important national security issue of the 
21st century, portrayed Malthus as the prophet of West Africa's future and the West 
African people themselves in racist language reminiscent of colonial times. Nowhere in 
"The Coming Anarchy" does one find an industrious peasant, male or female, which is 
not surprising since Kaplan seems to have never spent any time in an African village. 
Induced by overpopulation and environmental degradation, the chaos in WestAfrica and 
elsewhere directly threaten us because AIDS and crime know no borders. In "The 
Coming Anarchy" and other writings, Kaplan removes any hint of altruism from 
American policy:
We should care for our own naked self-interest. AIDS is a product of the 
cycle of poverty, deforestation, migration and other pathologies of sub- 
Saharan Africa, which found its way to white, middle-class suburbs in an 
inter-connected world where there are no borders...As governments 
collapse and even as weak democratic regimes try to take over in these 
places, they are perfect petri dishes for the rise of organized crime 
networks, which are another threat to us (Kaplan 1996a).
As for solutions, he is critical of democracy, preferring the "honest" authoritarianism of
Singapore's dictator Lee Kuan Yew (Kaplan 1996b:377), or the "quasi-authoritarianism"
of Fujimori in Pem (Kaplan 2000:65). Authoritarian systems, he claims, create the
middle classes necessary for stability and prosperity. Even in the U.S., "the last thing
America needs is more voters — particularly badly educated and alienated ones — with a
passion for politics" (89-90).
The Washington policy establishment reacted to Kaplan's alarmist fantasies not
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with alarm, but with accolades. Timothy Wirth, then Under-Secretary of State for Global 
Affairs, faxed it to every U.S. embassy around the world (Richards 1996). Two staff 
members of a prominent environmental organization told me that many leaders of the 
mainstream environmental movement were also positively impressed by it.
Similar articles followed in Kaplan's wake. Some were by journalists, such as 
Jeffrey Goldberg's "Our Africa Problem" in the New York Times Magazine (1997), but 
others were by established security scholars, such as Yale University's Paul Kennedy. In 
the December 1994 Atlantic Monthly. Kennedy and co-author Matthew Connelly 
revisited Jean Raspail's controversial right-wing novel, The Camp of Saints, which 
describes the invasion of the French Riviera by over a million poor, dark-skinned and 
over-sexed Indians forced to leave their country because of the ravages of famine and 
overpopulation (Connelly and Kennedy 1994).9 In order to prevent the wretched of the 
earth from overwhelming the Western paradise, Kennedy and Connelly argued for a new 
"North-South deal" to ameliorate demographic and environmental stresses. Like Kaplan, 
self-interest and Western security are the main motives, but unlike him, they favored a 
broader package of foreign assistance (including family planning, of course) more in 
keeping with the liberal version of stewardship.
Several years later Kennedy retreated from this position in advocating for a 
"pivotal states" approach to U.S. foreign policy. In an article in Foreign Affairs, his co­
authors and he recommended that the U.S. focus its efforts on a small number of Third 
World "pivotal states" whose future could seriously affect the surrounding region or the 
U.S., through, for example, illegal immigration. These "new dominoes" need assistance 
not from external threats but internal disorder: "The threats to the pivotal states are not
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communism or aggression but rather overpopulation, migration, environmental 
degradation, ethnic conflict and economic instability, all phenomena that traditional 
security forces find hard to address" (Chase, Hill and Kennedy 1996:36, also see 1999). 
Thus, a country like Haiti, which is geographically close to the U.S., is a more worthy 
candidate for intervention than Rwanda and Somalia where the U.S. has less concrete 
interests.
Richard Matthew contends that Kaplan and Kennedy (along with Jessica 
Mathews) have served as "vital but selective conduits between the academic and policy 
worlds" due in part to their knowledge of environmental change research and "sensitivity 
to the sort of language that will attract policymakers" (Matthew 1999:10-11). I would 
argue that it was Kaplan and Kennedy's portrait of a highly racialized and dangerous 
"them" which had the most appeal: here literally was the dark side to reinforce the white 
side of American universalism.
The irony is that appeal to these fears actually helps strip American universalism 
of its more positive aspects, such as the professed commitment to social justice and 
democracy, in favor of a more limited vision of American interests. Kaplan and 
Kennedy's understandings of environmental security reinforce the notion that 
development assistance should mainly be a function of security prerogatives, stabilizing 
"them," for example, by stabilizing population growth.
In recent years Kaplan and Kennedy's alarmist imagery has come under more 
critical scrutiny,10 and many members of the environmental security field realize they 
need to leave it behind if they are going to attract more scholars and policymakers from 
the South to the table. However, even if not rendered explicit, the dark and dangerous
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"them" lurks just beneath the surface of other crude demographic representations. The 
violent and destructive power of "them” underlies the degradation narrative, which in 
turn is deeply implanted in environmental conflict literature.
Environmental Conflict: First Wave and Second Wave
"Of the new sources of conflict, the combination of environmental and 
demographic pressures have received the most attention." So states a Rockefeller 
Brothers Fund review of the North American literature on the new security thinking 
(Florini and Simmons 1998:20). Thus, environmental conflict not only became the 
dominant area within the environment and security field in the 1990s, but in the 
extension of security in general.
The first wave of post-Cold War environmental conflict literature was more 
popular than scholarly, "unsupported by rigorous analysis" (Levy 1995:44). One of the 
first books to appear was Greenwar. published by the Panos Institute in 1991, which 
identified the African Sahel as an arena of environmental conflict. The book held the 
poor largely responsible for environmental degradation due to the pressures of 
population growth and dispossession which forced them to cultivate marginal lands. 
Environmental degradation, in turn, was assumed to play an increasingly important role 
in causing "social and political instability, bloodshed and war" (Twose 1991:1). In a 
1998 interview, a staff member remarked that Panos' goal at the time was to get 
journalists involved in environment and development issues; the book was intended to 
generate public discussion rather than to present a deep analysis.
This desire to attract public attention may also help to explain the hyperbole in
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Norman Myers' book Ultimate Security (1993). Writing in a apocalyptic vein, Myers 
maintained that the population explosion already generates violent discord and strife, and 
is "the biggest factor of all" in causing environmental degradation. He went so far as to 
claim that the bottom billion of the world's people — the poorest of the poor -  "cause 
more environmental degradation than the other three billion developing-world people 
put together" (Myers 1993:22-23). Myers linked population pressure and environmental 
degradation to civil wars in Africa and El Salvador, and suggested that in general fewer 
people mean less conflict. "If there were half as many people in India and Bangladesh, 
would they not suffer fewer conflicts?" he asked rhetorically (163). Presaging his later 
work on environmental refugees, Myers warned that global warming could render 100 
million people homeless: "whole waves of destitute humanity washing around the world 
could soon start to pose entirely new threats to international stability" (27).
Coming out of the Worldwatch Institute, Michael Renner's Fighting for Survival 
(1996) was more sensitive than Myers to the role of social inequalities and globalization 
as causes of environmental degradation and instability. Nevertheless, he made similar 
claims that population growth is outstripping the carrying capacity of the local resource 
base in many countries, leading to mass migrations and conflicts such as those in 
Rwanda and Chiapas. This analysis has become part of the standard Worldwatch world 
view (see Brown, Gardner and Halweil 1999).
The second wave of environmental conflict research is more methodologically 
sophisticated and academic than the first, though in fact many of the assumptions are the 
same. One of the principal architects of the second wave is Canadian political scientist 
Thomas Homer-Dixon. Homer-Dixon first made the link between environment and
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conflict in the Fall 1991 issue of the prestigious journal International Security. He 
submitted that poor countries were likely to be more vulnerable to environmental change 
than rich ones, and that in these countries environmental pressures over time would 
produce four main inter-related social effects: decreases in agricultural production, 
economic decline, population displacements and dismptions in normal social relations. 
These social effects would then lead to various forms of acute conflict, "each with 
potentially serious repercussions for the security interests of the developed world" 
(Homer-Dixon 1991:78). Homer-Dixon proposed a research agenda, which would 
include case studies, to explore the causal pathways between environmental change and 
acute conflict.
While this article caught the attention of the scholarly community, Homer-Dixon 
also proved adept at reaching a wider audience. Some of his writing bears more in 
common with the first wave than the second, although he disdains writers like Myers 
whom he has accused of "an almost complete absence of empirical rigor and theoretical 
structure" (Homer-Dixon, Levy, Porter and Goldstone 1996:49). A 1993 Scientific 
American piece he co-authored was less cautious than his first article. It asserted, for 
example, that
scarcities of renewable resources are already contributing to 
violent conflict in many parts of the developing world. These conflicts 
may foreshadow a surge of similar violence in coming decades, 
particularly in poor countries where shortages of water, forests, and, 
especially, fertile land, coupled with rapidly expanding populations, 
already cause great hardship (Homer-Dixon, Boutwell and Rathjens 
1993:38).
A spin-off op-ed in the New York Times called "Destruction and Death," with an 
accompanying graphic of a tree with skulls hanging off its dead branches and
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decapitated bodies littering the ground, advised the Clinton administration to consider 
the long-term links between ecological balance and mass violence, stressing in particular 
the role of population growth (Homer-Dixon 1993). A year later Homer-Dixon's work 
was featured in Kaplan's "The Coming Anarchy," increasing his fame.
Homer-Dixon went on to generate a much larger body of work focused on the 
link between renewable resource scarcities and intrastate violence, which is the subject 
of the next chapter. In addition, he influenced the development of other models by 
authors in Europe. While this work is largely academic in approach, it emerges not so 
much from the Ivory Tower as from policy institutes, with the attendant pressure to be 
policy-relevant and meet the needs of funders (see Chapter Five).
Among its destinations, the second wave of environmental conflict research 
washed up on the shores of the national security establishment. Haas (2002) argues that 
its appeal to traditional security policy networks lay in its ties to the Malthusian 
geopolitical approach to resource scarcity, which conformed with the Realist worldview. 
I would add that environmental conflict helped to put a new spin on resource scarcity by 
expanding the definition to include renewable as well as nonrenewable resources. In 
addition, the degradation narrative pinpointed the source of the problem — peasants and 
migrants — more clearly. It produced a new national security threat for defense and 
intelligence agencies.
Green Bullets and Flash Points
In Top Guns and Toxic Whales, a companion book for a TV documentary on 
environment and security, Prins and Stamp (1991) present a positive vision of a new
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high-tech war room called Cassandra where military planners monitor threats to the 
global environment just as they would enemy aircraft. At the center of the war room is 
the Population Screen since population heads the list of environmental threats. In an 
accompanying picture a board flashes "Alert Status Green" over a map of Egypt, with 
the word population written over it (38-39).11
Fanciful as it is, this vision of an environmental war room is not so far off the 
mark. In the U.S. the military and intelligence communities have been some of the main 
institutional actors to embrace environmental security, albeit largely in a narrow 
interpretive sense (Thomas 1997). Environmental security has become a vehicle for 
promoting a mix of strategies: satellite surveillance of the environment, the development 
of environmental conflict early warning systems, integration of NGOs into intelligence- 
gathering, clean-up of toxic wastes, a means of promoting relationships with other 
militaries, particularly in the former Soviet empire, and the development of "greener" 
ammunition. In May 2001, for example, at around the same time that President George 
W. Bush, Jr. announced the U.S. would move ahead with the 'Star Wars' missile shield, 
the Army released information about its new bullet, "just as deadly as the old lead-based 
one but cleaner for the Earth." As an Army spokeswoman put it, "We want to be good 
stewards of the environment" (Jelinek 2001). Indeed, the Department of Defense (DOD) 
is now billing itself as the preserver of biodiversity through its stewardship of the vast 
tracts of land it controls for military testing and training. "Biodiversity helps us achieve 
military readiness in harmony with nature," claims Sherri W. Goodman, Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense for Environmental Security (DOD n.d.).
While environmental conflict is only one out of many items on the national
162
security community's "green" agenda, the degradation narrative has certainly exerted a 
powerful influence on perceptions of the roots of violence in the Third World. Kent 
Butts, a professor of military strategy at the U.S. Army War College and one of the 
better known writers on the role of the military in environmental matters, argues that 
regional instability in the developing world has replaced the Soviet military threat as the 
greatest danger to world peace. A major cause of this instability is the pressure of 
"overpopulation, resource scarcity and failed agricultural policies" on newly democratic 
regional regimes, which results in "major refugee migrations across national borders" 
and "tensions that may encourage the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction" (Butts 
1996a:22-23). Butts believes the U.S. Department of Defence and NATO are well- 
qualified to take on environmental issues (1996a, 1996b); intelligence assets, for 
example, can be used "for the good of the environment" by providing data for an 
"environmental crisis monitoring system" (1996a:25).
Butts has also written about European environmental security, recommending 
that NATO promote solutions to environmental problems in areas that are strategically 
important to Europe. This includes North Africa where population growth and resource 
scarcities drive conflict and migration and provide a fertile ground for radical Islam.
Butts is keen to use militaries in the developing world as an instrument of 
environment and development policy. He claims they are often the best organized and 
efficient organs of government and should be encouraged to undertake environmental 
projects "in areas populated by disenfranchised minority groups" (Butts 1996b:440). 
Furthermore, he suggests that a NATO environmental security assistance program 
"could capitalize on new USAID-built roads to distant regions of a given country to
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provide environmental assistance in the newly opened area, or assist USAID in 
broadening training programs to include the host government military" (446). Already, 
the U.S. military has been promoting "sustainable development" and resource 
conservation in Africa, giving military assistance to 20 countries for diverse activities 
such as fisheries management, anti-poaching programs including aerial surveillance, and 
constructing roads in game parks (Butts 1996a, 1999).
The degradation narrative has also impacted the intelligence community. In 
1997, for example, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) hosted a workshop on 
"Environmental Flash Points," inviting IR and environment scholars and NGO 
representatives to help focus the work of its newly formed Director of Central 
Intelligence Environmental Center (DEC). The central premise of the DEC's Long Term 
Assessment effort, according to then Director Norman Kahn, "is the belief that 
environmental change — especially degradation and resource scarcity, but positive 
change as well -  affects national and regional policies in ways that impact U.S. 
interests" (Kahn 1997:40). This premise is not entirely a new one. In 1984, for example, 
another CIA analysis of global flash points pointed to extreme population pressure, 
immigration and resource depletion as potential sources of conflict, especially in the 
developing world (Brown 1990).
Most of the regional background papers for the 1997 conference repeat familiar 
degradation narratives, and population pressure figures prominently in the matrices 
categorizing the risk factors related to environmental flash points. The search is clearly 
for some kind of early warning system which will show the CIA where American 
interests are threatened. As the authors of the sub-Saharan African study write, their
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analysis points to the potential usefulness of "a 'tableau de bord' to monitor 
environmental flash points in Africa," which would collate and track environmental, 
economic, health, demographic, agricultural and infrastructure data to determine trends. 
"The system could also be set up to flash 'warning lights' when indicator data moves 
outside of the 'normal' range -  either too low, too high, or an exceptionally rapid rate of 
change" (Winterbottom and Neme 1997:238). What the CIA's response would be when 
the warning lights started blinking provides grounds for speculation.
Chapter Six will look more closely at the impact of environmental conflict ideas 
and the degradation narrative on national security agencies, but as this section illustrates, 
they clearly have had an audience. The next section considers human and ecological 
security concepts to see if they pose a challenge to the degradation narrative.
Human and Ecological Security: A Challenge?
Some scholars have argued that less attention should be paid to researching the 
links between environment and violent conflict and more to the relationship of 
environmental change to human security (Lonergan 2000). These tend to be the more 
liberal developmentalist members of the environment and security field. In some of its 
articulations, however, human security embraces the same neo-Malthusian assumptions 
found elsewhere in the field.
According to the United Nations Development Program's (UNDP) definition, 
human security has two main aspects: first, safety from chronic threats such as hunger, 
disease and repression, and secondly, protection from sudden and harmful dismptions in 
the patterns of daily life. It is not so much proactively rights-based as imbued with the
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spirit of neoliberal individualism. "The concept of human security stresses that people 
should be able to take care of themselves," writes the UNDP (UNDP 1994:24). 
Rendered secure, people become more effective participants in their own development.
According to the UNDP, unchecked population growth is first on the list of 
threats to human security. On the local level, it causes people to move to marginal areas 
where they are vulnerable to natural disasters; on the global level it is "at the root of 
global poverty, international migration and environmental degradation." "Excessive" 
international migration also makes the list of the top six threats, along with drug 
trafficking and international terrorism (36).
Such a vision of human security reinforces rather than challenges the degradation 
narrative. Thus, even a progressive critique like Barnett's (2001), which calls for 
reformulating environmental security in terms of human security and peace, accepts the 
conventional wisdom on the link between population, poverty and environmental 
degradation. On this point Barnett differentiates himself from environmental conflict 
theorists only to the extent that he believes overpopulation leads not to violence, but to 
famine, which reduces poor people's capacity to wage war.
Lonergan and colleagues in the Global Environmental Change and Human 
Security Project (GECHS) define human security more proactively than the UNDP, 
including the concepts of human, environmental and social rights. Moreover, they 
recognize the necessity of resistance: "[H]uman security will be achieved through 
challenging the structures and processes that contribute to insecurities" (Lonergan 
1999b:29). Their analysis of the linkages between population, poverty and 
environmental degradation refreshingly acknowledges that the relationship is "complex,
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multi-dimensional, conditional, and, at least to date, indeterminate...poverty, and 
environmental degradation are historically, socially and politically constructed" (50). 
Neo-Malthusian assumptions, nevertheless, creep into the work, especially when it 
comes to policy recommendations. In a study of environmental degradation and 
population displacement, Lonergan states categorically, for example, that population 
growth is a threat to the environment and "it is imperative that birth rates are brought 
down" (Lonergan n.d.:33).
The notion of ecological security also seeks to broaden the environmental 
security framework. It not only moves beyond the notion of state sovereignty, but 
towards a biocentric rather than homocentric world view (Barnett 2001). "Ecological 
security requires a new cosmology," writes Mische. "The earth is like a single cell in the 
universe, and humans do not control the cell but are part of it. We will live or die as this 
single cell lives or dies" (Mische 1992:108). Such a cosmology is more suitable to 
describing the grand scheme of things than specific social and political relations which 
affect resource use; lumping all humans together, meanwhile, can lend itself to 
survivalist discourses of "too many people." Indeed, Mische points to the perils of 
population growth, and to how environmental degradation will lead to growing numbers 
of environmental refugees who will cause increased instability and strife within and 
between nations.
Neither the human security nor the ecological security approach necessarily 
challenge the degradation narrative. As we have seen, the narrative influences both 
narrow and broad, state and non-state centered interpretations of environmental security. 
It also reinforces, and is reinforced by, the racialized demographic representations made
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by Kaplan et al, who have helped provide the dark side counterpoint to American 
universalism and its stewardship mystique. The concluding part of this chapter considers 
other related narratives of danger and scarcity in the environment and security field.
IV. THE EXTENDED FAMILY OF DEGRADING TROPES
Despite its central role in the environment and security literature, the degradation 
narrative does not operate alone as the sole dark filter through which the Third World is 
viewed. It is part of a larger, extended family of degrading tropes and narratives, some 
of which have been around for a long while and some of which are relatively new. As 
this section illustrates, the cumulative impact of these tropes, which include the 
dangerous rain forest, migrating microbes, the youth bulge, the hyper-fertile female and 
water wars, is to naturalize poverty and inequality and to obscure dynamics of power.
Dante's Rain Forest and Invasive Germs and Species
More than any other Third World landscape, the rain forest occupies a 
particularly romantic place in the Western imaginary. Slater argues that Amazonia and 
other rain forests are often represented in terms of Edenic narratives that consciously or 
unconsciously evoke the biblical Eden and in the process neglect the complex realities of 
specific people in specific places (Slater 1995). In recent years, the growth of eco- 
tourism has reinforced this vision through the marketing of Third World ecosystems as 
scarce and exotic Edenic scenes whose inhabitants are authentic 'primitives' (Bandy
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1996).
But just as in fairy tales, the enchanted forest can also be dark and menacing, a 
jungle of creeping vines and snakes. This dual view of the tropical forest, which has 
roots in the colonial period (Arnold 1996), co-exists in some of the environment and 
security literature. For example, while on the one hand Robert Kaplan laments the 
destruction of the West African forest by overbreeding peasants, on the other he warns 
us that dense canopies of trees breed violence. He describes the Liberian rain forest as "a 
green prison with iron rain clouds" where "men tend to depend less on reason and more 
on suspicion." By weakening the civilizing influences of Islam and Christianity, this 
"forest culture" is more prone to violence (Kaplan 1996b:28-29).
The more common fear, however, is that the African rain forest is the source of 
dangerous microbes like AIDS and Ebola, part of a new set of "biological national 
security issues" that threaten the U.S. (Goldberg 1997:35). In his study of portraits of the 
Ebola virus, Zemer argues that in the mid to late 1990s, representations of the 
directionality of African forest invasions reversed. Once conceptualized as incursions 
into the rain forest, agricultural conversion, road-building, lumbering and development 
are now seen as exit routes out of the forest, "the first connections to the global highway 
of commerce and the spread of tropical diseases" (Zemer forthcoming^). He links this 
view of "the viral forest on the move" to larger Western fears of globalization and 
especially of immigration, noting the use of rhetoric that "not only identifies illegal 
immigrants as carriers of exotic, dangerous micro-organisms, but identifies the 
immigrants themselves as pathogens" (33).
For some observers population growth is a major link in the viral chain. Security
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scholar Dennis Pirages contends, for example, that population pressure is forcing 
migration into previously isolated rain forests in Africa and Latin America where many 
lethal microorganisms are waiting to strike. "This explains the periodic but brief 
appearances of killer vimses among people living on the fringes of rain forests who 
come in contact with forest animals...As the forests continue to fall before the ax and 
plow, viruses continue to migrate into human populations" (Pirages 1996:11).
Other analyses focus less on the rain forest as the source of danger, but still stress 
the role of population growth in fostering disease. Lester Brown and colleagues believe 
die rapid spread of AIDS in Africa is due to "demographic fatigue": worn down by 
population pressure, poor African governments simply cannot cope with such a public 
health crisis (Brown, Gardner and Halweil 1999). The U.S. National Intelligence 
Council (NIC) report on the global infectious disease threat identifies a wider range of 
causes, but also notes how population growth, urbanization and cross border movements 
will continue "to facilitate the transfer of pathogens among people and regions" (NIC 
2000a:44-45). It concludes that infectious diseases are a national security threat, 
imperiling the U.S. civilian population and military forces, as well as impacting 
American interests abroad. In general, threats are seen to emanate from outside the U.S.; 
the report notes (overly) confidently, for example, that most emerging infectious 
diseases, including HTV/AIDS, originate "outside U.S. borders" (65). This view of 
disease as a foreign intrusion has long been an element of American thinking (Campbell 
1998).
Similar to the linking of disease and migration are current representations of the 
biological invasion of foreign species. Subramaniam (2001) documents how in the U.S.
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today, "the xenophobic rhetoric that surrounds immigrants is extended to plants and 
animals" as part of the cultural malaise and resurgence of nationalism associated with 
globalization. Foreign plant and animal species are typically described as alien, 
pervasive, destructive, aggressive, and hyper-reproducing. In regard to the latter, 
Subramaniam draws the parallel between classic stereotypes of over-fertile and over- 
sexualized immigrant women and rhetoric about the rapid reproduction of foreign plants, 
which includes fears about miscegenation.
The Youth Bulge and the Belly Bulge
Another lurking threat is the so-called 'youth bulge.' Concerns about the security 
implications of the large youth cohort in Third World populations reaches back to the 
Cold War (see Chapter Two), and it entered the environment and security field with 
hardly a critical eyebrow raised.12 "The poorest and fastest growing countries in the 
world are characterized by bottom-heavy population profiles: they are nations of young 
people, the ones that yield the sad images of barefoot children with automatic rifles." So 
states a Carnegie Commission report on environmental quality and regional conflict 
(Kennedy 1998:36).
In the environment and security literature, the youth bulge essentially takes over 
where the degradation narrative leaves off. Once rural migrants reach the city, they are 
transformed into "underemployed, urbanized young men" who "are a particularly 
volatile group that can be easily mobilized for radical political action" (Homer-Dixon 
1999:58). It is interesting how young women are completely missing from the picture.
The youth bulge is not only represented as predominantly male, but often
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predominantly Islamic (Hendrixson 2002). Samuel Huntington warns, for example, of 
the expansion of die youth cohort in Muslim countries which provides "recruits for 
fundamentalism, terrorism, insurgency and migration" (Huntington 1996:103). Drawing 
the link between population, environment and conflict, Anthony Zinni, Commander in 
Chief of the U.S. Central Command, warns that dramatically increasing population 
growth in the Arabian Gulf region is
putting pressure on natural resources, especially water, and 
economic systems. This has resulted in instability, especially in countries 
experiencing this "youth bulge." Certain areas of this dynamic and 
volatile Central Region offer a fertile environment for extremists to 
recruit, train and conduct terrorist operations (Zinni 2000).
As Hendrixson notes, nowhere in the literature on the youth bulge is it portrayed
positively. Young men do not create jobs, they only put pressure on the means of
employment, and they are by nature prone to violence. This view of young men in the
Third World has much in common with the alarmist "superpredator" literature on the
proliferation of young criminal males in the U.S. (Hendrixson 2002).
And where are the young women of the youth bulge? In more recent population
literature, they are the girls who need to be educated, empowered and given access to
birth control in order to slow population growth. They are sexually active, but at least
non-violent. However, with a few exceptions, young women, and women in general, are
largely missing from the environment and security literature.
Robert Kaplan is one of those exceptions. The women of his imagination are
almost all Orientalist stereotypes: Persian women have sensuality implanted in their
genes, rural Indian women are "petite mahogany sculptures," the maids who clean his
hotel in Baku are "ancient female automatons," and African women are mainly bare­
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breasted and pregnant (1996b:15,19,164,184,359). More commonly in the literature, 
women are represented obliquely through the proxy of population growth.
While the degradation narrative ignores women's productive roles in agriculture, 
through "population growth" it stresses their reproductive role in the despoiling of the 
environment: the fertility of poor, dark women renders the earth infertile in an inversion 
of the Earth Mother myth, and for some, only family planning can save it. For example, 
under the caption "FAMILY PLANNING CHANGES EVERYTHING," a Packard 
Foundation-sponsored PLANet Campaign advertisement features a picture of a degraded 
tropical forest on fire next to another picture of the same forest, now lush and green. The 
ad then reads:
Amazing as it may seem, providing people in developing nations 
access to family planning is a critical first step in saving much of the 40 
million acres of tropical rainforest being lost each year. Forests that are 
being cut down to create cropland to feed the world's ever-growing 
population...In places where family planning programs already provide 
voluntary contraception, health care, and sex education, most women are 
choosing small families. This, in turn, eases the intense pressure on the 
environment's natural resources (PLANet 2000).
"Population growth" is profoundly infused with race and gender, the ultimate 
trope which masks what Lisa Richey calls the "more insidious, unspoken, and often- 
denied undertones that link 'over-fecundity' with 'savagery,' 'backwardness,' 
unconstrained sexuality and violence" (Richey 1999:313). These undertones, in turn, 
have deep roots in the colonial encounter in which non-European women were 
represented variously as exotic, oppressed, irrational, ignorant, and sex objects (de Groot 
1991). They were also viewed as dangerous immoral temptations for white men living 
in the tropics, posing the risk of racial mixing and miscegenation (Arnold 1996).
Controlling women's fertility then becomes the solution, not only for
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environmental degradation, but for the violence which is its 'natural' outcome. Most 
often, this is put in the neutral language of calls for reducing population growth through 
more family planning and literacy programs for women, but occasionally a starker image 
of the exercise of biopower shows through. Thus, as journalist Jeffrey Goldberg watches 
the sterilization of a poor, naked Kenyan woman, he reflects on how U.S. aid for family 
planning can help stem the "biological crisis" of overpopulation in Africa. He expresses 
surprise that the patient is "seemingly oblivious to the fact that she is naked and that her 
reproductive tract is exposed to the world," oblivious to his own voyeurism and that it is 
he who is doing the exposing (Goldberg 1997:39).
Images of women's offspring are similarly uncharitable. In the words of Prins 
and Stamp, "each new baby in the poor world by its birth slashes at the forests and 
erodes the soils of its immediate environment, reducing its own chance of survival" 
(Prins and Stamp 1991:42).
Water Wars
The degradation narrative features less prominently in die literature on 
prospective resource wars, which argues that competition over economically valuable, 
increasingly scarce resources such as oil may cause nation states to go to war (e.g. Klare 
2001). This "resource war" approach derives more from conventional geopolitical 
concerns, though in recent years neo-Malthusian assumptions about the nature of rising 
demand have generated a discursive linkage with environmental conflict. This is 
particularly true in the case of a renewable resource like water.
Proponents of the water war thesis argue that increased demand is making water 
scarce and heightening the risk that nations will engage in violent conflict over who
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controls shared water resources. And for many, population growth is die main source of 
increased demand; wasteful water practices are typically presented as a secondary 
concern. "Any further increase in world population will produce a corresponding surge 
in the demand for water," Klare argues. He points to high levels of population growth in 
countries along the Nile River Basin as making the situation there "potentially 
explosive" (Klare 2001:143,156). The specter of water wars in fact has become a popular 
vehicle for raising alarm. "My fear is that we’re headed for a period of water wars 
between nations," Klaus Topfer, head of the U.N. Environment Program (UNEP), stated. 
"Can we afford that, in a world where conflicts over natural resources and the numbers 
of environmental refugees are already growing?" (cited in Asmal 2000:3).
Interestingly, the water war thesis has received more critical scrutiny by 
environment and security scholars than the degradation narrative. A substantial body of 
critical literature has pointed out that despite the realities of water scarcities and tensions 
over shared water resources, nations, in fact, have not gone to war over it in the past and 
are unlikely to in the future. Instead, these tensions more often provide an opportunity 
for conflict resolution and international cooperation (e.g. Lonergan 2001, Wolf 1999). 
Moreover, in regions which face serious problems of water quality and quantity, such as 
the Horn of Africa and the Middle East, the problems are primarily political, economic 
and managerial, and not simply a question of population-induced scarcity (Allan and 
Nicol 1998, Allan 1996).13
Nevertheless, potential conflict over water, blamed primarily on population 
growth, remains a concern of the environment and security field.14 Fears of water wars 
have a survivalist ring about them, and may, like previous survivalist discourses,
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reinforce the degradation narrative through the emphasis on population pressure as the 
primary threat.
This list of tropes related to the degradation narrative is by no means exhaustive, 
and no doubt others will emerge over time. What it points to is the need not only to 
identify and contest such stereotypes, but to analyze how they reinforce each other and 
contribute to the crude demography which renders the Third World ’other' a threat.
V. CONCLUSION
As we have seen in this chapter, the degradation narrative has wielded and 
continues to wield tremendous ideological power. With historical roots in the colonial 
era, it later became a salient feature of development thinking, a crisis narrative that 
justified Western interventions in the Third World in die form of rural development and 
population control. Embraced by many sustainable development theorists in the 1980s 
and 1990s, it was increasingly linked to migration concerns, especially the construction 
of 'environmental refugees.' Interacting with neo-Malthusian survivalist discourses, it 
was integrated uncritically into the project of rethinking security during the Cold War. In 
the post-Cold War period it became an element of the crude demography which helps 
legitimize American hegemony through the notion of stewardship. In the environment 
and security field, it operates as a hegemonic myth that draws seemingly diverse and 
conflicting interpretations together.
The ideological power of the degradation narrative lies largely its ongoing utility 
in the construction and production of the 'Other' as threat or target for Western 
intervention, its ability to shift the blame for poverty, environmental degradation and
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violence to the Third World poor from the First World rich, and its capacity to naturalize 
social, economic, and political processes. Within the environment and security field 
more generally, Dalby warns that ecological metaphors concerning security risk 
reinforcing the power of ideological moves of naturalization. "If the social can be 
rendered natural then it is beyond political control. The realm of necessity is not the 
realm of freedom and political choice" (Dalby 1998a:294). After examining the 
environmental determinism implicit in both the water wars and population discourses, 
and the way they reinforce power inequalities and neoliberal 'solutions,' Lipshutz issues 
a call to 'denaturalize' such concepts and focus on the social dimensions of resource 
control (Lipshutz 1997).
Given the entrenched power of the degradation narrative and its relatives, this 
'denaturalization' is not an easy process. It requires not only philosophical but empirical 
challenges to the prevailing wisdom. The next chapter challenges the most influential 
environmental conflict models, starting with Thomas Homer-Dixon's Project on 
Environment, Population and Security, as a necessary step toward an effective critique.
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Endnotes to Chapter Three
L See Jarosz (1996) for how the colonial administration blamed native shifting 
cultivation practices for deforestation in Madagascar, ignoring the role of commercial 
coffee production and logging concessions. Historically, unprecedented deforestation 
rates during the colonial period coincided with population stagnation, not growth. For a 
general discussion of the impact of colonialism on land degradation see Blaikie and 
Brookfield (1987).
2. Even when refugees resettle, they are frequently stereotyped as "exceptional resource 
degraders," whether the empirical evidence supports the claim or not (see Black 1998).
3'. Security scholar Ken Conca told me that in the period around the end of the Cold War 
he attended a number of Peace Studies conferences. While they were left of center in 
terms of their criticism of political science, there was also a lot of acceptance of Garrett 
Hardin-like views of people as the problem and gloom and doom. He found that in the 
Peace Studies field, the end of the Cold War was converging with a troubling language 
about scarcity.
4‘. Interestingly, in his previous role as a foreign agricultural policy advisor with the 
Department of Agriculture, Brown had been a technological optimist, a staunch 
promoter of the Green Revolution and agribusiness investment (Brown 1970).
5'. It is interesting to view the findings of Our Common Future in relation to the first 
United Nations Conference on the Environment, held in Stockholm in 1972. McCormick 
describes the conference as "the single most influential event in the evolution of the 
international environmental movement" (McCormick 1989:104). Despite its many 
achievements, Stockholm fostered the notion that underdevelopment and poverty were 
the most serious threats to the environments of poor countries (Thompson 2000), and 
not, for example, resource extraction or displacement of peasant agriculture by corporate 
forces. Our Common Future follows in this tradition.
6'. The report was not without its critics. Chatteijee and Finger (1994) noted how it failed 
to take on the financiers and profit-makers of the arms race, the relationship of the 
military-industrial complex to industrial development in general, and the military's role 
in environmental destruction. Moreover, they argued, it is wrong to place political and 
environmental causes of conflict on the same level. The environment and security 
analogy "automatically leads to a resource, a risk, and ultimately to a crisis management 
approach, where the most efficient way to deal with the crisis will be a militaristic one, 
based on high-tech and hierarchy" (169). This is part of a larger process of transforming 
the global environmental crisis into global environmental management, which privileges 
Northern interests and successfully coopts environmental NGOs and movements through 
the New Age one-world model of politics (see also Lohmann 1990).
7. Lately, more critiques have emerged of the neo-Malthusian assumptions prevalent in 
the field. See Peluso and Watts (2001) and Haas (2002). Haas argues that the
attractiveness of doctrines of environmental conflict and resource scarcity "is not solely 
the nature of the arguments they make, but rather their affinity to the values and beliefs 
invoked by the person making the argument" (1).
8. For a further critique of Gore's environmentalism, see Luke (1999).
9. The novel was translated and published in the U.S. under the auspices of John Tanton, 
the founder and funder of the most powerful anti-immigrant organizations in the U.S. 
(Southern Poverty Law Center 2002).
10'. For example, see Dalby (forthcoming 2002) for a refreshing critique of Kaplan's 
views.
n \ See Mitchell (1995) for an astute critique of this image of Egypt.
12. Today the 'youth bulge' is the subject of more critical scholarly inquiry. See Urdal 
(2001).
13. For the Jordan catchment, Allan (1996) argues that "the analysis of the relationship 
between economic development and the use of water leads to the conclusion that a high 
policy priority must be the diversification of the economies, in other words the creation 
of new livelihoods which use water to greater economic effect. The successful 
implementation of such policies will stabilize the internal economy and society and will 
simultaneously enable the purchase of 'virtual water' on world markets in the form of 
food products" (76). For an interesting and in-depth discussion of the relationship 
between population growth and water scarcity, see Turton and Warner (2002).
14. The ECSP, for example, recently produced a booklet on the linkages between 
population and water, supported by USAID. While the foreword and first article are neo- 
Malthusian in tone, the others are more nuanced (ECSP 2002).
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CHAPTER FOUR
Environmental Conflict:
Wrong Turns on the Causal Pathway?
"Inspiring work," "more solid than his predecessors," "right place, right time," 
"hit single too soon:" These were some of the comments about Thomas Homer-Dixon’s 
work that were elicited by my interviews. Admirers and critics alike agreed that Homer- 
Dixon had put environmental conflict on the academic and policy maps, and that "the 
ferment around his work" had sparked the creation of new institutions, such as the CIA’s 
Environmental Center. More than any other single individual, Thomas Homer-Dixon 
became the frame of reference for the environment and security field more generally and 
environmental conflict work more specifically. As he himself ruefully noted, he has been 
attacked so much precisely because his work was the starting point.
In this chapter I also take his work as the starting point, focusing on the models 
and case studies of his most widely known venture, the Project on Environment, 
Population and Security (EPS), a joint activity of the University of Toronto, the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science and the Canadian Center for 
Global Security. This project took place between 1994-1996 and was primarily funded 
by the Pew Charitable Trusts. Homer-Dixon also undertook two other projects on 
environmental conflict, Environmental Change and Acute Conflict (1990-1993) and 
Environmental Scarcities, State Capacity and Civil Violence (1994 on).1 Although I do 
not focus on these directly in this chapter, their results have certainly influenced his other
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work and are reflected in his summary book, Environment Scarcity and Violence 
(1999), to which I refer in this chapter. (For a list of the publications of the three 
projects, see Appendix B.)
While there have been other critiques of Homer-Dixon's work, on which I draw 
in this chapter, the main debates have centered on flaws in his political science 
methodology, rather than the assumptions and evidence which undergird his analysis. 
Because the latter have escaped much critical attention until more recently, they have 
exerted undue influence on other environmental conflict models and continue to impact 
policy today. In this chapter I provide an in-depth critique of the Project on 
Environment, Population and Security, not because it is an easy straw man to attack, but 
on the contrary, because of the enormous staying power of many of its assumptions.
The chapter is organized into four parts. Part One provides a brief overview of 
the project's findings and methodology and the main criticisms of the latter. Part Two 
develops the elements of a critique, challenging the project's assumptions and evidence 
in regard to population growth, migration, the localization of blame, the role of the state, 
ethnicity, gender and the "ingenuity gap." Part Three examines related models developed 
by other institutions and scholars in the field, addressing to what extent they converge 
and diverge from those of Homer-Dixon, and Part Four offers some concluding remarks.
I. SPINNING THE WEB
In Ecoviolence Homer-Dixon and co-author Jessica Blitt lay out the central 
findings of the EPS project based on research on 15 countries (Homer-Dixon and Blitt 
1998).2 The project chose five areas for detailed case studies: Chiapas, Gaza, South
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Africa, Pakistan and Rwanda. Case study selection was based on the occurrence of both 
environmental scarcity and conflict, and the method of "process tracing" was used to 
determine if and how the independent variable (environmental scarcity) was linked to the 
dependent variable (conflict). Homer-Dixon cites George and McKeown's definition of 
process tracing:
The process of constructing an explanation is much like the 
construction of a web or network. The researcher assembles bits and 
piece of evidence into a pattern; whether a piece is to be changed or 
added depends on whether the change fits with what already has been 
constructed, and whether it strengthens the web's structure. Does the 
modification of the explanation create more new puzzles than it solves?
If yes is the answer to these questions, the modification is rejected. 
Modifications that are consistent and produce smaller, more localized, 
and less frequent research puzzles are to be valued. The growth of the 
web orients the search for new pieces, just as the growth of a jig-saw 
puzzle guides the search for new pieces that will fit together with what is 
already assembled (George and McKeown 1985:31-32, cited in Homer- 
Dixon 1999:171).
Through process tracing, the EPS project derived a model for the relationship 
between environmental scarcity and conflict which has these key features:
1. In certain situations scarcities of renewable resources such as croplands, fresh 
water and forests can cause civil conflict and instability, even though on first inspection 
the scarcities do not appear to be a direct cause. This is because "environmental 
scarcity" generates powerful intermediate social effects, e.g. poverty, migrations, ethnic 
tensions and weak institutions, "that analysts often interpret as conflict's immediate 
causes" (Homer-Dixon and Blitt 1998:223).
2. While environmental scarcity above refers specifically to scarcities of 
renewable resources, the definition is then widened to include three factors: "the 
degradation and depletion of renewable resources, the increased demand for these
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resources, and/or their inequitable distribution" (224). The increased demand for 
resources is mainly linked to population growth, so population growth in effect becomes 
the second factor, as illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 (see next page).
3. In conjunction with population growth, the degradation and depletion of 
renewable resources induce powerful groups to tighten their grip on them in a process 
called "resource capture." These groups often use this control to generate profits, while 
intensifying scarcity for poorer and weaker groups. (See Figure 1).
4. Combined with population growth, unequal resource access can force the 
migration of the poorest groups to ecologically vulnerable areas such as steep hillsides, 
tropical rain forests, areas susceptible to desertification, and low-quality urban land. The 
pressure of their numbers and their lack of knowledge and capital then cause "severe 
environmental scarcity and chronic poverty," a process termed "ecological 
marginalization" (225). (See Figure 2.)
5. Environmentally induced conflict can be avoided if societies adapt to 
scarcities by using resources more sustainably or acquiring them through international 
markets. The capacity to adapt, however, depends on whether or not there is "an ample 
supply of the social and technical ingenuity that produces solutions to scarcity" (226). 
The outlook is grim for many Southern countries under-endowed with efficient markets, 
research institutions and the like; moreover, environmental stress is likely to diminish 
their ability to create such institutions in the first place. The result is further 
impoverishment and migration.
6. Environmental scarcity can weaken the state by threatening "the delicate give- 
and-take relationship between state and society" (10), increasing the demands on public
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institutions, encouraging predatory elite behavior, and reducing tax revenues. At the 
same time it can reinforce group identities based on ethnic, religious or class differences 
because "individuals identify with one another when they perceive they share similar 
hardships" (226). Increased competition between groups leads to social segmentation 
and reduced social trust. Ultimately, the weakening of the state "shifts the social balance 
of power in favor of challenger groups...and increases opportunities for violent collective 
action by these groups against the state" (227).
7. By contributing to migrations, economic decline, social segmentation and 
weakened states, environmental scarcity helps lead to violent "ethnic conflicts, 
insurgencies and coups d’etat" (227). These have serious consequences for the security 
interests of both developed and developing countries, triggering monetary crises, refugee 
flows, humanitarian disasters, and either the fragmentation or increased authoritarianism 
of states.
The EPS model of environmental conflict thus neatly completes the circle 
between environment and security. However, neat models rarely do justice to complex 
social realities; as Ronnie Lipschutz has aptly noted, "All arrows might be equal in flow 
charts, but not all have equal significance in everyday life" (Lipschutz 1997:46). There 
are a number of serious problems with the approach.
First and foremost is the weak definitional foundation upon which the model is 
built. As Fairhead notes, the concept of environmental scarcity conflates distinct 
processes -  the generation of renewable resource scarcities, environmental degradation, 
population growth, and the social distribution of resources — into a single, over-arching 
term which is "tantamount to analytical obfuscation" (Fairhead 2001:217, also see Hauge
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and Ellingsen 2001). Environmental degradation is confused with renewable resource 
scarcity (indeed, they are often presented as virtual synonyms) although there is no 
necessary link between the two. Land shortages, for example, can be an incentive to 
boost productivity through better agricultural techniques and land improvements 
(Fairhead 2001).
By adding the social distribution of resources into the definition of 
environmental scarcity, Homer-Dixon de facto creates a link to conflict, since political 
conflict often revolves around issues of resource control. This is the main tool by which 
he is able to force very disparate conflictual situations into his universalizing model, but 
the result is a model so inclusive as to be banal (Fairhead 2001). Gleditsch makes a 
similar point, noting how all resources are scarce "to some degree, at some times, or in 
some places," and that scarcity almost by necessity leads to conflict o f interest 
(Gleditsch 2001:257). Levy notes that environmental factors interact with such a variety 
of social processes to generate violence that "there are no interesting mechanisms that 
are purely and discretely environmental" (Levy 1995:58).
In defense of their tripartite definition of scarcity, Homer-Dixon and colleagues 
state that in their research, problems of decreasing resource supply and rising demand 
were always "intimately entangled" with unequal resource distribution (Schwartz, 
Deligiannis and Homer Dixon 2001:276). While this may be the case, it is not a 
justification for a confusing definition; on the contrary, it calls for disentangling these 
elements in the interest of greater clarity. In the end, their argument relies on privileging 
the natural over die social. "The fundamental issue is one of scarcity of renewable 
resources," they argue, and therefore it is permissible to subsume the social sources of
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scarcity in the definition (276).3
Levy identifies another central flaw of the EPS project as the choice of case 
studies in which violent conflict and resource scarcity are simultaneously occurring. 
Homer-Dixon's rationale is that these cases can most effectively falsify the null 
hypothesis that the two factors are not causally related. However, as Levy points out, 
conflict over renewable resources is to be expected in developing countries since these 
resources are a major source of wealth: "Developing country elites fight over renewable 
resources for the same reason that Willy Sutton robbed banks — that's where the money 
is" (Levy 1995:57). According to Levy, a better research strategy would be the 
comparison of countries with similar environmental problems but varying degrees of 
conflict:
That would permit some precision in identifying the conditions 
under which environmental degradation generates violent conflict and 
when it does not, and for formulating useful policy advice on how to 
avoid violent outcomes. By instead taking aim at a null hypothesis that 
has virtually no advocates, researchers have lost the ability to say 
anything more than "the environment matters," something not seriously 
disputed before this work was undertaken (Levy 1995:57).
He also advises the use of "counterfactuals:" The question should be asked how a
given case of scarcity might have had different outcomes if the political institutions
involved were stronger or more democratic, on the lines of Singapore or Costa Rica, for
example. However, he makes the point that to use counterfactuals effectively, one must
have detailed empirical knowledge of those societies too, another reason Homer-Dixon
should consider places where there is more variation in the operation of the variables he
considers important (Homer-Dixon, Levy, Porter and Goldstone 1996:59).
Homer-Dixon has vigorously defended his research methods, but in so doing has
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revealed several key biases. He admits his colleagues and he deviate from standard 
social science inquiry in the way they go about looking at the relationship between the 
'dependent variable' (conflict) and the 'hypothesized independent variable' 
(environmental scarcity). They are not interested, he writes, "in the whole range of 
factors that currently cause changes in the value of the dependent variable (conflict)," 
instead wanting to show the particular impact of one independent variable 
(environmental scarcity). This is supposed to justify the selection of cases which 
specifically accentuate the variance of the independent variable (Homer-Dixon 1995b:2).
This approach easily leads to an over-emphasis on scarcity causing conflict 
because the other independent variables are a priori of secondary importance. Moreover, 
the methodological muddle of the term "environmental scarcity" confuses matters 
further, since as previously noted, the term conflates distinct social and ecological 
processes so there really is no 'one' variable he is testing.
The process tracing methodology is also problematic since it can encourage 
deterministic patterning: internal consistency is stressed over more open-ended 
exploration, questioning and specificity. Indeed, according to George and McKeown 
(1985), modifications of the explanation are rejected if they create more new puzzles 
than they solve. But these very puzzles could be a warning signal that the chain of causal 
reasoning has weak links or that no single pattern applies.
The models Homer-Dixon produces on the basis of his process tracing have 
similar shortcomings to over-generalized and closed ecological system dynamic models. 
In his critique of such a model for the impact of nomadic pastoralists on the Sahelian 
environment, Taylor (1992) points to a number of problems, including the choice of
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what are considered internal or external factors in the particular ecology and how agents 
are categorized and specified. An important question is "whether to emphasize the 
contingency, even idiosyncracy, of agents' actions or to generalize about agents despite 
differences in their situations. If the particularity is discounted, do the outcomes come to 
appear simply determined?" (119).4
In his summary book Environment. Scarcity and Violence. Homer-Dixon (1999) 
shows himself more open to other methodological approaches, though mainly within the 
bounds of political science. He writes that his methods made sense in the early stages of 
the investigation, but now based on this work, researchers can derive "more 
sophisticated hypotheses" using a broader range of methodologies, such as cross-national 
statistical and counterfactual analyses (182). He is particularly interested in cases where 
violence does not occur even though environmental scarcities are a serious problem.
Nevertheless, he continues to stand behind the EPS project's case studies and 
they still greatly inform his work, comprising the main body of Ecoviolence (Homer- 
Dixon and Blitt 1998) and serving as supporting evidence in Environment. Scarcity and 
Violence. While it is true that the case studies are more nuanced and attentive to context 
than the model, the next section shows how both often generate a misleading picture of 
the causes of environmental degradation and violence.
II. ASSUMPTION TRACING
The deepest flaws of the EPS project include not only methodology but the 
assumptions about the Third World on which it is premised. In a sense the project is 
strangely antiquated, insulated from research in the other social sciences which challenge
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the dominant Western narratives of development. It is sophisticated in form, but not in 
substance. A prominent peace researcher remarked to me that the approach is 
reminiscent of U.S. foreign policy analysis during the Cold War, when information 
about the Soviet Union was made to conform to a prescribed vision of the Evil Empire. 
While this may be unduly harsh, an examination of the project's central assumptions 
reveal serious limitations.
The Ghost of Malthus
Homer-Dixon claims he is not a neo-Malthusian in the sense that he does not 
accept that "finite natural resources place strict limits on the growth of human population 
and consumption" (Homer-Dixon 1999:28). He points out how technological and 
institutional change can boost productivity and induce environmental improvements, and 
he is critical of the apocalyptic vision of "arch-pessimists" like Paul Ehrlich who believe 
that humans have already outstripped the earth's resources (28).
Despite these disclaimers, population growth is the single largest causal factor of 
environmental scarcity in both his project's model and case studies. It figures 
prominently throughout his writings, though less so in his most recent book The 
Ingenuity Gap (2000) (see subsection on the Ingenuity Gap below).
The negative role of population growth is fundamental to the very definition of 
environmental scarcity. As mentioned previously, it becomes a virtual synonym with the 
increased demand for resources, which is one of the three components of environmental 
scarcity. It is central to the processes of 'resource capture' and 'ecological 
marginalization.'
This automatic equation of population growth with increased resource demand is
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incorrect. Not only does it not necessarily follow that if there are more people, they will 
consume more -- per capita consumption could fall for a variety of reasons -- but it may 
be that the increased resource consumption has little to do with demographic factors but 
instead with increased demand in external markets for a particular product, e.g. teak for 
Scandinavian style furniture. (I will return to this point later.)
The relationship of depopulation with environmental degradation does not figure 
in the EPS model at all. In Brazil, for example, many areas depopulated by poor peasants 
because of their lack of access to land and agricultural inputs have gone over to 
ecologically damaging extensive cattle raising, industrial monoculture and logging 
(Mello 1997). Similarly, in Mexico the exodus of peasants to urban areas has led to the 
loss of valuable micro-habitats and crop genetic diversity previously sustained by their 
labor (Boyce 1996; Garcia-Barrios and Garcia-Barrios 1990). In Africa low population 
densities and dispersed settlement patterns have been identified as important factors 
impeding the development of agriculture (Turner et al 1993). In general, as Templeton 
and Scherr observe, decreases in population density can lead not only to declines in 
cropping frequency, but "to cessation of labor-intensive methods of replenishing soil 
fertility, to neglect, abandonment or destruction of terraced landscapes and to soil 
erosion, downstream siltation and other forms of degradation" (Templeton and Scherr 
1999:906).
While in Environment Scarcity and Violence. Homer-Dixon acknowledges the 
possibility that population growth may in certain cases help spur agricultural innovation 
and intensification, he is largely pessimistic, remarking, for example, that even under the 
most favorable conditions, countries in Africa and elsewhere with high population
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growth rates will not be able to boost yields sufficiently to keep pace with population 
growth (Homer-Dixon 1999: 34). This contradicts field research which suggests the 
situation is considerably more complex and context-specific. For example, Tiffen, 
Mortimore and Gichuki's study of Machakos District in Kenya found that increasing 
population densities combined with sound agricultural practices and market access led to 
boosts in agricultural productivity and environmental improvement (Tiffen, Mortimore 
and Gichuki 1994; also see Turner et al 1993). While population growth may decrease 
the size of landholdings, it can also expand the family labor supply, encouraging more 
labor-intensive cultivation and conservation techniques. Thus, declining landholdings in 
Rwanda are associated with more investments in soil conservation and greater managed 
tree densities per unit of land (Templeton and Scherr 1999).
In their research in West Africa, Fairhead and Leach document how population 
increase can lead to greater rather than less forest cover. Fanning practices such as 
gardening and mounding can alter soils in ways that encourage afforestation, while 
village settlements are associated with the intentional creation of forest "islands" in the 
savannah as a source of forest products, a means of defense, and a location for cultural 
activities. Farmers also plant and transplant trees in fields and fallows (Leach and 
Fairhead 2000, see also Fairhead and Leach 1996,1998).
Fairhead and Leach caution, however, that one should not simply trade neo- 
Malthusian assumptions for neo-Boserupian ones. Just as there is no iron law that 
population growth leads to environmental degradation, nor is it axiomatic that population 
growth automatically spurs agricultural innovation and environmental improvement. "By 
framing the issue primarily in terms of relationships between aggregate populations, an
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aggregate '’environment” or resource set, and technology,” they write, "both neo- 
Malthusian and neo-Boserupian perspectives exclude crucial questions relating to social 
and ecological specificity and history” (Leach and Fairhead 2000:18).
In the end, Homer-Dixon blames population growth disproportionately for 
environmental degradation, poverty, migration and ultimately political instability. Thus, 
he cites population growth as a major cause of the rise of Sendero Luminoso in Peru, 
violent unrest in Chiapas and the New People's Army (NPA) insurgency in the 
Philippines (Homer-Dixon 1999:18,23,78). He also fears the effects of the "youth 
bulge,” the fact that the age structure in most developing countries is heavily weighted 
toward the young (see previous chapter).
Around the planet, Homer-Dixon claims:
Population growth and unequal access to good land force huge 
numbers of rural people onto marginal lands. There, they cause 
environmental damage and become chronically poor. Eventually, they 
may be the source of persistent upheaval, or they may migrate yet again, 
helping to stimulate ethnic conflicts or urban unrest elsewhere (155).
Thus, like so many environment and security scholars, he subscribes to the degradation
narrative, to which he gives the name "ecological marginalization."
Ecological Marginalization and the Localization of Blame
Homer-Dixon's acceptance of the degradation narrative leads to a neglect of 
larger economic and political forces that profoundly affect 'local' environments and 
conflicts. In a period of rapid global economic integration, the model is surprisingly 
insular in scope. It is essentially a closed system in which internal stresses may generate 
movement outward, mainly through mass migration, but the outside is rarely seen to be
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pressing in.
Yet in reality there is no distinct boundary between the inside and the outside, or 
between the local, regional, national and global; they are linked through complex 
patterns of trade, investment, and foreign policy imperatives. Renewable and non­
renewable resources alike have long been the traditional exports of the South. This 
"effective demand" from elsewhere may drive environmental degradation much more 
than local poverty and population growth (Fairhead 2001). Largely missing from 
Homer-Dixon's model is the crucial role of extractive industries -- mining, timber, 
agribusiness, etc. — in the depletion and degradation of local natural resources.
Homer-Dixon is not alone in these omissions. As Conca remarks, the 
environmental security framework in general focuses on the "geographic location of 
visible symptoms rather than the social location of underlying causes" (Conca 1998:43). 
In the same vein, Dalby draws attention to how the demands of rich urban areas in the 
North for the resources of the South create a '"shadow economy' of degradation," which 
is often ignored in the literature (Dalby 1999).5
Homer-Dixon depicts ecological marginalization as a process by which unequal 
resource access and population growth force the migration of the poorest groups to 
ecologically vulnerable areas such as steep hillsides and tropical rain forests, which they 
then proceed to degrade. There are two problems here. First is the assumption that 
population growth and unequal resource access have equal weight as the 'push factors' 
causing people to migrate to such areas. Second is the failure to fully articulate the range 
of actors responsible for "unequal resource access."
For example, an extensive study of deforestation by the United Nations Research
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Institute for Social Development notes that while many observers blame deforestation on 
forest clearing by poor migrants, they ignore the larger forces attracting or pushing these 
migrants into forest areas, such as the expansion of large-scale commercial farming, 
ranching, logging and mining. "To blame poor migrants for destroying the forest is like 
blaming poor conscripts for the ravages of war" (Barraclough and Ghimire 1990:130). 
The study found an absence of any close correspondence between deforestation rates and 
rates of either total or agricultural population growth.
Homer-Dixon uses deforestation in the Philippines as a classic example of 
ecological marginalization. Unequal land access and population growth push poor 
unemployed peasants into ecologically vulnerable uplands where their slash and bum 
farming and small-scale logging destroy the environment. What Homer-Dixon leaves 
out is that under the Marcos dictatorship fewer than 200 wealthy individuals controlled a 
large fraction of the country's forests (Boyce 1993); during that period the country's 
forest reserves dwindled from 34.6 million acres to only 5.4 million (Jones 1986). The 
main culprit was not population growth -- one study found zero correlation between 
population growth and rates of deforestation in the country's provinces (Kummer 1992) - 
- but rather the illegal logging concessions Marcos gave to relatives and political friends, 
as well as his agricultural policies which heightened rural inequalities.
To the extent that poor peasants have degraded the upland environment in the 
Philippines, one needs to look more closely at the dynamics involved. Settlers have 
moved into the highlands on already existing logging roads. Although they occupy 
nominally public land, many pay rent to wealthy private landlords who use the money to 
pay 'taxes' to local officials so they can eventually lay claim to the land. As Boyce notes:
195
Although upland farmers often do contribute to deforestation, it is 
misleading to cast them as the main villains...what distinguishes upland 
farmers from other agents of deforestation -  loggers, government 
officials, absentee landlords, and international firms and institutions -- is 
that the upland farmers are among the principal victims of the 
deforestation process. Not coincidentally, they are also the poorest 
(Boyce 1993:238).
Also missing from Homer-Dixon’s picture of the Philippines and elsewhere are 
the consumers of the extracted products. For example, the main cause of deforestation in 
developing countries is demand for wood and paper, and nearly half that wood and 
three-quarters of that paper are used in industrialized nations (UNDP 1998). The failure 
to link the consumption patterns of Northern countries and Southern elites to ’local' land 
uses is in fact a major blind spot in Homer-Dixon's approach. Another is the lack of 
adequate attention to the role of price fluctuations on the international market in 
determining resource supply and demand. It is outside the scope of this chapter to do a 
detailed rendering of the international political economy of trade and finance, but suffice 
it to say, it has profound effects on resource use.
In one instance when Homer-Dixon does specifically refer to multinational 
corporate interests, the conclusion he reaches twists the concept of environmental 
scarcity and effectively puts the onus back on the local people. He notes how 
multinational extraction of oil in Nigeria's Ogoniland and copper on the island of 
Bougainville has polluted those regions.6 This pollution magically becomes 
"environmental scarcity," even though it was the abundance of resources which attracted 
foreign firms to both areas in the first place (Homer-Dixon 1999:147-148).
He then describes violent insurgencies in Ogoniland and Bougainville as 
examples of "group-identity and relative deprivation motivations." He writes:
196
If the historical identity of a clearly defined social group is 
strongly linked to a particular set of natural resources or a particular 
pattern of resource use, degradation or depletion of that resource can 
accentuate a feeling of relative deprivation. Members of the group can 
come to feel that they are being denied their rightful access to resources 
that are key to their self-definition as a group. This relative deprivation 
boosts grievances that may eventually be expressed through aggressive 
assertion of a group identity (Homer-Dixon 1999:147-8).
That local people bonded together to defend their land and livelihoods hardly seems a
special case of group identity. In Ogoniland, in fact, it was the Nigerian military who
displayed the most "aggressive assertion of a group identity" in their brutal campaign to
protect the interests of Shell Oil. Why, one has to ask, does Homer-Dixon focus on the
violence of local acts of resistance, and not on the much larger violence of state and
corporate enforcers?
Sometimes the problem is not only what is missing from the picture, but the
'facts' which comprise the picture itself. The case study of Chiapas strongly emphasizes
the role of deforestation and land degradation, particularly soil erosion, in the creation of
environmental scarcity and conflict in the region. The authors acknowledge that there
has been "no credible long-term study of soil erosion in Chiapas," but nevertheless
believe that "by piecing together available data and anecdotal evidence, we can clarify
the story of supply-induced scarcities of cropland in the state" (Howard and Homer-
Dixon 1998:32). "Speculate" would be a far better word than "clarify" in this instance.
They use three sources of data to make their case. First, is the World Map of the
Status of Human-Induced Soil Degradation published by UNEP and the International
Soil Reference Center in the Netherlands, in which the data for specific regions are
highly aggregated. Nevertheless, there is provisional soil degradation information for
Chiapas which indicates moderate losses in a number of locations. The accuracy of the
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data is questionable, however, since there have been no credible long-term studies of soil 
erosion in the region. According to Lindert, the World Map project in general is 
seriously flawed because it attempts to measure changes over time in the absence of data 
over time, presents a set of predictions rather than a real census of soil conditions on 
nonexperimental farms, and "proceeds from its own preconception that all land 
degradation is human induced" (Lindert 2000:22). As Lindert notes, "If we don't know 
with any real degree of certainty when the soil changed, or even whether it changed, how
n
can we know why it changed" (20).
Howard and Homer-Dixon (1998) then hypothesize on the basis of a 1975 study 
of farming techniques and soil degradation in the Central Highlands of Chiapas that 
conditions "have probably worsened" since the population has grown, thereby leading to 
a shorter fallow period in swidden agriculture (33). They assume that this process is also 
being replicated in the colonization of land elsewhere. The evidence here, needless to 
say, is speculative. They then project the extent of soil erosion in Chiapas on the 
basis of a general model of the economic costs of erosion developed by David Pimentel 
and colleagues for a temperate ecosystem. They insert indicators for rainfall, soil depth, 
slope, etc. for a tropical and a more temperate zone in Chiapas into Pimentel's model and 
come up with estimates of the erosion rate, yield loss and replacement costs. Given the 
vast differences between tropical and temperate zones, and the variation in temperate 
zones themselves, this is a dubious exercise. The use of such models is questionable in 
general given their oversimplification of interactive variables. Even soil erosion studies 
done in situ are fraught with errors (Stocking 1996), and Howard and Homer-Dixon's 
approach is many more steps removed from the actual landscapes they seek to analyze.8
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Lindert questions the overall emphasis placed on erosion as the main cause of 
land degradation. Concerns about erosion have a more dramatic appeal, he argues, and 
have greater implications for social intervention, yet soil nutrient imbalances due to 
intensive cropping and inadequate fertilization may in fact be the larger problem (Lindert 
2000).
Many models and data on deforestation are similarly flawed. In their study of six 
West African nations, Fairhead and Leach found that the extent of deforestation had 
been exaggerated in each, in part due to lack of attention to historical evidence and the 
resulting assumption that at the beginning of the 20th century, West African forests 
existed in a state of pristine equilibrium, essentially undisturbed by human use (Fairhead 
and Leach 1998). Moreover, in the absence of other data, many analyses of forest change 
have utilized a model which links population increase to land clearance, and hence 
vegetation change. As a result, "neo-Malthusian assumptions about local population- 
forest relations are thus embedded in the forest statistics themselves" (Leach and 
Fairhead 2000:24). In the case of the Himalayan region, Thompson, Warburton and 
Hatley (1986) found that the deforestation data were woefully defective and 
contradictory, based on "premature quantification, excessive abstraction and 
overgeneralization" (4). At the very least, such findings indicate that the statistics which 
undergird degradation narratives should be carefully interrogated, and that a healthy dose 
of skepticism is in order.
In the Chiapas case, the focus on population pressure and soil erosion ultimately 
reinforces the naturalization of a social conflict. It is not as if Howard and Homer- 
Dixon ignore the social causes; on the contrary, they write at length about the history of
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class and race relations in the region and the role of the Mexican state. But in their 
conclusion they cite "a rapidly growing peasant population" as the first among a 
"particularly explosive combination of factors" leading to the Zapatista rebellion 
(Howard and Homer Dixon 1998:54). A contrasting view is presented by Bobrow- 
Strain (2001), who argues that land conflicts in the area are not a result of "too many 
people competing for too little land." Rather,
They arise from the confluence of national and economic 
reforms, changes in international commodity markets, and local histories 
of violence and insecurity that reduce both ranchers and peasants' 
capacity to use land intensively and effectively. In this sense, the actual 
scarcity in Chiapas is not tied to the environment or even land 
distribution but rather to politically charged forces that push producers 
toward less effective production (157).9
In the case of Gaza, Kelly and Homer-Dixon similarly over-emphasize 
Palestinian population growth and water scarcity in the generation of conflict. "Rapid 
population growth and intense agricultural activity in a region of scarce resources have 
combined with Israel's policies throughout the occupation to produce a potentially 
volatile political environment in Gaza," they write (Kelly and Homer-Dixon 1998:99). 
Yet it is not a question of "combining with" here; as the authors themselves document, 
the Palestinian population's lack of access to water and other productive resources is 
directly due to Israeli policies. Israeli policies should be a main subject of the sentence, 
and of serious analysis of conflict in the region.
Exclusion and Enclosure
One of the most fundamental problems with Homer-Dixon's approach is the 
acceptance of exclusion and enclosure as a given state of affairs, understating the role of
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the violent processes that lead to them. His case study of South Africa, co-authored with 
Percival, portrays the bantustans as virtual Malthustans,'10 where overpopulation, 
depleted resources and unequal resource access lead to ecological marginalization and 
then to migration to marginal urban areas where growing black populations in limited 
areas once more wreak havoc on the environment. The resulting environmental scarcity 
ostensibly escalates grievances, intensifies group divisions, and weakens institutions, 
fuelling violence which potentially may lock South Africa "into a deadly spiral of 
conflict" (Percival and Homer-Dixon 1998a: 139).
But why are people made to subsist in limited, marginal areas, whether rural or 
urban? Why and how are they enclosed? Might the enduring violent legacy of apartheid 
have more to do with present political unrest than the fact that black people are cutting 
down trees?
A related issue is why people who are excluded and enclosed lack opportunities 
elsewhere. In the case studies there is little emphasis placed on the possibility of 
concrete economic and political changes which would provide people with the ability to 
diversify their livelihoods and/or reduce pressure on the natural resource base. The 
Chiapas case study does recognize that peasants suffering from acute land scarcity have 
only limited economic alternatives because of structural adjustments in the 1980s which 
reduced labor absorption in key industries and the spread of labor-displacing agricultural 
technologies on large estates (Howard and Homer-Dixon 1998). Yet peasant population 
growth still figures much more prominently in the analysis than this lack of an economic 
outlet due to state fiscal and agrarian policies.
Similarly, it is only on the last pages of the South Africa study that the authors
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briefly sketch alternatives (economic growth, job creation, agricultural extension 
services, etc.) to the grim scarcity scenario they have laid out. Generally, in the case 
studies the necessity of, and prospects, for market development and industrialization are 
underplayed because in the absence of these possibilities, the neo-Malthusian scarcity 
argument appears more convincing. It also appears more convincing when migration is 
portrayed in a predominantly negative light.
Migration: Menace or Mitigation?
Aside from a few provisos that migration is not always a negative phenomenon 
(e.g. Homer-Dixon 1999:142), the EPS model, like the degradation narrative, is 
premised on the idea that migration is mainly demographically and environmentally 
induced, and that it often generates conflict as well as environmental degradation in the 
receiving area. "Environmental scarcity is, without doubt, a significant cause of today's 
unprecedented levels of internal and international migration around the world," Homer- 
Dixon writes confidently (95).
Doubt, however, is in order. The causes of migration are extremely complex and 
context-specific, and moreover, there is little evidence to support the view that 
demographic pressure is at the root of many population movements (Suhrke 1997). 
Moreover, migration from rural areas is often not a linear phenomenon or a rejection of 
rural livelihoods. Instead, it can be a vital part of sustaining them.
In their study of Vietnam, Locke, Adger and Kelly (2000) point out how internal 
migration is frequently circular and seasonal, with migrants returning to the rural areas at 
harvest time. Moreover, their remittances from urban jobs often help fund investments
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in agricultural intensification, children's education, etc., enhancing the ecological and 
social resilience of the household. Black (1998) notes similar processes in the Sahel, 
where migration is less a response to environmental decline than a strategy of income 
diversification, with remittances playing a major role in household and regional 
economies.
The relationship between migration and conflict also does not fit well into a 
simple model. Suhrke challenges Homer-Dixon's notion that migrants are major 
instigators of urban unrest and ethnic conflict. Migration from rural areas is only one 
cause of urban growth; natural increase and urban-to-urban migration are also significant 
factors. Moreover, it is difficult to isolate growth as the cause of urban violence, and the 
phenomenon of urban violence itself is often over-exaggerated. A number of micro­
studies now dispute the "the presumed pathology of megacities in the Third World," 
pointing to the functionality of many large urban areas (Suhrke 1997).
Homer-Dixon uses Bangladeshi migration to Assam as a classic example of 
population pressure-induced migration generating ethnic conflict (Homer-Dixon 
1994,1999). Suhrke argues, however, that the conflict in the 1970s was largely due to 
the Indian central government aligning itself with the immigrants against the local 
Assamese:
The peculiarly competitive structure of Indian politics in this 
period turned the illegal Bangladeshi migrants into valuable 'vote banks' 
for the all-India Congress party, thereby threatening the local political 
party. The locals responded by forming a nativist movement which in a 
complicated but related dynamic, led to large-scale violence (Suhrke 
1997:264).
The Congress Party also made it easy for immigrants to settle by providing ration cards 
and access to land, thus acting as a powerful "pull factor."11
203
While Homer-Dixon acknowledges that these political developments are part of 
the "contextual factors" which shape migration and conflict dynamics in the region, he 
emphasizes land scarcity arising from population growth as the key driver. But as Black 
notes, "in conflict, as much as in migration, it is difficult or impossible to isolate 
particular causes outside the broader context within which these processes develop" 
(Black 1998:35). "Context" is not background; it is the very heart of the matter.
Under-specification
Overall, the EPS project's treatment of rural poverty, population growth, 
environmental change and migration suffers from under-specification. Emerging from 
an IR/security framework, the model takes too little notice of other social science 
research in anthropology, geography and development studies that looks more closely at 
the dynamics of resource use and distribution from the household level on up.12 The 
local is not adequately differentiated, nor the global articulated. The poor, when they are 
differentiated at all, are done so mainly on the basis of ethnicity and religion.
Gender, for example, is not used as a category of analysis, a lacuna that has been 
noted by a former member of Homer-Dixon's team (Percival 1997). Yet despite lack of 
explicit attention to gender, certain views of women are implicit in the model, 
particularly given the central and negative role it ascribes to population growth. 
Subsumed into the analytic frame of population pressure, women through their fertility 
become the breeders of environmental destruction, poverty and violence.13 They are the 
invisible heart of environmental scarcity, made visible only when policies to ease 
"population growth-induced scarcity", such as "family planning and literacy campaigns"
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(Homer-Dixon 1994:16), are put forward.
Important questions about gender are not asked, much less answered. What are 
women's property rights, labor obligations, and roles in the management of 
environmental resources? Is there differential access to resources within the household? 
How have structural adjustment and other macro-economic policies affected women's 
health, workloads and status relative to male family members? Where are investments 
being made: in basic food production, where rural women most often work, or in export 
agriculture? If men must migrate to earn cash or to join militaries, how do women cope 
with the labor requirements needed to sustain food production and maintain 
infrastructure? How does environmental change affect gender relations?14 And how do 
all these issues relate to women -  and men's — reproductive strategies?
Case studies in Africa, for example, have shown how gender dynamics can have 
an important effect on agricultural growth. "Increasingly, day-to-day decisions about all 
facets of agriculture are being made by females, in most cases under conditions in which 
access to land is invested in males," write Hyden, Kates and Turner. "This contradiction 
is one that must be resolved adequately...if agriculture is not to stagnate" (Turner et al 
1993:418). Recent literature on women and land rights points to the critical role of land 
ownership in providing women with the political clout and economic security for real 
'empowerment' to take place within the household, community and society at large 
(Agarwal 1994, Deere and Leon 2001).
Gender analysis also opens a window through which to view potential solutions 
to the problems of resource degradation, maldistribution and constraints on agricultural 
growth. Unfortunately, many current land redistribution and community-based natural
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resource management schemes have widened the gender gap rather than narrowed it 
because they have ignored power differences within the household, community and 
larger political structures. According to Indian economist Bina Agarwal, rethinking 
communities from a gender perspective would have a number of advantages:
Conventionally treated as aggregates of households (at best with 
class/race/caste differences), communities, if recognized as gendered 
networks of individuals, could become spaces for creating institutions 
based on identities derived not only (or even) from household 
membership, but from socioeconomic need and gender. The examples of 
communal management of land by women are cases in point. In fact, a 
gendered perspective on institutions for the collective management of 
local resources — land, water, forests — would provide a promising new 
focus for development analysis and policy (Agarwal 1997:1379).
The EPS project also fails to differentiate types of rural poverty and their
relationship to environmental change. Criticizing the degradation narrative in general,
Reardon and Vosti argue that poverty cannot be treated as a single concept, and that
assets must be broken down into specific categories. When households are "investment
poor," lacking the cash and human resources to invest in maintenance or enhancement of
the natural resource base, then environmental degradation is more likely to occur.
However, there are many different reasons for investment poverty, and analyses need to
be time and site-specific. Moreover, the precise nature of the environmental change in
question must itself be specified (Reardon and Vosti 1995).
The Wind-Up State
Homer-Dixon's view of the state is also under-specified as well as oddly old- 
fashioned. Before the onset of environmental scarcity, the state is essentially presented 
as a unitary actor, engaged in a "delicate give and take relationship" with society, and
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delinked from the larger international context of regional and superpower rivalries. But 
enter environmental scarcity like a deus ex machina, and the state becomes the agent of 
whomever can get their hands first on the turn-key and springs into a flurry of largely 
destructive activity.
Several points need making here. First, whether in times of resource scarcity or 
abundance, most states have always been arenas of contention between groups making 
competing claims; the state may be unitary in form but seldom in substance. Secondly, 
the "delicate give and take relationship" between state and society may have existed 
somewhere under a benevolent monarch, or perhaps under the most enlightened social 
democracies, but otherwise the relationship has long been fraught with conflict, 
frequently brutal and violent. Thirdly, the state itself, through state-owned or aided 
enterprises, parastatal institutions such as marketing boards, conservation policies, 
contract awards, fiscal policies, etc., has often played a major role in managing, 
extracting and profiting from natural resources.
A pertinent example is the case of development projects. In describing the 
process of resource capture, Homer-Dixon has noted that agricultural shortfalls due to 
population pressure and land degradation can induce states to launch large development 
schemes, such as dams for irrigation (Homer-Dixon and Percival 1996:35). The benefits 
of these schemes are then captured by the rich, potentially leading to conflict.
However, the undertaking of a large development project often has much less to 
do with agricultural shortfalls than with the links between foreign donors/companies and 
domestic elites who stand to gain from lucrative procurement and construction contracts 
awarded to them because of their prior cozy relationship with government officials. In
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this sense, too, the choice of technology — whether it is environmentally appropriate and 
more conducive to control by small farmers, or large, expensive and even harmful -- 
usually has less to with the actual shortfalls than with who has the power to do the 
choosing. (See, for example, the case of a World Bank deep tubewell project in 
Bangladesh in Hartmann and Boyce 1983; also Fairhead 2001).
Homer-Dixon believes that in the absence of adequate adaptation, environmental 
scarcity weakens states, though a case can be made for the opposite scenario. The client 
state could potentially use resource scarcities to leverage more foreign assistance, and 
with this assistance secure more domestic clients and create new bureaucracies for aid 
projects, yet another avenue of patronage. In fact, one could argue that in recent years 
declining foreign assistance, high levels of debt, unfavorable terms of trade and financial 
austerity measures — not shortages of renewable resources — are creating the real 
’scarcity' that weakens states.
Richards notes how African patrimonial systems of governance were 
strengthened in the Cold War period when leaders could use their geopolitical position to 
bargain for increased aid resources from the West and the Soviet Union. According to 
him,
Patrimonialism in the 1990s faces a double crisis. World 
recession has reduced prices of many raw materials. Countries like 
Sierra Leone have also seen the exhaustion of some of their best sources 
of minerals. Meanwhile the ending of the Cold War caused sources of 
aid money to dry up. There is less money around to maintain the 
crumbling facade of the 'official state'(Richards 1996:36).
Yet even the weak state finds ways to cope in this new era. Reno describes the 
key mechanisms by which weak African states have preserved their power. With the end 
of Cold War superpower support, weak states are re-working their foreign ties,
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especially clandestine commercial ones. In some cases, they are using foreign firms 
such as the South Africa-based Executive Outcomes to perform important functions of 
state security; states also sell off national resources to foreign firms since "from a weak 
state ruler's perspective, it is better to have important state assets fall into the hands of 
reliable foreigners than to see them removed from his control entirely" (Reno 1997:172). 
This suits creditors as well, since it meets their demands for revenue generation, and 
international development agencies are pleased with the resulting 'stability.' A far more 
interesting question to ask than "Is environmental scarcity weakening the state?" would 
be how these post-Cold War relations affect the reconfiguration of the state, patterns of 
resource exploitation, and the nature of conflict and security.
For example, recent research on the nature of contemporary civil wars points to 
the primacy of the economic interests of the perpetrators. "To paraphrase Carl von 
Clausewitz," David Keen writes, "war has increasingly become the continuation of 
economics by other means. War is not simply a breakdown in a particular system, but a 
way of creating an alternative system of profit, power and even protection" (Keen 
1998:11, see also Reno 2000). A recent study of civil wars by Paul Collier corroborates 
this point. He finds that the presense (not scarcity) of primary commodity exports that 
are easily lootable substantially increases the risks of civil conflict (Collier 2000). De 
Soysa (2000) and Fairhead (2001) similarly contend that an abundance of mineral wealth 
is positively and significantly related to armed conflict, and not scarcity of renewable 
resources.
War economies meanwhile are intrinsically linked with current processes of 
economic globalization and neoliberalism. Duffield notes how the erosion of the state's
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regulatory authority and public welfare functions under neoliberalism help spur market 
deregulation and declines in the rule of law and protection of customary rights. This 
allows warring parties to engage in resource extraction and transborder economic and 
arms transactions with greater impunity. Warring parties meanwhile are closely linked 
to both legal and criminal globalized trade networks: "Today's so-called warlords or 
failed states may act locally, but to survive they have to think globally" (Duffield 
2000:84). Duffield disputes the idea that conflict arises from the "development malaise" 
of poverty and scarcity; rather war economies often employ immiseration and violent 
population displacement "as an essential precondition of asset realization" (81).15
In terms of the state and ethnicity, Homer-Dixon maintains that environmental 
scarcity can lead to a kind of localized ethnic and identity politics that causes social 
fragmentation and more opportunity for powerful groups to seize control of the state. 
Several observations are warranted here. As Fairhead notes, segmentation and narrow 
identity affiliations often arise in the context of insecure economic, legal and political 
rights, whether the environment is depleted or not. As conflict develops, "the politics of 
identity" can become "the politics of resource access" (Fairhead 1997:16), particularly 
when personal property is at stake. However, that does not mean the property, e.g. land, 
is necessarily 'scarce' or even if it is scarce, is the determining factor.
Moreover, much ethnic strife is due to the cynical manipulation of ethnicity by 
political leaders. Colonial policies of divide and rule in Africa, for example, have left a 
legacy of ethnic divisions that many current politicians are all too willing to exploit. 
Journalist Bill Berkeley documents how recent conflicts in Liberia, Congo-Zaire, South 
Africa, Sudan, Uganda and Rwanda share in common a century-long history of racial or
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ethnically based tyranny. The main fomenters of violence are well-educated and 
sophisticated, often with close ties to Western governments and corporations. As 
Berkeley points out, while 'barefoot soldiers' may carry out the violence on the ground, 
the planners wear very nice shoes indeed (Berkeley 2001). Playing the ethnic card is a 
political choice.
It is also important to remember that ethnic violence occurs in many different 
types of settings — in weak states and strong states, poor states and rich states. Even in 
the resource-abundant United States, there have been a number of contemporary black 
riots in urban ghettos. The precise nature of ethnic conflict is highly culture and context- 
specific, not easily forced into any kind of model especially one which essentially 
naturalizes the process by linking it to the environment rather than to complex social, 
economic and cultural systems.16
Another problem with Homer-Dixon's conception of the state is the generally 
negative characterization of oppositional forces. In Environment, Scarcity and Violence 
he is careful to note that "social conflict — even violent conflict — is not always a bad 
thing" (Homer-Dixon 1999:5). Yet he rarely takes a look at social movements other 
than those which he directly links to environmental scarcity. National and transnational 
movements for women's rights, economic justice, environment and peace not only offer 
alternative scenarios to the insidious social segmentation he portrays, but are a rich 
source of alternative research and analysis of the issues he raises. Because of his 
overriding concern with security, his model is deeply oriented toward the status quo — 
what is in place is stable, and whatever upsets it is destabilizing, leaving little room for 
the possibility ofpositive political transformation.
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The Rwanda Exception
Interestingly, Homer-Dixon and Percival's case study of Rwanda finds that 
"environmental and population pressures had at most a limited, aggravating role" in 
causing the genocide there and criticizes commentary which attributes the conflict to 
them as being "too simplistic" (Percival and Homer-Dixon 1998b:201). In a departure 
from the norm, it purposefully sets about to refute hypotheses which posit a strong 
causal relationship between environmental scarcity and high levels of grievances, 
political instability and the manipulation of ethnic identity in Rwanda. Instead the study 
identifies regime and elite insecurity caused by the civil war and the Arusha accords as 
the central cause of the conflict and highlights the role of structural adjustment, the fall 
in coffee prices and declining food production in creating general economic malaise.
Unlike other case studies, it makes a strong distinction between the regime and 
the state:
The regime is the set of individuals that has gained control of the 
state's internal relations. In developing societies, the regime usually lacks 
the support of a large share of the population: it represents the interests of 
a specific ethnic, economic or military group. The distinction between 
the internal and external aspects of the state is cmcial to our 
understanding of the Rwandan case: it was the Habyarimana regime, not 
the Rwandan state, that faced threats to its security. The regime did all it 
could to maintain its grip on power (215).
This conception is problematic for several reasons: The separation between the internal
and external aspects of the state is overstated, since the same actors are often involved in
both and policies overlap; and the characterization of developing countries as ruled by
small groups ignores the great diversity of political formations. However, it is useful in
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that it allows Homer-Dixon to deviate from his own previous conceptions of the state in 
order to pinpoint specific political actors in the generation of violence in Rwanda. These 
actors are largely missing from the other case studies, or cast as 'powerful groups' who 
gain control of the state because of environmental scarcity.
In Rwanda, it seems, more explicit political human agency exists that is not 
environmentally determined. The study concludes: "If researchers are to understand 
complex conflicts like the Rwandan genocide, they must be acutely aware of the issues 
motivating the conflict's actors. They must not only examine what people do and what 
physical environment they do it in, but why they do it" (217-8).
It is worth considering why Rwanda is the exception. Any of the other cases 
studies could have also found that environmental scarcity played "at most a limited, 
aggravating role" in generating conflict if political and economic factors were given the 
same weight that they were in the Rwandan study. One suspects that the Rwanda 
exception was made for more pragmatic reasons: the crude environmental determinism 
of Robert Kaplan et al was finally coming under critical scrutiny in academic quarters 
(e.g. Ford 1995 and Olson 1995) and Homer-Dixon did not want to be tarred with the 
same brush.
In his PhD thesis on environmental security, Leif Ohlsson also notes the 
divergence between the Rwandan and other EPS case studies, although he believes 
Homer-Dixon should have stayed with a neo-Malthusian analysis. He cites personal 
correspondence with Homer-Dixon who wrote:
Yes, you can say that our research and policy advocacy goals 
were shifted somewhat by a desire to respond to prevailing simplistic 
arguments (by people from the Washington Post editorial staff to Tipper 
Gore) about the causes of the Rwandan crisis. I am not repudiating the
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central conclusions of the Rwandan paper, however (Ohlsson 
1999:119,fti.98).
This acknowledgement provides an intriguing glimpse of the political context in which 
the EPS project was operating, which will be explored further in the next chapter.
Ingenuity Gaps
Homer-Dixon’s main solution to the problems generated by environmental 
scarcity is a technocratic one, represented by the concept of "ingenuity,” by which he 
means "ideas applied to solve practical social and technical problems" (Homer-Dixon 
1999:109). Both social and technical ingenuity are required, with the former being a 
precursor of the latter. According to him:
Social ingenuity is key to the creation, reform, and maintenance 
of public and semipublic goods such as markets, funding agencies, 
educational and research organizations, and effective government. If 
operating well, this system of institutions provides psychological and 
material incentives to technological entrepreneurs and innovators; it aids 
regular contact and communication among experts; and it channels 
resources preferentially to those endeavors with the greatest prospect of 
success (110).
Scarcities of resources, especially renewable ones, will demand ever greater 
supplies of ingenuity. The need to run resource systems more efficiently will require 
"tightly coupled and highly complex horizontal and vertical management" (113). And 
even this may not suffice because "fundamental physical, biological and social 
constraints may make it difficult to fully compensate for the effects of scarcity" (114).
Homer-Dixon believes one of the strongest barriers to creating the ingenuity to 
cope with scarcity is none other than scarcity itself because of the "social friction" it 
generates.17 In line with his weakening of the state argument, he maintains scarcity can
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lead to the formation of small coalitions with narrow interests that prevent the 
institution-building necessary for social and technical ingenuity to flourish.
In the end he falls back on cultural stereotypes to explain whether a country can 
break out of this vicious cycle or not. In a "culture of selfishness" people resort to 
narrow coalitions more rapidly than in a "culture of good will" (120). He cites the 
Philippines as an example of the former: "Filipino culture encourages cooperation within 
groups rather than among groups; the resulting isolation of groups from each other — the 
oft-remarked clannishness of the society — undermines the concept of national welfare" 
(120). Yet the Philippines has one of the most highly sophisticated and integrated 
democratic social movements in Asia, as witnessed in the anti-Marcos struggle.
Similarly, states already penetrated by narrow coalitions are deemed less able to 
handle scarcity. The example given here is India, which supposedly does not have 
strong political parties that can mediate between narrow coalitions and the state (121). 
Yet not only does India have strong political parties, but a well-developed, publicly 
funded scientific establishment, an essential ingredient in Homer-Dixon's recipe for 
ingenuity. Unfortunately, that 'ingenuity' has also demonstrated itself in a destructive 
manner, with the development and testing of nuclear weaponry.
Homer-Dixon also takes a narrow, Western view of science, neglecting the role 
of local knowledges, or what James Scott (1998) calls metis or practical knowledge, in 
helping to mitigate scarcity and bring about environmental improvements. "Many of the 
scarcities facing poor countries demand advanced science like molecular biology that 
they cannot afford," Homer-Dixon notes (Homer-Dixon 1999:124).
Perceiving poor peasants as largely degraders of their environment, rather than
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possible agents of its restoration, he fails to acknowledge the tremendous ingenuity of 
small cultivators around the world, whose agricultural knowledge is based on close and 
astute observation. As Scott writes, these cultivators have a vital stake in the results of 
their own experimentation. Unlike research scientists or extension agents, they live all 
year in the field of observation and will directly benefit or suffer economically from the 
impact of their decisions. Moreover, contrary to Homer-Dixon's formula, Scott maintains 
that the poverty or marginal economic status of these cultivators can itself be "a powerful 
impetus to careful observation and experimentation" (Scott 1998:324).
Homer-Dixon (1999) claims his theory of ingenuity gaps integrates the neo- 
Malthusian approach which focuses on the physical causes of scarcity and poverty with 
the neoclassical economics and distributionist approaches which emphasize social 
factors such as unequal resource allocation, ineffective markets and public policies. 
"Social improvements such as better markets and less unbalanced wealth distribution 
often alleviate the negative effects of scarcity," he writes. "But a society's capacity to 
make these improvements — to deliver the required social ingenuity — will be partly 
determined by scarcity itself, which is powerfully influenced by the society's physical 
context" (43).
When it comes to poor countries, however, his neo-Malthusian predilections 
generally win out. He strikes an apocalyptic note, warning that poor societies may lose 
the race to outrun scarcity, sinking into widespread violence, crisis and decay. He 
predicts a world increasingly bifurcated into countries that have an adequate supply of 
ingenuity to face rising scarcities and those that do not (44).
The concept of ingenuity thus becomes an ingenuous way to rationalize
216
persistent social and economic inequalities between and within countries, and to place 
the onus on population-related environmental depletion. Through the concept of 
ingenuity, ideas also become disembodied; the understanding of human agency is largely 
limited to mechanistic interactions between ideas, institutions and scarcity.
In his latest book, The Ingenuity Gap (2000), Homer-Dixon seems somewhat 
less Malthusian and more optimistic. He criticizes "limits to growth" thinking:
[T]he entire neo-Malthusian rhetoric of absolute resource limits, 
or to use the popular phrase, of "ecological carrying capacity," has come 
to strike me as deeply misleading, because it implies impending, 
unbreachable constraints on human development. Human history is a 
triumphant record of people smashing through such constraints (374).
In his travels in Bihar, India, Homer-Dixon comes to die conclusion that the state's
problems are not the result of overpopulation, but of the state's inability to provide an
adequate supply of technologies and institutional reforms. He takes a few steps into the
realm of political economy, but in the end stops short, focusing on technical and
bureaucratic fixes for land and water scarcities rather than the power dynamics between
rich and poor that have blocked economic and social progress in the state. However, one
is left with the hope that in the future he might risk a few more steps and that perhaps his
journey has just begun.
III. RELATED MODELS: CHALLENGE OR CORROBORATION?
Homer-Dixon's work has helped inspire a number of other studies of 
environmental conflict, based on case studies, modelling exercises and multivariate 
statistical analyses. This part considers the most significant of these -- the NATO 
CCMS study, research by Gunther Baechler and by Colin Kahl, and the State Failure
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Task Force — to determine to what extent they reinforce or challenge his findings. It 
concludes with a consideration of alternative political ecology approaches.
The NATO CCMS 'Syndrome1 Approach
One of the best known studies, "Environment and Security in an International 
Context," was undertaken under the aegis of the NATO Committee on the Challenges of 
Modem Society (CCMS). Founded in 1969, CCMS is a civilian branch of NATO, 
which encourages cooperation of alliance members on research projects, particularly 
those related to environmental problems. Since the end of the Cold War, CCMS has 
played an important role in building bridges with Central and Eastern European 
countries through incorporating them into research projects (Lietzmann and Vest 1999).
In 1991 NATO adopted a new Strategic Concept which broadened its concept of 
security to include threats from "non-traditional sources" in an expanded regional and 
global context. The Strategic Concept acknowledges that political, as opposed to purely 
military, means are critical for achieving NATO objectives and that security and stability 
involve not only defense but political, economic, social and environmental elements (86- 
87). According to the CCMS study, NATO now needs to take into account "the impact 
of the negative consequences of environmental stress on the potential incidence or 
escalation of conflict" (92).
The CCMS study employed a variety of consultants, although the main groups 
responsible for developing the conceptual framework were the German think tank 
Ecologic and the U.S. firm Evidence Based Research. For the analysis of environmental 
conflict, the study drew heavily on the work of Gunter Baechler and the Environmental
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Conflicts Project (ENCOP) of the Swiss Peace Foundation.18
The CCMS study has a number of the same shortcomings found in Homer- 
Dixon's work. Its independent variable of "environmental stress" is conceptually 
muddled, comprising both the real or perceived scarcity of renewable natural resources 
as well as resource degradation (although unlike Homer-Dixon it does not fold social 
distribution into the variable too). Its dependent variable is "security," understood in its 
inverse form as "the potential incidence or escalation of conflict" (Lietzmann and Vest 
1999:96-97). Like Homer-Dixon, the CCMS study mentions many of the contextual 
factors which affect whether environmental stress leads to conflict or not. It 
acknowledges that "political, economic, social and economic issues are at least as 
relevant to the incidence of conflict as environmental stress" (101). Nevertheless, the 
study maintains that it is possible to isolate environmental stress from these other factors, 
and to analyze its impact on them. The CCMS study identifies four types of 
environmental conflict: ethno-political conflicts, migration conflicts, international 
resource conflicts, and GEC-related conflicts. The degradation narrative figures 
prominently in the migration category, with the assumption that high population pressure 
in eco-regions of low productivity "causes either local conflicts or migration which, can 
in turn, lead to conflicts in the area of destination" (115). Population pressure also 
pushes people to marginal areas where they become more susceptible to natural 
disasters. Ethno-political conflicts can be influenced by population growth too; in 
Rwanda, Bangladesh and Assam, "population pressure on an ecologically-sensitive 
region beset with environmental stress contributes to the hardening of inter-ethnic 
rivalries" (111).
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On the positive side, the CCMS study recognizes more explicitly than Homer- 
Dixon the role of large-scale resource extraction, such as mining, in environmental 
degradation. However, the predominant focus is still with the prime locae of the 
degradation narrative: drylands, mountain areas, tropical forests, and urban slums.
The study utilizes the "Syndrome Approach" to identify patterns of 
environmental stress which can help policymakers develop indicators for early 
intervention. These range from the "Sahel Syndrome" where "ecological carrying 
capacity" is exceeded in marginal regions, to the "Favela Syndrome" where 
"uncontrolled" population growth and rural-urban migration leads to a long list of social 
and environmental ills, to syndromes associated with waste dumping and industrial 
pollution (124,126).19
Although the syndromes are experimental hypotheses, their impact is to simplify, 
de-contextualize and naturalize complex site and time-specific processes of social and 
environmental change. Moreover, because syndrome often refers to concurrent 
symptoms or signs of biomedical abnormality, the use of the term also gives the implicit 
impression of a diseased Third World. In general, despite some differences, the NATO 
CCMS study reinforces Homer-Dixon's analysis rather than refuting it.
Baechler's 'Maldevelopment' and Kahl's DES Variable
In his own scholarly work, Gunther Baechler emphasizes the critical function of 
agrarian transition, something which is missing from Homer-Dixon's analysis: 
"Environmentally caused conflicts should be understood as struggles of the land against 
the town, as competition among endangered rural livelihoods and invasive modernity"
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(Baechler 1999:227). However, this modernity is not sufficiently elaborated; rather he 
encapsules it in Vandana Shiva's rather vague term of "maldevelopment" and describes 
social inequalities in access to natural capital as "environmental discrimination" (87). He 
largely accepts the artificial distinction between the traditional and the modem. He 
assumes that the former is less productive, adopting the conventional wisdom of the 
degradation narrative:
Against the heterogenous background of a dynamic modem 
sector and a traditional sector becoming more and more unstable, a 
politically powerless and economically ever more marginalized rural 
society is forced to overuse the renewables available and, as a 
consequence, to destroy the living space rural producers depend on (10).
Predictably, these marginalized people then migrate to already over-crowded peri-urban
areas. Baechler pays greater attention than Homer-Dixon to the need for rural livelihood
diversification through off-farm alternatives, but his analysis is equally steeped in
population and environmental determinism.21
This impacts the nature of the 'empirical evidence' he uses to prove his case. In
South Africa black women cannot help but degrade the environment, he asserts, since
they are among the most marginalized groups and are responsible for provision of food,
water and fuel (189). In Bangladesh, where there is population pressure on scarce
resources, the rural population is deprived of fresh water because of seasonal drought
and the negative impact of floods. In reality, there is plenty of fresh drinking water in
most areas of Bangladesh even in the dry season; the scarcity is lack of public
investment in filtration and sanitation.
Baechler blames ethnic troubles in the Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh on
overpopulation. He paints the country as a place where nature is out of control, forcing
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economic and "environmental disaster refugees" to migrate to the more environmentally 
favorable Hill Tracts (199). (In fact, the Hill Tracts are not more environmentally 
favorable than the fertile lowland delta which comprises most of Bangladesh). He notes 
in passing that the government encouraged the settlement of Bengali migrants in the Hill 
Tracts, but fails to elaborate the political reasons why, i.e. as part of a long strategy of 
colonization and counter-insurgency against the indigenous inhabitants (Chittagong Hill 
Tracts Commission 1991).
In the end, there is substantial agreement between Baechler and the EPS project. 
This is also the case with Colin Kahl whose work draws heavily on Homer-Dixon. Like 
environmental scarcity, Kahl's composite variable of demographic and environmental 
stress (DES) is broad and vague, encompassing population growth and the degradation, 
depletion and maldistribution of renewable resources. In developing countries DES has 
predictably negative consequences such as increasing the number of marginalized 
people, creating volatile "youth bulges," and heightening popular grievances against the 
state. One of the forms the latter takes is "demands for major development projects" 
(Kahl 1998:87); here Kahl, like Homer-Dixon, displays little knowledge of the elite 
politics behind the generation of development projects.
Diverging from Homer-Dixon, Kahl believes that DES does not need to 
dramatically weaken states in order for violence to occur because "the purposive action 
of state elites" is often implicated in violence. However, DES is often the underlying 
cause since "it can simultaneously create threats to a regime and opportunities for state 
elites to pit social groups against one another" (90). Whether or not DES results in "state 
exploitation conflicts" depends on the intervening variables of inclusive institutions and
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"groupness," a.k.a. the degree of social segmentation (90-91).
In case studies of violent conflict in Kenya and the Philippines, Kahl goes into 
some detail about state politics, but human agency largely plays second fiddle to DES 
determinism and the chain of causality is heavily neo-Malthusian. Thus, DES was at the 
root of the Communist insurgency in the Philippines in the late 1960s, and it was 
population growth that frustrated land reform efforts. During the Marcos years, Kahl 
claims, acute DES led to the marginalization of millions of Filipinos and forced the 
government to borrow from abroad because of the significant gap DES created between 
domestic savings, investment needs and government expenditures. Later on Kahl notes 
how Marcos stole billions of dollars in foreign aid and loans, but somehow this is much 
less important than DES in the government's decision to borrow (Kahl 2000). In Kenya, 
violence erupted in 1991-93 "because elites were threatened by demographically and 
environmentally induced social pressures" (Kahl 1998:118). There is little to challenge 
Homer-Dixon here.
Multivariate Statistical Analyses
The methodological shortcomings of Homer-Dixon's and related models have 
led some researchers in a more empirical direction. Hauge and Ellingsen (2001) use data 
from 1980-1992 to test statistically various hypotheses on the relationship between 
environmental scarcity and civil conflict. They conclude that countries suffering from 
land degradation are more prone to civil conflict, but that the level of economic 
development has the strongest effect on both incidence and severity of conflict. In 
general, economic and political factors are more important than environmental ones. 
The environmental data which they use are problematic, however, a fact which they
223
acknowledge. For example, the soil degradation data are based on the 1990 UNEP 
World Map project criticized by Lindert (2000) and as noted above, deforestation data 
are similarly unreliable (Leach and Fairhead 2000).
The largest multivariate statistical analysis is that of the State Failure Task Force 
(SFTF). On the basis of a request by A1 Gore, in 1994 the CIA convened the SFTF, a 
group of independent researchers whose mandate was to identify the factors that 
"distinguish states that failed from those which averted crises over the last 40 years" 
(Esty et al 1999:49). The SFTF examined a wide range of demographic, societal, 
economic, environmental and political indicators influencing state stability; environment 
was not a priori the focus of the study.
The results of Phase I of the SFTF found that environmental factors did not 
directly contribute to state failure, and that instead infant mortality (as an indicator of 
general material well-being), openness to trade, and level of democracy were the critical 
discriminators between stable and failed states. Phase II confirmed the importance of 
these three variables, but refined the democracy variable to include "partial 
democracies." It found that partial democracies are less stable than full democracies or 
autocracies.
Phase II also further tested environmental variables and again confirmed that 
environmental change does not appear to be directly linked to state failure. However, 
the researchers found evidence of an indirect causal mechanism:
Deforestation and soil degradation appear to diminish the quality 
of life, as measured by infant mortality rates, for low-capacity states that 
are socially vulnerable to disruptions in soil ecosystems; and infant 
mortality has been shown to have a direct impact on the likelihood of 
state failure (66).
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But again, the soil erosion data they use is based on the same unreliable UNEP data set; 
they themselves note the generally poor quality and paucity of environmental data. In 
any case, the connection they find between environmental change and state failure is 
weak to say the least, and the authors stress that a country's institutional vulnerability to 
environmental change and ability to cope with it effectively are at least as important.
While these analyses challenge the environmental determinism of the EPS 
project, their statistical approach is similarly limited in terms of the ability to 
comprehend the dynamic interface between environmental resources and different sets 
of actors, with differential access to power. For this one must look elsewhere, toward 
political ecology.
Alternative Approaches
In political ecology, write Peluso and Watts (2001), "the environment is an arena 
of contested entitlements, a theater in which conflicts or claims over property, assets, 
labor, and the politics of recognition play themselves out" (25). Emerging out of this 
tradition, the environmental entitlements framework offers a much more complex, 
historical and pluralist approach to understanding both the dynamics of local ecologies 
and the diverse institutions and differentiated social actors which affect and are affected 
by them (Leach, Meams and Scoones 1997). It moves beyond simple cause and effect 
relationships to what Black calls 'contextualization' — "the examination of complex, 
overlapping and sometimes contradictory trends at a range of spatial scales" that is the 
hallmark of political ecology (Black 1998:185). This kind of contextualization is very 
different from presenting the 'context' as the medium in which environment and scarcity
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interact to produce conflict.
Using the entitlements approach, as well as a more elaborated understanding of 
violence, Peluso and Watts (2001) rethink the relationship between environment and 
conflict. Their starting point is not scarcity, but the historical and social appropriation of 
nature by humans; the properties of particular natural resources meanwhile shape the 
forms of that appropriation. They focus on three broad aspects of the social relations of 
production: the patterns and regimes of accumulation, the forms of access to and control 
over resources, and the diversity of actors engaged in these relations. Their analysis is 
not narrowly materialist, however. They write:
[T]he labor process is the point of incubation of historical and 
cultural fields of power in which human agency (organized through 
differing social forms: firms, the state, households, and so on) is 
expressed. In turn these fields of power constitute institutional and 
discursive fields of struggle. These too shape environmental processes.
From the confluence of these two expressions of political economy — the 
social relations of production and the social fields of power -- emerge the 
forms of contention (always differentiated and varied) that can 
encompass both physical and symbolic, organized and disorganized, state 
sponsored and "civic", and highly mixed forms of violence (29)
Such an approach yields no one grand over-arching model;22 rather it is an
analytical starting point, and not end point, from which to investigate specific case
studies, which may or may not yield an easily generalizable theory. This can be
counterpoised to Homer-Dixon's approach, where deterministic patterning and the
acceptance of key assumptions such as the degradation narrative in effect meant that
starting point and end point were virtually assured to be the same, limiting the scope of
inquiry in between.
In a recent critique of Peluso and Watts' framework, Kahl argues that one of its 
drawbacks is that "it is not a causal theory, at least not in any systematic sense" (Kahl
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2002:142). I would argue that this is in fact a strength, not a weakness, and that 
environmental conflict research would do well to step off the simple causal pathways it 
has followed to date even at the risk of getting lost in specificity and complexity.
IV. CONCLUSION
This chapter has taken a close look at the methodology, assumptions and 
evidence underlying Homer-Dixon's EPS model of environmental conflict in order to 
reveal its weaknesses as well as to point to alternative approaches grounded in political 
economy and political ecology. The rigidity of the EPS model, however, should not be 
seen solely as a methodological or epistemological problem. It must also be viewed in 
the context of the pressure to produce policy-relevant knowledge. The next chapter 
investigates the combination of forces that shaped the construction and execution of 
Homer-Dixon's three major projects as a case study in the political economy of 
knowledge production.
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Endnotes to Chapter Four
1. Jointly organized by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the University 
of Toronto Peace and Conflict Studies program, the Environmental Change and Acute 
Conflict project involved the collaboration of 40 scholars and the convening of several 
meetings to research and discuss the topic. The findings formed the basis of Homer- 
Dixon's article in International Security (1994) and Scientific American (1993). Also 
jointly sponsored by the American Academy and the University of Toronto, the 
Environmental Scarcities, State Capacity and Civil Violence Project commissioned case 
studies by regional experts. For more on both projects, see the following chapter.
. Bangladesh-India, Mexico (Chiapas), Israel-Palestine, Pakistan, Rwanda, Senegal- 
Mauritania, South Africa, El Salvador-Honduras, Haiti, Peru, and the Philippines.
3'. They also criticize social scientists like Gleditsch for marginalizing the physical 
circumstances of human society by stressing the social roots of conflict in developing 
countries (Schwartz et al 2001:277).
4‘. Interestingly, the model Taylor (1992) critiques was developed at MIT, where Homer- 
Dixon did his graduate work. It was also supported by USAID with the intended 
objective of policy intervention. Its assumptions are Malthusian.
5'. Dalby develops this theme at length in his forthcoming book (2002) Environmental 
Security.
6. For more information on the conflict in the Niger Delta, see Ibeanu (2000) and Watts 
(2001); on Bougainville, see Boge (1999).
n '
'. According to Lindert, the preannounced purpose of the project -- to draw the attention 
of policymakers to the dangers of bad land and soil management as a basis for 
establishing an action program — "mixed prejudgments of causes and remedies into the 
scientific inquiry itself' (Lindert 2000:20).
8 .. Lindert (2000) questions the overall emphasis placed on erosion as the main cause of 
land degradation. Concerns about erosion have a more dramatic appeal, he argues, and 
have greater implications for social intervention, yet soil nutrient imbalances due to 
intensive cropping and inadequate fertilization may in fact be the larger problem.
9'. For an analysis of the complex forces behind land degradation and forest clearance in 
Chiapas, see O'Brien (1998). Using satellite imagery from 1974 and 1989, for example, 
she shows the impact of armed conflict in Guatemala on forest settlements in the region. 
That conflict forced 46,000 Mayans over the border into Chiapas.
10'. Former bantustans, refugee encampments, and urban squatter colonies are what 
anthropologist Anna Tsing has ironically termed "Malthustans," environmentally 
degraded areas where population pressure and depleted resources are pushing the
environment into a downward spiral (Tsing 1995).
11. Black also questions the validity of the migration statistics on which Homer-Dixon's 
analysis of Bangladeshi out-migration to India are based (Black 1998:24).
12 . Noorduyn and De Groot (1999) call for better interaction between the security, 
environmental science and anthropology fields in the study of environment and conflict, 
but do not offer a substantive critique of the EPS project's approach.
13'. Although women are largely invisible in Homer-Dixon's work, there are other cases 
where their roles in biological and social reproduction are more openly blamed for 
environmental degradation. Mahmoud cites the case of Sudan where environmental 
studies researchers were instructed to go out to the villages and collect data about how 
women destroy forests by collecting firewood and by neglecting resource conservation 
(Mahmoud 1999).
14'. Heyser's case study of Limbang District in Sarawak found, for example, that 
environmental change largely due to logging eroded women's major roles in the 
subsistence economy and made them more dependent on male wage-eamers and hand­
outs from the logging companies (Heyser 1995).
15. For an analysis of the immiseration accompanying diamond mining and conflict in 
Sierra Leone, see Richards (2001).
16. For a critique of the naturalization of ethnicity and scarcity, see Hildyard (1999).
17'. De Soysa (2000) criticizes this line of reasoning. On the basis of a multivariate 
model he develops, he suggests that countries which have an abundance of mineral 
wealth may have less incentive to innovate and diversify economically.
18‘. The full ENCOP studies are published in German. See Baechler et al (1996).
19. The 16 syndromes are the Sahel Syndrome, the Overexploitation Syndrome, the 
Rural Exodus Syndrome, the Dust Bowl Syndrome, the Katanga Syndrome, the Mass 
Tourism Syndrome, the Scorched Earth Syndrome, the Aral Sea Syndrome, the Green 
Revolution Syndrome, the Asian Tigers Syndrome, the Favela Syndrome, the Urban 
Sprawl Syndrome, the Major Accident Syndrome, the Smokestack Syndrome, the Waste 
Dumping Syndrome, and the Contaminated Land Syndrome.
20. Baechler explicitly acknowledges this analogy to disease (Baechler 1999:2).
21. For further critique of Baechler's model, see Peluso and Watts's (2001) introduction 
to Violent Environments.
22'. However, Peluso and Watts (2001:28) do present a figure of "A Political Ecology of
Environmental Violence,” showing how these forces interact with each other.
CHAPTER FIVE
Circumscribed Heterodoxy:
An Account o f Thomas Homer-Dixon rs Three Major Projects
In this chapter I turn to a closer investigation of agency in knowledge production 
and dissemination: in this case, the who, when and why of how Homer-Dixon's 
environmental conflict ideas were generated, supported and spread in U.S. policy circles 
in the 1990s. The history I recount is largely based on my interviews, Homer-Dixon's 
archives, and documents I collected in the course of my research. The interviews are 
necessarily subjective because of the selection of people I was able to interview, the 
questions I chose to ask and the personal reflections offered by the interviewees. 
Nevertheless, certain common interpretations emerge which give coherence to the story.
The chapter covers Homer-Dixon's three major projects: the Project on 
Environmental Change and Acute Conflict (ECAC), the Project on Environment, 
Population and Security (EPS), and the Project on Environmental Scarcities, State 
Capacity and Civil Violence (State Capacity), and the political context in which they 
were brought to fruition. The chapter sets the stage for a more analytical investigation in 
Chapter Six of the impact of Homer-Dixon's ideas, the nature of the knowledge 
communities which have formed around such concepts, and die extent to which 
environmental conflict has actually been securitized.
The history of Homer-Dixon's three projects brings into focus a number of key 
themes related to the success of his particular hybrid of academic/policy work. First are
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the critical roles played by strategic philanthropy and certain powerful personalities in 
providing the necessary material support and media and policy venues for the spread of 
his ideas. Second is the importance of the political moment in terms of the post-Cold 
War security climate, the search for a more democratic approach to foreign policy, and 
the importance given to the Cairo population conference in the Clinton administration. 
In addition, there is the factor of crisis and contingency, especially the Rwanda genocide 
in 1994. Third is the strategic use of demographic alarmism, particularly concerning 
migration, in the representation of threats. This was deemed necessary to advance liberal 
foreign policy goals despite consistent concerns that such a negative approach might 
backfire. And lastly, there is the imperviousness of Homer-Dixon's framework to critical 
advice and challenges.
Throughout Homer-Dixon's three projects one witnesses the phenomenon I term 
"circumscribed heterodoxy." A certain plurality of views are allowed, and in some cases 
even encouraged, in terms of advisory meetings and the like. However, there are usually 
less seats at the table for voices from the South, and those critiques which do surface 
appear ultimately to have little influence. This phenomenon is not unique to Homer- 
Dixon's projects, of course; it is common in the politics of consensus-building, 
manifesting itself, for example, in the larger processes of reframing foreign policy in the 
early years of the Clinton administration. The danger of circumscribed heterodoxy is that 
the illusion of plurality masks die reality of uniformity.
This chapter is organized into three parts. Part One describes the evolution of the 
Project on Environmental Change and Acute Conflict; Part Two looks at the Washington 
political context, especially the role of A1 Gore, Timothy Wirth, Robert Kaplan and the
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Pew Global Stewardship Initiative in Homer-Dixon's rise to success; Part Three 
addresses the Environment, Population and Security and State Capacity projects and 
offers some concluding thoughts on the recurring themes cited above.
I. ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND ACUTE CONFLICT
Initiated in 1990, the Project on Environmental Change and Acute Conflict 
(ECAC) was a joint venture of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences1 (Academy) 
in Cambridge, Massachusetts and the Peace and Conflict Studies of the University of 
Toronto, Homer-Dixon's academic base. Over the three year course of the project, it 
received funding from a number of foundations and institutions, including the Pew 
Charitable Trusts, the Donner Canadian Foundation, the W. Alton Jones Foundation, the 
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and the Canadian Department of 
National Defense. Project directors were Jeffrey Boutwell of the Academy, George 
Rathjens at the MIT, and Homer-Dixon.
The project concentrated on three main areas: water scarcity, population 
displacement and the economic repercussions of reduced agricultural and resource 
productivity. It commissioned a number of papers on these themes, six of which were 
published by the Academy. (See Appendix B for a list of publications of the three 
projects). This project launched Homer-Dixon into national and international 
prominence, but before exploring it in more detail, it is important to look at the genesis
* Hereafter referred to as the "Academy." The acronym AAAS will be used for 
the American Association for the Advancement of Science, which also became involved 
in Homer-Dixon's work at a later stage.
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of his involvement.
The Cambridge Period: On the Threshold
Thomas (nickname Tad) Homer-Dixon was bom into a family closely associated 
with environmental issues. His father was a professional forester on Vancouver Island in 
British Columbia, responsible for the watershed which serves the city of Victoria. 
Homer-Dixon told me that his father was "one of the world's cleanest loggers," 
responsible for the development of a number of sustainable logging practices such as 
small clear-cuts. His mother had a degree in botany and was a naturalist and illustrator.
Homer-Dixon's scholarly interest in the environment did not develop until later, 
however. As an undergraduate at Carleton University in Ottawa in the late 1970s, he 
became concerned about the Cold War military build-up and the presence of Trident 
submarines in Washington state. His ensuing interest in conflict theory and arms control 
led him to enter a PhD program in Political Science at MIT in 1983. In 1989 he 
completed his thesis on notions of us and them in defense bargaining ("They and We: 
An Empirical and Philosophical Study of a Theory of Social Conflict") under the 
supervision of Hayward Alker.
Before completing his thesis, Homer-Dixon travelled in India, the Soviet Union 
and Africa. He was in India during the massacres of Bengali settlers in Assam and in 
Transkei he saw "incredible land degradation." A fellow student who knew him at the 
time remembers him returning from the journey strongly affected by the environmental 
devastation and poverty he saw, which now seemed as important to him as the nuclear 
arms race. After the trip he had a "wonderful messianic quality," according to this
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observer, and put up large photographs of India in the corridor at MIT. George Rathjens, 
who was one of his supervisors, helped nurture this interest in the environment.
After his PhD, Homer-Dixon made a "wholesale shift" (his own words) to 
environmental issues. He stayed on another seven to eight months at MIT on a post­
doctoral fellowship from Canada to study global environmental change and became 
involved with the Harvard-MIT global environmental studies group. By virtue of having 
received a S SRC/Mac Arthur Foundation dissertation fellowship in International Peace 
and Security in 1986, Homer-Dixon was also part of a network of other young scholars 
whom MacArthur encouraged to broaden the concept of security in the waning years of 
the Cold War. These included Ronnie Lipschutz and Peter Gleick, both at the University 
of Califomia-Berkeley, who focused on resource and environmental issues and who co­
founded the Pacific Institute in 1987. According to Homer-Dixon, the MacArthur 
program was extraordinary; it took chances on people in the early years and pushed 
boundaries, creating "a community of people, a culture."1
In 1989 Homer-Dixon attended a conference on environment and security in 
Cambridge, MA, co-sponsored by the SSRC and the American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences. According to him, it did not go very well and later he dropped in on Jeffrey 
Boutwell at the Academy to suggest that a theoretical framework needed to be developed 
to address these issues. (According to Boutwell, George Rathjens had already "talent 
spotted" Homer-Dixon and urged the Academy to work with him.) This marked the 
auspicious beginning of a long working partnership.
The Academy itself was part of the MacArthur web, having received funds from 
the foundation in the late 1980s and early 1990s to work on emerging security issues.
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Boutwell, Program Director for International Security Studies, told me how the 
Academy had been well-suited for the job. Unlike Washington, D.C.-based think tanks 
like the Brookings Institute and Heritage Foundation, the Cambridge-based Academy is 
not in such close proximity to policymakers and is thus freer to concentrate on more 
long-term issues. While it has over 3000 elected members from all academic disciplines, 
it has a small staff and is able to move forward without the bureaucratic inertia of larger 
research organizations.
Using some MacArthur program money, the Academy got Homer-Dixon started. 
He also received funds from Richard Rockwell at the SSRC to do a paper on 
environment and conflict, which was discussed at a SSRC-sponsored meeting at MIT. 
The paper later formed the basis for Homer-Dixon's first major publication, "On the 
Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict," which appeared in the 
prestigious Harvard/MIT journal International Security in the fall of 1991.
By this time Homer-Dixon had moved to Toronto to become the Director of the 
Peace and Conflict Studies Department at University College, University of Toronto. 
However, he acknowledged that the fact he had been "hanging around Cambridge" made 
a difference in terms of being able to get published in the International Security journal. 
(Previously in 1987, he had published a research note on Lanchester equations in the 
journal.) International Security was casting around for things that would open new 
issues, but still fit their agenda. The article was a "huge breakthrough" for him. It wasn't 
terribly innovative, he remarked, but it was a way for people to organize their ideas. He 
brought a structure and framework to the environment and security field, and in so 
doing, became its reference point.
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The article was also what brought him to the attention of journalist Robert 
Kaplan. Homer-Dixon passed the article to one of Gore's assistants, who passed it to 
Gore's speech writer, who then passed it to his friend Kaplan. Homer-Dixon heard later 
that his article was circulating on Vice-President Gore's Air Force Two.
In retrospect, it seems somewhat surprising that an article like this, in a scholarly 
journal, would have such an impact, especially since the Cold War mentality in security 
studies was still prevalent at the time. However, against this more conservative 
backdrop, Homer-Dixon's ideas were "very exciting and provocative," according to a 
scholar in Cambridge security circles. They appealed to a wider community than narrow 
security specialists, most of whom were "bean-counters," i.e. still counting weapons. 
Homer-Dixon was ambitious, this observer noted, but he was also "bright and 
conscientious and passionate to have his theories affect the field." And despite his focus 
on a new arena — the environment — his methods were in the classic IR vein, with 
models and flow charts, so that he could still appeal to the community of security 
scholars from whose ranks he came.
However, he encountered resistance from some members of this community, 
who thought his work was analytically weak and would not have survived without 
funding. As one interviewee wryly noted, "A little good idea by a good scholar can 
spread like wildfire without money; this half-baked idea could spread like wildfire 
because it had money behind it."
While the article was a big breakthrough, the nature of Homer-Dixon's 
partnership with the Academy also yielded other tangible results, helping to solidify his 
standing in the philanthropic and policy worlds.
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Forward Motion
"Tremendously exciting" were the words Jeffrey Boutwell used to describe the 
Project on Environmental Change and Acute Conflict Project (ECAC). It was an 
opportunity to take Homer-Dixon’s ideas, circulate them in the wider policy and 
scholarly community, and figure out whether they were "worthy and legitimate 
components of national and international security."
A preliminary meeting to shape the project, entitled "Environmental Change and 
Threats to Security," took place March 30-31, 1990 in Cambridge, MA, attended by 
fifteen participants, none of whom were from the developing world (ECAC 1990a). 
The participants made several recommendations which helped to shape the project as 
well as the future direction of Homer-Dixon’s work. They agreed that the project:
(1) should not try to undertake original research, but rather should "identify and 
synthesize the best existing knowledge so that it is usable by scholars, educators, and 
policymakers" (ECAC 1990a:3);
(2) should aim to influence policy with the aim of avoiding environmental 
conflicts and should therefore consider how to present "the most persuasive arguments" 
to policymakers. A footnote elaborates: "As one participant put it: Our objective should 
be to alter the State Department's list of countries of importance to American interests. 
Bangladesh should be put on that list" (3);
(3) should keep in mind the interests of its audience.
Here the recommendations are particularly telling:
For example, policy makers in both the U.S. and Canada will be
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sensitive to issues of refugees and migration because these countries are 
magnets to immigrants. As another example, the intelligence community 
might be particularly receptive to research on the links between 
environmental variables and conflict. Intelligence analysts are aware of 
the importance of "indirect" causes of conflict and of the need for a long­
term policy perspective. This community is also a promising conduit to 
the upper levels of decision making (3).
These recommendations, which would later become de-facto decisions, directed 
the project away from original research which might have challenged or at least 
complicated Homer-Dixon's causal path from environmental scarcity to conflict. The 
desire to attract policymakers also led it down the dubious path of stressing migration 
issues, as well as appealing to the intelligence community. Participants did call for 
involvement of experts and resource organizations from developing countries, and the 
project would later make some effort to accommodate this request. Yet in essence the 
agenda was already set since there was general acceptance that environmental 
degradation was a cause of conflict. As the concluding paragraph remarks, "In tracing 
the possible paths from environmental change to conflict, the project should show that 
many variables are linked together in a complex system, without obscuring the role of 
environmental degradation as an underlying force" (8). This passage illustrates just how 
entrenched the degradation narrative already was as an a priori conviction; as Chapter 
Three described, even before the end of the Cold War, it began to feature prominently in 
the literature on environment and security.
After securing $213,000 from the Donner Canadian Foundation, the ECAC 
project held another meeting in Cambridge on October 26-27, 1990 (ECAC 1990b). At 
this point, seven commissioned authors were confirmed, including three from 
developing countries, although once again there were no Southern participants at the
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meeting. Several important concerns were voiced during the discussion. One was that 
authors should identify 'control cases' where there is not a clear link between 
environmental change and conflict. Another was the fear that the project might generate 
knowledge useful to the police and military in developing countries; a participant warned 
that these institutions might use the linkage between environment and conflict to "justify 
suppression of environmental NGOs, which are often the sole locus of democratic 
activity in developing countries" (3). There was also a discussion about the negative 
impact of large development projects such as dams, hydroelectric schemes and irrigation 
systems on human habitats, with the conclusion that authors "examine the aid-allocation 
policies of the North that support such projects" (3).
These concerns apparently had little impact on the development of Homer- 
Dixon's own framework as judged by his writings (see previous chapter). However, the 
ECAC project did allow a certain pluralism of views which are reflected in the first six 
papers presented at two June 1991 research workshops in Canada (ECAC 1991a).3 For 
example, while New York Times South Asian correspondent Sanjoy Hazarika's paper on 
Bangladeshi migration to Northeast India was stereotypically neo-Malthusian, even 
advocating "aggressive family planning programs," Astri Suhrke's paper on population 
displacement challenged Homer-Dixon's views of migration. During the second 
workshop, Bernard Nietschmann, the author of a paper on Nicaragua, was reported to 
have "disputed the role of population growth and resource scarcity in precipitating the 
conflict between the Sandinista government and the Miskito Indians" (7).
The fact that ECAC lacked sufficient developing country involvement was noted 
by several prominent people consulted by the project, including Maurice Strong,
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organizer of the upcoming 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED or Earth Summit) (Homer-Dixon correspondence 2/15/91).4 By September 
1991, the project had moved to establish collaborative arrangements with the Center for 
Science and Environment in New Delhi and the African Center for Technology Studies 
(ACTS) in Nairobi (ECAC 1991b) (it is unclear how these arrangements actually 
functioned in practice), and would later develop a relationship with the Institute for 
Strategic and International Studies in Malaysia and the Peace Studies Institute in the 
Philippines (ECAC 1992b). In November 1991 the project held its first research 
workshop outside of North America, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (ECAC 1991c). For 
the first time, developing country participants were in the majority, representing 
Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia.
At this workshop participants clearly challenged Homer-Dixon’s framework. For 
example,
Several participants suggested that the research project has been 
too negative about the consequences of environmental change. 
Population movements, economic decline, disruption of institutions, and 
even conflict can have positive as well as negative social effects. In 
particular, mass mobilization and some forms of civil strife can produce 
opportunities for constructive change in institutions, the distribution of 
land and wealth, and processes of government (5).
In discussions of upland deforestation in the Philippines, some participants stressed the
need for a "political-economic analysis" of environmental decline, noting how the
Filipino state has long reflected the capitalist interests of the elite and has been an
instrument for plunder, with many of the regulators of resource extraction "intimately
involved in the extraction process itself." Their call for "a revolutionary change of the
country's social structure" was met, however, with neo-Malthusian pessimism on the part
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of other participants who argued that even a sharp improvement in the country's social, 
political and economic systems would not solve the resource problem quickly enough 
(6). The identities of the participants are not revealed in the commentary so it is 
impossible to know who took what side of the issue. However, the controversy itself is 
illuminating.
The final review conference of the project took place at the Brookings Institution 
in Washington, D.C. in May 1992 (ECAC 1992a). Present at the conference was Leon 
Feurth, Vice President Gore's senior advisor on foreign affairs. According to one 
participant, the project organizers were wooing Feurth "something fierce." While the 
conference report mentions a few critical comments by participants, it concludes that 
most people present "agreed that complexity and context-dependency do not undermine 
the project's central conclusion that there are important linkages between environmental 
change and conflict" (ECAC 1992a: 10).
This conference differs from the rest in its attempt to solicit policy 
recommendations from participants. Recommendations included targeting the 
intelligence community, North-South collaboration in population control programs, and 
better aid policies, including supporting land reform and debt relief. Geographer Diana 
Liverman offered suggestions for improving environment-conflict research such as 
looking at adaptation and cooperation as well as conflict, more precise interrogation of 
case studies, framing environment-conflict linkages as hypotheses (and presumably not 
as faits accomplis), and asking people in the field -- "peasants, farmers, and local 
government officials" — if there was a connection between environmental change and 
conflict (14). Unfortunately, these suggestions were never adequately taken on board.
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In reading the various ECAC meeting reports, a consistent pattern emerges of 
circumscribed heterodoxy, wherein alternative views are solicited but ultimately wield 
little influence. Among the authors of the commissioned papers as well as meeting 
participants, there are a few critical and cautionary voices who do not accept Homer- 
Dixon's framework. The original funding proposal for the project noted, "Project 
organizers will not try to force participants' ideas and research into a particular mold or 
procrustean framework" (ECAC 1990c:9). That did not mean, however, that those who 
begged to differ had the same influence as those who acceded to the framework. In 
particular, critical voices were conspicuously absent from the most influential of the 
project's publications, the Scientific American article "Environmental Change and 
Violent Conflict" co-authored by Homer-Dixon, Boutwell and Rathjens (1993). 
(Scientific American is a monthly magazine published by the Academy which is 
accessible to lay audiences as well as scholarly ones.)
This article was planned from the very inception of the project to get the message 
out to a wider audience of policymakers and the media than the proposed scholarly book 
(which never materialized). In the article the authors claim to represent the findings of 
the 30 researchers involved in the ECAC project, yet they use alarmist language and 
projections to make a case that population growth and resource scarcity are inducing 
violence in many regions of the Third World. Homer-Dixon himself told me that "the 
population issue is bigger" in the Scientific American piece than in much of his other 
work. The degradation narrative is writ large, the complexities and controversies raised 
during the course of the project writ hardly at all.
In the article's description of deforestation in the Philippines, for example, there
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is nothing about the state's role in resource extraction. Instead the emphasis is placed on 
poor peasants slashing and burning the hillsides, with the resulting resource scarcity 
driving them into the arms of communist insurgents. A series of flow charts illustrate 
simplistic causal chains, while photographs of a denuded mountainside, a urban garbage 
dump in the Philippines, poor Ethiopian women lugging water, and the army on patrol in 
Assam show us a nightmarish vision of the Third World.
The article literally made the news, landing Homer-Dixon a nationally broadcast 
interview with National Public Radio, and excerpts appeared in the New York Times. 
International Herald Tribune, the Toronto Globe and Mail, and a number of other North 
American newspapers. Homer-Dixon received reports that it had been distributed within 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and National Security Council. It 
attracted the attention of some members of the mainstream population community in 
Washington as well as more conservative groups. For example, the anti-immigrant 
organization Carrying Capacity Network reprinted Homer-Dixon's New York Times op­
ed (1993) as the lead article in their bulletin, followed by their own commentary on how 
desperate immigrants will be pushing hard against U.S. borders and by expanding ethnic 
diversity, will create competition and conflict within the country (Carrying Capacity 
Network 1993).
According to an interviewee engaged with the project, the Scientific American 
article cemented Homer-Dixon's influence -  but also froze his framework. When he 
was criticized about parts of the article, he responded by adding more arrows in the flow 
charts but the basic direction of causation remained the same. Above all, Homer-Dixon 
was a theorist and modeler, this observer remarked, and he was very invested in his
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framework.
The alarmist tone of the Scientific American article, as well as other of Homer- 
Dixon's publications, must also be viewed in the context of security studies more 
generally. As one IR scholar told me, security studies scholars tend to be imbued with 
alarmist, worst-case mindsets that are reflected in the project's findings. "The whole 
emphasis of the field is to identify and analyze looming threats. There is a presumption 
that this pessimistic, simplistic approach is the best way to make a persuasive argument 
that will attract attention, as well as money, invitations to conferences, and career 
advancement."
The ECAC project yielded high enough returns that it would have probably been 
difficult for Homer-Dixon to abandon his framework even if he had wanted to. In 
February 1993 he presented the ECAC findings at one of the Western world's most elite 
gatherings, the World Economic Fomm in Davos, Switzerland, and he published another 
article drawing on project research in the summer 1994 issue of International Security.
The ECAC project gave Homer-Dixon the foundation connections, the hybrid 
academic/public policy venue and ultimately the media attention to establish himself as a 
legitimate and important voice in the emerging environment and security debate. It set 
the stage so to speak, but other developments made the spotlight shine brighter than it 
might have otherwise. Part Two looks at how certain key people in the media, 
foundation and foreign policy communities helped advance his work and how certain 
major events, notably the Cairo population conference and the Rwandan genocide, 
provided a conducive context.
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II. WASHINGTON, D.C.: AT THE TABLE AND UNDER THE TENT
According to a number of IR scholars I interviewed, the early and mid-1990s in 
Washington, D.C. were a heady time, an "unusual moment" and "real window of 
opportunity" for academics to influence the foreign policy establishment. While 
historically the Defense Department had paid for most IR research, in the mid-1990s 
private foundations saw an opportunity to weigh in on security policy. They began 
funding more academic research as well as encouraging the bringing together of scholars 
and policymakers in more open-ended discussions. Homer-Dixon made the most of this 
process.
Almost everyone I interviewed, whether they liked his work or not, agreed that 
Homer-Dixon was a very effective academic entrepreneur in this period. According to a 
prominent foreign policy analyst, Homer-Dixon’s concept of environmental conflict was 
located at "the intersection between scholarly research and an electrifying slogan." 
However, there were also other effective academic entrepreneurs in similar circles who 
did not achieve his degree of fame or rate an invitation to dinner with A1 Gore. One 
advantage Homer-Dixon possessed and they lacked was the attention of journalist 
Robert Kaplan.
"An Unlikely Jeremiah"
Just as the partnership with Jeffrey Boutwell proved mutually beneficial, so did 
Homer-Dixon's relationship with journalist Robert Kaplan. In Homer-Dixon Kaplan 
found the scholar who most substantiated his views, while in Kaplan Homer-Dixon
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found the journalist who could popularize his. Homer-Dixon is the intellectual hero of 
"The Coming Anarchy," an "unlikely Jeremiah" (Kaplan 1994:56), with novelty value as 
well as the right social class: boyish and blue-blooded, a sort of stand-in for A1 Gore but 
without die political baggage. In "The Coming Anarchy" Kaplan wrote that Homer- 
Dixon's 1991 International Security article might one day be seen as the beginning of our 
post-Cold War foreign policy. In particular, he stressed the pessimistic, neo-Malthusian 
aspects of Homer-Dixon's analysis.
According to Jeffrey Boutwell, Kaplan was an important vehicle for getting 
Homer-Dixon's ideas out there, but in some ways he did more harm than good; people 
read Homer-Dixon differently after they read Kaplan, Boutwell told me. Homer-Dixon 
thought environmental scarcity was an underlying, not direct cause of conflict, but after 
Kaplan's attentions, he got attacked as a determinist even though he was more 
intellectually rigorous than that.
Homer-Dixon's own view of Kaplan was more appreciative, since for one thing, 
Kaplan brought him to the attention of A1 Gore. Based on an interview with Homer- 
Dixon, a Canadian journalist wrote in 1994:
Until earlier this year, Homer-Dixon was known only in 
academic circles...Enter journalist Robert Kaplan and his February cover 
story for the Atlantic Monthly magazine, "The Coming Anarchy."...The 
article struck a nerve and a media frenzy quickly followed. Homer- 
Dixon was deluged by interview requests from reporters fascinated with 
the more sensational aspects of his research and the idea of a coming 
apocalypse. But journalists weren't the only ones interested. Kaplan's 
article was sent to all U.S. embassies and soon became standard reading 
material in the Clinton administration. Homer-Dixon found himself 
briefing A1 Gore and James Woolsey on his stories (Pugliese 1994:C1).
In April 1994 Homer-Dixon was invited to Gore's house for dinner. Already as a
senator in the late 1980s, Gore had proclaimed the environment a key national security
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issue (e.g. Gore 1989), and his book Earth in the Balance (1993) stressed the role of 
population growth (see Chapter Three). Before the April dinner, both his wife Tipper 
and he had read Homer-Dixon's first International Security article. Among the people 
invited to the dinner were Gore advisor Leon Feurth; Timothy Wirth, Under Secretary of 
State for Global Affairs; Sherri Goodman, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 
Environmental Security; and Kathleen McGinty, Chair of the President's Council on 
Environmental Quality. They were together for over three hours and according to 
Homer-Dixon, "covered a lot of ground." They discussed the views of biologist E.O. 
Wilson and acknowledged that this was a high contingency moment and what happened 
in the U.S. in terms of policy would affect the rest of the world.
The genocide in Rwanda would turn out to be one of those contingencies. That 
same April Rwandan President Habyarimana's plane exploded, and the mass killing 
began. Gore went on record implicating population growth in the genocide, noting "the 
contribution of rapid destabilizing population growth" not only in Rwanda, but in 
Somalia and the former Yugoslavia (CNN News 1994). After visiting refugee camps in 
Zaire, Tipper similarly emphasized the role of population growth in the genocide, calling 
Rwanda "a tragedy and a warning" before the NGO forum at the ICPD in Cairo (Copans 
1994) in a speech which many in the population community considered overly 
simplistic.
A number of people in the Clinton administration shared these views on Rwanda. 
Two years later, in his much heralded speech on the global environment, Secretary of 
State Warren Christopher warned that "We must not forget the hard lessons of Rwanda 
where the depleted resources and swollen populations exacerbated the political and
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economic pressures that exploded into one of this decades greatest tragedies" 
(Christopher 1996). Timothy Wirth similarly stated that in Rwanda, "...there were simply 
too many people competing for far too few resources" (Wirth 1996:118). As one U.S. 
government population policy expert remarked, Clinton, Gore, Wirth and Brian Atwood 
of USAID were all impacted by Kaplan and Homer-Dixon, especially as "The Coming 
Anarchy" coincided with the tragic events in the Great Lakes.
In August 1994 Homer-Dixon was invited to Washington again, this time to do a 
morning briefing on China in Gore's office along with colleagues Vaclav Smil and Jack 
Goldstone. Homer-Dixon remembers Director of the CIA James Woolsey was present 
as well as Larry Summers, Undersecretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, 
Carol Browner, head of the EPA, Kathleen McGinty and several cabinet members. All 
together there were about 30 people.
While Homer-Dixon's connection to Gore brought him increased prominence, 
the politics and personalities surrounding the ICPD accelerated his forward motion. 
Without the ICPD, in fact, it is doubtful whether Homer-Dixon would have attracted so 
much attention and foundation funding.
The ICPD: Expanding the Foreign Policy Constituency
In many NGO circles, the 1990s are known as the decade of UN conferences, 
with major international gatherings on environment, human rights, population, women, 
and social welfare occurring in the first five years. What made these conferences 
different from ones that came before was the extent of organized NGO involvement. 
Partly this was a response to the growing strength and insistence of transnational
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advocacy networks, but it also reflected the politics of neoliberalism, in which "civil 
society” was codified, reified, and assigned a role in the "partnership” between the state, 
private sector and citizenry. The subordinate nature of this role was visible in the very 
geography of the conferences, where NGO fora were held outside the main venue. In 
the case of the 1992 Earth Summit, for example, the NGOs were relegated to steaming 
hot tents in a municipal park; at the 1995 women's conference in China, the NGO 
meeting was banished amidst controversy to a city on the distant outskirts of Beijing.
In the U.S. the conference which received the most attention, and probably the 
largest outlay of funds from the philanthropic community, was the ICPD. As discussed 
in Chapter Two, the flurry of organizing around the Cairo population conference resulted 
from a confluence of developments, including the desire of the population community to 
forge an alliance with feminists against religious fundamentalists (and less charitably, to 
coopt feminist opposition to population control) and internal pressure for reform within 
population agencies. The Cairo conference also provided an opportunity for the Clinton 
administration to define a new image of post-Cold War foreign policy as well as to 
expand the domestic constituency which would support it. Vital to this project was the 
role played by Timothy Wirth.
Formerly a senator from Colorado and a close political colleague of A1 Gore's, 
Wirth was appointed Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs as part of the Clinton 
administration's reorganization of the State Department. In the follow-up to the 1992 
Earth Summit, Wirth had as many as 150 people working under him in the State 
Department, although throughout his tenure he operated below the level of a senior 
policymaker (Hopgood 1998).
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Several people I interviewed stressed how Wirth came to the State Department 
with a different view of foreign policy. Not only was he more concerned with social and 
environmental issues, but according to one population policy analyst, he was a more a 
politician than firmly rooted in the foreign policy culture. This had certain drawbacks. A 
former State Department official remarked that Wirth lined up issues "like stove pipes," 
instead of undertaking the hard work of institutionalizing environmental concerns into 
the State Department bureaucracy. Another noted that his office became "a lightening 
rod" for criticism of the administration on Capitol Hill, since opponents could claim that 
here was "another lame brain idea of Gore’s."
However, almost everyone I interviewed who had been in Washington during the 
period acknowledged that Wirth played a central role in organizing U.S. participation in 
the ICPD, particularly the NGO coalition. Like Gore, Wirth's environmentalism was 
tinged with a heavy streak of neo-Malthusianism. According to a foundation officer who 
worked closely with him, Wirth was "always one breath away from birth control." (He is 
reportedly a friend of Paul Ehrlich's and his wife is active in population causes.) When 
he first joined the State Department, he had little knowledge of women's health issues, 
but in the words of the foundation officer, he was part of a new generation of 
policymakers who were able "to make the reproductive rights link" with population and 
environment issues. He proved particularly adept at making contact with women's 
groups around Cairo.5
Wirth liked Kaplan and Homer-Dixon's work, many people told me. His own 
beliefs were 'neck on neck' with Homer-Dixon's, and he promoted him a lot around the 
ICPD. The affinity was not only ideological but strategic. According to one of his close
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associates, Ellen Marshall, one reason Wirth seized on the environment and security 
issue was because its appeal to the security community allowed him to involve them in 
promoting the ICPD.
Marshall remarked that there was something in the simplicity of the environment 
and security link that helped it take hold. It was different than more arcane policy issues, 
such as the international gag rule (the denial of U.S. government funding to foreign 
organizations which provide or even just counsel women about abortion), which was 
hard to explain even though it was really a simple free speech issue. The environment 
and security link was also thrust forth in a dynamic way by Homer-Dixon and Kaplan, 
who were not the typical foreign policy people. Whether or not it actually influenced 
policy was not as important as the way it got different players to the table to promote the 
ICPD, including the CIA which became part of an inter-agency working group. People 
learned that women were integral to "all this," according to Marshall. Environment and 
security was a tool to pique people’s interest and get them to the right advocacy goal, 
such as women's rights.
Others share a similar view of the strategic value of environment and security. 
Homer-Dixon himself sees it as a subversive agenda which brought more progressive 
issues into conservative security circles since environmental issues are wrapped up with 
important moral and distributional concerns. The Pew Global Stewardship Initiative 
(PGSI) also used environment and security as a tool to build a larger constituency for the 
ICPD and for a broadening of U.S. foreign policy generally. In fact, PGSI worked 
closely with Wirth and vice versa, and became the largest funder of Homer-Dixon. The 
next section looks at the PGSI in more detail since its proactive strategies are
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fundamental to understanding the next stage of Homer-Dixon's work.
The Pew Global Stewardship Initiative
In the early 1990s, the Pew Charitable Trusts (PCT), whose wealth derives from 
the Sun Oil Company, became the largest environmental donor in the U.S., as well as 
one of the most proactive. It set out to shape the agenda of the American environmental 
movement,6 and as critics note, to mute criticism of corporate practices, emphasizing a 
tame lobbying strategy instead (Dowie 2001, Tokar 1997, Greene 1994). An important 
component of Pew's proactivity was the funding of public relations and media 
campaigns (Bailey 1994).
Expanding its mandate, Pew began to look more closely at foreign policy issues 
related to the environment in the early 1990s. In May 1993 it held a meeting on possible 
grantmaking approaches to the problem of environmental refugees, at which Homer- 
Dixon made a presentation on the global impacts of environmentally induced migration. 
As a result of differences of opinion expressed at this meeting, and resistance from 
traditional refugee assistance organizations, Pew decided not to set up a program 
explicitly on environmental refugees.7
That same year, however, the foundation established the Pew Global 
Stewardship Initiative (PGSI) to address population and consumption issues in 
preparation for the ICPD. PGSI was a collaborative effort with the Aspen Institute, a 
high-powered policy think tank based in Colorado but with offices in Washington, D.C. 
Susan Sechler was hired to be PGSI director along with five other supporting staff.
Sechler's background was primarily in agricultural policy. After working in the
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Carter administration, she moved to a base at the Washington offices of the Aspen 
Institute where she consulted on food security issues with funding from the Ford 
Foundation. She also ran the agricultural transition for the Clinton administration. 
Sechler is known as a dynamic philanthropic and policy entrepreneur. During the PGSI 
project, her base at the Aspen Institute gave her a fair degree of independence, though it 
led to an uneasy relationship with the Pew leadership in Philadelphia.
PGSI's July 1993 White Paper laid out its four major project objectives: (1) "to 
build a stronger conceptual base for global stewardship and its expression in enlightened 
population and consumption policies;" (2) "to forge consensus among diverse 
constituencies" working on these issues, and well as to attract new ones; (3) "to inform 
and improve relevant U.S. and multilateral policies and programs;" and (4) "to increase 
public understanding of, and commitment to act on, population and consumption 
challenges" (PGSI 1993a:i). These goals would be accomplished by collaboration with 
institutions and individuals from three major constituencies: environmentalists, religious 
communities, and international affairs and foreign policy specialists.
In regard to the latter, Pew hoped to broaden the concept of national security in 
ways that invoked Homer-Dixon. The White Paper stated:
The Initiative will endeavor to assist foreign policy specialists in 
framing the related concerns of population, environment and sustainable 
development, and in identifying areas where demographic trends threaten 
regional or international stability. The goal is to elevate these concerns in 
U.S. foreign policy formulation, international agreements and the work 
of multilateral institutions (13).
To develop the conceptual base for this endeavor, PGSI would offer support for applied
research on the linkages between population, environment and security.
While its applied research strategy was more academic in tone, PGSI also aimed
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to influence the media and popular opinion. It hired three top American polling and 
opinion research firms, representing both Democratic and Republican interests, to do 
focus group research on attitudes toward population growth and the environment among 
different constituencies. Interestingly, the researchers found that most people did not 
have strong neo-Malthusian attitudes; they recommended adding Man emotional 
component" and "targeted visual devices" such as pictures of traffic jams and degraded 
landscapes to population messages in order to create the necessary alarm (PGSI 
1993b:73-74).
PGSI also hired the Future Strategies, Inc. consulting firm to make 
recommendations on how to build a campaign on population and sustainable 
development in Washington policy circles (PGSI 1994a). Although it is unclear whether 
PGSI followed all the consultants' advice, the report provides a fascinating window on 
the reasoning behind the strategic use of demographic alarmism.
The Future Strategies report highlights the need for a "grand strategy" to increase 
international family planning and women's health assistance. The strategy would entail 
promoting this assistance as critical to environmental protection as well as to the 
alleviation of the causes of violent conflict (4-5). An information database on population 
and the environment would be an important advocacy tool since "though the link 
between excessive population and environmental destruction would seem obvious, there 
is...little in the way of scientific evidence to draw exact correlations" (11). The report 
rues the fact that despite PGSI funding, U.S. environmental groups remain "behind the 
political curve" on developing programs linking population and environmental 
degradation (2).
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Americans will have to be convinced that "unchecked population growth and 
destruction of the environment are key national security concerns of the 21st century" 
(31). So will specific constituencies, such as defense and intelligence policymakers and 
intellectuals as well as Congressional actors, notably the Black Caucus who should be 
worried about the social chaos in Africa described by Kaplan. Meanwhile, multilateral 
aid organizations like the World Bank should adopt a "credit and condoms" approach, 
insisting that credit, education and disaster relief programs include family planning 
information (20).
The report considers a variety of arguments to sway the public and policymakers, 
including concerns about migration. For example, "One clear payoff is reducing the 
immigration pressure which will only increase if poverty and resource depletion go 
unchecked." The report notes that "these sorts of arguments can be made without 
reinforcing racist and isolationist strains in the American political culture" (33). Yet 
further on, the authors write that "Unfortunately, the specter of 'environmental refugees' 
driven by scarcity of resources and flooding American borders may be necessary to build 
the public support necessary for required increases in funding for population and 
sustainable development" (35).
Along with such arguments, it recommends using visual tools such as 
computerized mapping which overlays information about "population growth, resource 
depletion, overt conflict and refugee movements" (13), as well as adopting some of the 
campaign tools of the American Israel Political Action Committee (33).
The PGSI leadership was not blind to the contradictions inherent in using fear 
and alarmism to build support for liberal foreign policy goals, but its pragmatic pluralism
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overrode moral qualms. Looking back on the period, Sechler told me that she was 
looking for ways of bringing people under the tent who could contribute to the project; 
she also wanted to include people who would be destructive if they remained on the 
outside. Although she does not believe in fear-mongering per se, she thought it was 
better "to voice fear and deal with it, deal with the unconscious, put the stuff out on the 
table...If you don't think about the dark side, it will come out. You can't keep people 
from thinking about these things." People are afraid of chaos, she noted, and though 
critical of Kaplan now, she said his writing was a "wake-up call," and was at least 
preferable to talking about throw weights.8
Sechler was also interested in creating a more open foreign policy, where 
Americans' own aspirations for themselves and their children were linked to the 
aspirations of people in other countries. U.S. foreign policy suffers from the belief that it 
can be done in secret, she remarked, that policymakers can "just work with the leaders 
and treat the Third World as a ghetto where you help organize markets and police 
forces...the more people who can relate to the Third World and democracy (with a small 
'd'), the more pressure on Congress and the Senate."
Sechler's broad-tent approach was reflected in many aspects of PGSI's work and 
proved instrumental in shaping the Cairo consensus. Despite die caveats of feminist 
friends who warned of the Malthusian "environmental juggernaut," she funded the 
population work of mainstream environmental organizations in the hopes that they 
would come around to a women's agenda. She also held a controversial meeting on 
immigration, where she put immigrant rights and anti-immigrant advocates in the same 
room. To involve the security community, she brought Homer-Dixon into the tent and
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also was the primary funder of the Woodrow Wilson Center's Environmental Change 
and Security Project (ECSP). She acknowledged that it may have been a mistake to 
include environment and security in PGSI's strategy, but she is not sure. She told me 
that you don't have to agree with everyone you fund.
By the mid-1990s Homer-Dixon thus found himself courted by powerful public 
and private players trying to broaden foreign policy issues and constituencies through 
their own strategies of circumscribed heterodoxy. While the goal of both Wirth and 
Sechler was to set more places at the table and get more people under the tent, this did 
not mean that all invited had equal voice, or that the guest list itself was not limited. 
This period was marked by a certain ideological confusion as women's rights, neo- 
Malthusianism and dark Kaplanesque visions of the Third World were woven together 
into the fabric of liberal American stewardship. There was method to the madness, 
however, as PGSI's own documents and funding priorities reveal.
That this was a special moment in U.S. foreign policy — and perhaps a fleeting 
one — gave an urgency to the tasks at hand. The initial name of "Fast Track" given to the 
Environment, Population and Security (EPS) Project suggests the pressure Homer-Dixon 
was under to deliver results; Sechler herself acknowledged that she probably drove 
Homer-Dixon and his assistants too hard. Part Three looks at the EPS and State 
Capacity projects, both of which were formulated in this unusual political moment. Yet 
the irony is that by the time they concluded, the moment had almost passed.
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I l l  THE PEW PERIOD: THE EPS AND STATE CAPACITY PROJECTS
One ingredient in Homer-Dixon's success was his capacity for hard work. During 
the years 1994-96 he directed both the EPS and State Capacity projects. The former 
yielded over ten publications, of which he was the author or co-author of nine (see 
Appendix B); the latter produced only two in-depth case studies of China and Indonesia 
(though one on Bihar and one on Malawi are still in the pipeline). Although he was not 
the author of either the China or Indonesian studies, Homer-Dixon was heavily involved 
in their execution, and as o f2000 was planning to write the Bihar report himself.
PGSI supported both projects. It was the chief initiator of the first and helped 
Homer-Dixon get additional Rockefeller Foundation funding for the second. The goal of 
the two projects was to influence policy, hence the pressure on Homer-Dixon to deliver 
fast results. Despite all the aggravations, Homer-Dixon told me he would still do the 
'policy stuff again. In pragmatic terms alone, it helped him get funding.
The following two sections explore each of the projects in more depth, starting 
with EPS.
On the Fast Track: The EPS Project
"Quick and dirty" are the words Homer-Dixon used to describe the EPS project. 
(According to him, PGSI wanted it to be called the Project on Population, Environment 
and Security, but he insisted that environment go first.) Launched in July 1994 by 
PGSI, the project, based at Homer-Dixon's center in Toronto, was conducted in 
cooperation with the Program on Science and International Security of the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) in Washington, D.C. and the
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Canadian Center for Global Security in Ottawa. AAAS was responsible for the 
production and dissemination of the project documents.
Of Homer-Dixon's three major projects, EPS was the one most directly geared 
towards policymakers. According to the initial work plan, the project's aim was "to 
produce a large volume of material as quickly as possible for use in current policy 
debates" (EPS 1994a: 1). Indeed, "the value to policymakers of the anticipated product" 
was one of the three criteria used to determine the focus of research efforts (3). Along 
with country and thematic case studies, a briefing book on environmental security issues 
for policymakers and members of the media was part of the work plan. Project 
publications were sent out by AAAS to a list of over 1000 policymakers, representatives 
of the media, scholars, etc., another example of the report dissemination methods of 
strategic philanthropy (see Chapter Two).
The EPS project received a $300,000 grant from PGSI. At Homer-Dixon's 
request, Robert Kaplan was employed as a project consultant for $30,000, an indication 
of the close relationship between them. Kaplan's role was "to review all project 
materials for clarity and impact, to provide the Project with relevant information during 
his own travels and research, and to include relevant information from the Project in the 
book IThe Ends of the Earth! he is currently writing on environment-conflict linkages" 
(EPS 1994b:3). A team of graduate students at the University of Toronto served as 
Homer-Dixon's research and project assistants as well as co-authors of the various case 
studies.
In May 1994 the PGSI held a meeting of its Advisory Board, at which both 
Timothy Wirth and Homer-Dixon made presentations. Wirth called for building new
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constituencies for a new foreign policy, with increasing investments in areas "like 
population, the environment, migration and counter-narcotics" (PGSI 1994b: 14). 
Homer-Dixon described the EPS project and received several critical comments. 
Cambridge University scholar Emma Rothschild encouraged him to examine how 
historically some societies have adapted to and overcome stresses; Judith Bruce of the 
Population Council urged him not to ignore states' roles in fostering insecurity through 
lack of adequate social investment and over-expenditure on defense. Demographer 
Michael Teitelbaum also asked Homer-Dixon "how he plans to tip-toe through the 
minefield of migration" (16). At the meeting concern surfaced once again about the 
dangers of a negative, crisis-driven approach to population versus a more positive vision 
of stewardship.
PGSI also put together a high-level Stewardship and Security steering committee 
which met to advise Homer-Dixon in November 1994 (PGSI 1994c). Among its 
members were Eileen Claussen, Senior Director for Global Environmental Affairs on the 
National Security Council, Kathleen McGinty, Director of the White House Office on 
Environmental Quality, and Enid Schoettle, National Intelligence Officer for Global and 
Multilateral Issues and a principal advisor to the Director of the CIA.9 That Homer- 
Dixon had access to such high-level officials suggests both PGSI's clout within the 
foreign policy establishment and the weight given to Homer-Dixon's project within 
PGSI.
Another advisory team member was Jeff Wise, then director of the Aspen 
Institute's Environmental Security Policy Project and a former White House Fellow on 
environmental policy. Wise was the main link between the EPS project and the National
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Security Council (NSC). Wise viewed the project's proposed briefing book as an 
important tool for members of the NSC's interagency working group on environmental 
security policy as well as senior government officials, key congressional staff, and 
speech writers. He wanted to work with Homer-Dixon to produce the book, using his 
access to CIA documents to add to Homer-Dixon's information. He anticipated both a 
classified and non-classified version. The NSC apparently wanted the material by the 
end of December 1994 to use in a communications and policy-making effort.
In the end, the briefing book (Homer-Dixon and Percival 1996) was not 
produced in conjunction with the NSC and did not appear until two years later, toward 
the conclusion of the project.10 Nor did it contain strong policy recommendations of the 
type that Wise and others had originally envisioned. In responding to PGSI, Homer- 
Dixon justified the lack of policy recommendations in the briefing book on the basis 
that: (1) the goal of the EPS project was primarily providing accessible research and 
analysis to policymakers, who could then make their own informed judgments; (2) it 
would take considerable time and effort to develop recommendations that would reflect 
the complexity of relevant U.S., Canadian and inter-governmental policy institutions and 
the rapidly changing policy context; (3) recommendations would therefore suffer from 
vague generalizations and platitudes that would make them vulnerable to attack; and (4) 
most readers would only look at the recommendations section, without adequately 
examining the evidence. While Homer-Dixon's reluctance to offer specific policy 
prescriptions can be seen in the light of his concern for evidence and scholarly rigor, the 
briefing book itself is one of the weakest publications of project, especially its simplistic 
neo-Malthusian summaries of the case studies.
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It is an open question whether the briefing book had much direct effect on 
policymakers, though a draft was given to the State Department speech writer who wrote 
Warren Christopher's April 1996 Stanford speech on environment and foreign policy. 
The EPS project also held policy briefings in Ottawa and Washington in May 1996. 
These included a briefing for the State Department's Policy Planning Staff and the 
Intelligence Community, an appearance at the State Department in the Important Issues 
Speakers Series, and a meeting with USAID (EPS 1996).
According to State Department interviewees, these briefings did not have a major 
impact there (although as we shall see in the next chapter, Homer-Dixon's ideas 
exercised considerable influence on the foreign policy establishment in both intentional 
and unintentional ways). Environmental security was not a particularly popular subject 
at the State Department, and its heyday in the administration was drawing to a close. In 
addition, in the summer of 1996 the Pew Charitable Trusts made the decision to wind 
down the PGSI and let go of Susan Sechler. Pew's abandonment of PGSI had partly to 
do with abortion politics. Because of PGSI's proactive stance on population issues, the 
foundation was starting to draw unwanted heat from the anti-abortion lobby. PGSI 
support had been vital in keeping the environmental security issue alive in the State 
Department. According to a senior population officer, people at the State Department 
were grateful that PGSI had provided the space to have a discussion of environmental 
security outside of a political context. Now that space was disappearing.
It was an advantage for the EPS project to commence in 1994, at the crest of the 
wave of interest in environmental security, but it was harder to ride that wave as it 
diminished in size, particularly in the absence of strong policy recommendations and
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with the demise of PGSI. Although the State Capacity project was very different than 
EPS, it too faced similar limitations.
Challenges to the Fixed Frame: The State Capacity Project
In the project on Environmental Scarcities, State Capacity and Civil Violence, 
Homer-Dixon returned to his collaboration with Jeffrey Boutwell and George Rathjens 
at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. This project was more of a direct 
successor to die first project on Environmental Change and Acute Conflict; like that 
project, it commissioned a series of case studies by area specialists though the number 
was smaller. Initially, the plan was for studies of China, Indonesia and India. As noted 
above, the India case study did not materialize as planned.
In a sense, this project was Homer-Dixon's least successful though best-funded; 
it received over $400,000, with roughly half coming from PGSI and half from the 
Rockefeller Foundation Population Sciences Program. At the Rockefeller Foundation 
the project was viewed as an 'outlier' in its population portfolio, which was focused more 
directly on family planning research and policy. It was the first grant made by the 
foundation officer Sarah Seims, and she took it on mainly due to encouragement from 
PGSI and the fact that the Rockefeller Foundation liked project co-sponsorship with 
other foundations. Rockefeller was disappointed with the results. Not only were there 
difficulties with the Indian study, but methodological problems with the Indonesian 
study and political constraints on the China study in terms of what could be said.
However, looked at from another standpoint, the project was more successful 
intellectually than the other two projects, since the area specialist authors of the
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Indonesia (Barber 1997) and China (Economy 1997) case studies posed hard challenges 
to Homer-Dixon's theoretical framework. In addition, the collapse of the Indian study 
forced Homer-Dixon to do his own research in Bihar. It is in his account of his 
experiences there (The Ingenuity Gap 2000) that one sees the possibility of his moving 
beyond the environmental scarcity model (see previous chapter).11
The project proposal initially set forth four main hypotheses regarding the 
relationship between environmental scarcity and state capacity:
- Environmental scarcity significantly increases demands on the 
state by requiring the construction and repair of infrastructure, the 
mitigation of environmentally related poverty in rural areas, and the 
provision of urban services to migrants from the impoverished 
countryside.
- Environmental scarcity significantly decreases resources 
available to the state by interfering with general economic productivity.
- Environmental scarcity therefore contributes to a widening gap 
between demands on the state and state resources. This gap strengthens 
certain elites while it weakens others; it reduces the state's managerial 
capacity and its bargaining and coercive power; and by increasing mass 
deprivation, it reduces state legitimacy.
- These effects increase the risk of civil violence, including insurgency, 
ethnic conflict, riots, and potentially, civil war (State Capacity 1993:9).
Stressing the serious implications for international security, die proposal cites the
possibility of China disintegrating in the face of environmental and population stresses
or the evolution of aggressive authoritarian regimes which might launch military attacks
against neighboring countries. "Should a number of developing countries evolve in this
direction, they could eventually threaten the military and economic interests of rich
countries" (8).
The project framework drew familiar criticism from scholars brought in to offer
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advice. At an October 1995 meeting at the Academy, for example, Lester Ross 
questioned whether the rise in local violence in China was really due to environmental 
scarcity or "a function of greater openness and political expression" in the country (State 
Capacity 1995a:3). Vaclav Smil underlined the strength of the Chinese state, and 
pointed out how China was paying much more attention to environmental issues than 
Western countries at a comparable historical stage, a process which was enhanced by 
foreign investment (3-4). In regards to India, Myron Weiner challenged the idea that 
resources were scarce in Bihar, and cautioned against analyzing the state as a black box 
and neglecting the role of NGOs and other important actors (5).
As in the previous projects, such critical comments did not make much of a dent 
in Homer-Dixon’s framework, and the authors of the case studies faced some determined 
resistance on his part. In a 1995 memo to the case study authors, Chip Barber 
(Indonesia), Elizabeth Economy (China), and Shaukat Hassan (India), Homer-Dixon 
wrote that it was important that "we are singing from the same song sheet" in terms of 
the definition of state capacity, although he also stated that "we are not prejudging the 
results of this project. If you look hard and find that there are no clear links between 
environmental scarcity and state capacity, then say so. None of the people running this 
project would be distressed by such a result" (State Capacity 1995b).
However, a certain amount of distress was evidenced when the case studies 
failed to conform to the framework. In comments on Elizabeth Economy's third draft of 
die China study, Homer-Dixon expressed concern that much of her paper "argues in 
support of a thesis different from the one we intend to investigate" in the project. He 
was worried, for example, that she treated environmental stress as a dependent rather
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than independent variable and that her causal chain was wrong. According to him, her 
causal chain ran from " [economic and political] Transition -> Changes in state capacity 
-> Problems with environmental management," whereas he was interested in the causal 
chain that ran from "Rising environmental scarcity X Transition Reduced state 
capacity" (1995c: 1-2).
Interestingly, in the same memo, Homer-Dixon included comments by Vaclav 
Smil, who was more sympathetic to Economy’s analysis. Smil wrote:
The real problem is to fit the findings into the prescribed mold, 
and on that account she cannot succeed because it is inherently 
impossible. None of the three big bad things she singles out -- income 
disparity, surplus labor, and corruption — can be tied in any plausible 
causative manner to environmental pollution and degradation.
Homer-Dixon challenged Smil, however, telling Economy that the key
independent variable was not pollution and degradation "but resource SCARCITY." He
pointed to the work of Jack Goldstone12, who shows convincingly that severe and
rapidly increasing resource SCARCITY can contribute to income disparities and
corruption. Surplus labor is often a function of rapid population growth; just ask most
economists in sub-Saharan Africa or India. Vaclav is simply wrong here (1995c).
Homer-Dixon was less critical of Barber's case study of Indonesia, though again in
comments to the author he was concerned that it conform to the basic framework and
incorporate his concept of ingenuity (State Capacity 1995d).
Partly as the result of this editorial process, the Indonesia and China case studies
adopt elements of Homer-Dixon's framework, but also provide a much more in-depth
and detailed rendering of the political economy of resource use in both places. They are
more rigorous and less deterministic than the EPS case studies, partially due, no doubt,
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to the fact that they are written by area specialists (see Barber 1997 and Economy 1997).
In addition to the publication and distribution of the two case studies, a final 
project briefing on China, Indonesia and India was held in May 1997 at the Woodrow 
Wilson Center, sponsored by the Environmental Change and Security Project (Woodrow 
Wilson Center 1997). In the list of participants were officials from the State 
Department, USAID, EPA, the Department of Defense, the National Intelligence 
Council and the National Security Council, along with representatives from foundations 
and NGOs.
Aside from this one policy briefing, it is unclear what, if any, policy impacts the 
project had. Unlike the EPS project, it did not set forth a simple model; as a final 
narrative report for the Rockefeller Foundation states, "the causal relationships between 
scarcities, state capacity, and civil violence were not fully evident in all three cases" 
(State Capacity 1998:4). Project successes were instead billed as the undertaking of 
substantial case studies, identifying and building links with "the growing communities of 
environmental specialists in China, Indonesia and India," and more nebulously helping 
"gain greater policy prominence for the importance of environmental scarcities as a 
public policy issue" (4). As Homer-Dixon himself remarked, the project produced no 
easy recommendations for policymakers.
The State Capacity project was the last of Homer-Dixon's major collaborative 
projects on environment and security. In a sense it marked the end of an era. In the 
second term of the Clinton administration, the openness toward new foreign policy goals 
diminished and environment and security started to lose its novelty value. In discussing
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how much of what goes on in policy circles is moving from one fad to the next, Homer- 
Dixon told me that he had had his "fifteen minutes." Nevertheless, he felt he was 
successful in the sense that now it is almost uninteresting that environmental issues are 
part of the security agenda. He feels he was one contributor to an important shift in 
world view.
When asked what he would have done differently, he commented that he might 
have come up with a more conventional research design, for example, using 
counterfactuals, although this could have been bewildering. Process tracing, he 
emphasized, was important in the first stage of the work. In a 1999 International Studies 
Association (ISA) workshop assessing the state of the field,13 he identified another 
problem as the failure to get down to the village level and talk to the people affected; he 
commented that we need to go down to the level where the pathologies are (personal 
notes from ISA Environment and Conflict Workshop; also see report of the meeting by 
Matthew and Dabelko 2000). He also spoke in favor of a plurality of research 
approaches.
This appeal to pluralism is also found in a paper he co-authored responding to 
criticism of his work. In order to deal with new research challenges, the authors 
encourage their colleagues to accept "a degree of methodological pluralism. The various 
methods available to us make up a diverse set of arrows in the quiver of the social 
scientist, and we should choose the arrow most likely to hit our target" (Schwartz, 
Deligiannis and Homer-Dixon 2001:291). But methodological pluralism is one thing, 
ideological as well as national, ethnic, and gender pluralism another.
In their comments on the ISA workshop, Dabelko and Matthew note the lack of
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meaningful participation by developing country scholars and practitioners in 
environment and conflict research. "Although some efforts have been made in this 
direction, the research remains largely conducted by European and North American 
scholars and practitioners despite the overwhelming focus on Southern cases" (Dabelko 
and Matthew 2000:100).
But is this so much a shortcoming of environment and conflict research -- or a 
precondition for its success? More specifically, without circumscribing heterodoxy, 
would Homer-Dixon have got as far he did? What if he had listened more closely to the 
critical comments he received along the way regarding the need for more developing 
country participation, attention to political economy and causal complexity? Without his 
adherence to a rigid framework and alarmist warnings about impending threats, would 
he have grabbed the attention of Robert Kaplan and A1 Gore and appealed to 
policymakers? Without the strong emphasis on the degradation narrative and other neo- 
Malthusian assumptions, would he have attracted funders like PGSI for whom 
highlighting population concerns was the central mission? Homer-Dixon seized the 
political moment, but the moment also seized him, rewarding him for not stepping out of 
bounds. His work was profoundly "funder-driven."
As this chapter reveals, agency clearly matters, not only the agency of the 
individual Homer-Dixon but of the powerful people and institutions that supported and 
shaped his work. Yet there were limits to this agency in terms of its ability to influence 
foreign policy. In the end, influencing policy at the macro level may be the least 
important impact of Homer-Dixon's work. In the concluding chapter, I examine the 
diffusion of his ideas in the context of U.S. government institutions and knowledge
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communities and look to what may lie ahead in terms of their role in threat 
representation and environmental surveillance and securitization.
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Endnotes to Chapter Five
1‘. For example, in 1990 the University of Califomia-Berkeley MacArthur Group on 
International Security Studies helped fund a workshop on "Global Resources and the 
Environment" co-sponsored by the Pacific Institute and the Energy and Resources Group 
at Berkeley. Homer-Dixon was a featured discussant. One of the goals of the workshop 
was to develop a common language for this new field of research which bridged the 
natural and social sciences (Pacific Institute 1990).
2. In addition to Boutwell, Homer-Dixon and Rathjens, participants included Dr. Robert 
Chen from Brown University’s World Hunger Program, Dr. Stephen Lintner from the 
World Bank and various scholars and researchers from the U.S. and Canada. One 
prominent participant was Dr. Janet Welsh Brown of the World Resources Institute and 
editor of In the U.S. Interest (1990), previously cited in Chapter Three as one of the first 
post-Cold War publications to tie population, environment and conflict directly to U.S. 
national security. Noting how his interest in environmental conflict was coincident with 
Brown's and her colleague Jessica Mathews’, Homer-Dixon told me how there was a 
kind of "simultaneous generation" of these ideas during the period, but he brought 
together environment and conflict independent of their influence.
'. These papers are "Water and Conflict" by Peter Gleick, "Environmental Stress and 
Conflicts in Africa: Case Studies of African International Drainage Basins" by Charles 
Okidi, "West Bank Water Resources and the Resolution of Conflict in the Middle East" 
by Miriam Lowi, "Environmental Change, Population Displacement, and Acute 
Conflict" by Astri Suhrke, "Bangladesh and Northeast India: Migration, Land Pressure, 
and Ethnic Conflict" by Sanjoy Hazarika, and "Environmental Conflicts and Indigenous 
Nations in Central America" by Bernard Nietschmann.
4‘. It may be that Strong's critical stance is one of the reasons the ECAC project did not 
have much influence on UNCED, although the project organizers had hoped it would.
5'. One interviewee told the story of speaking with him at a party when he confided that 
the reason he could get along with women's movement people is that he treated them 
well. She remarked: "'Look around the room,' he told me, 'all these women have been 
hammered.' There was some courage in him."
6'. As PCT's 1994 annual report noted, its team of professionals, consisting of lawyers, 
scientists and consultants, would "play a key role in generating many of the ideas behind 
the programs we support, participating with colleagues from the environmental 
community in defining the goals and objectives of these programs, designing their 
operating structures, hiring key staff and, in some cases, being directly involved in 
program execution" (cited in Tokar 1997:28).
7'. For example, John Topping, Jr., head of the Climate Institute which funded Norman 
Myers' alarmist study of environmental refugees (Myers 1995), stressed the relationship
of land degradation and soil erosion to population movements. Another participant raised 
the question of whether "the fear of mass migrations, either internal or external, [could] 
be used as leverage to convince governments, multilateral agencies, and corporations to 
think in terms of sustainable development" (Pew Charitable Trusts 1993:6). Homer- 
Dixon was skeptical of the term environmental refugee and was concerned that it would 
take attention away from the root causes of poverty. In an interview, Topping told me 
there was much more interest in environmental refugees in European policy circles 
because of stronger fears about immigration, particularly from North Africa. To the 
extent that there was interest in the issue in the U.S., it came more from the population 
community than environmental groups.
8. Sechler believes there is great value in allowing civil society to articulate both its 
positive and negative thoughts and feelings in the same room, as it were. "It seems that 
no matter what is wrong with us, Americans will not go with the draconian mean- 
spirited option if they know that is what is entailed in various programs and policies 
unless they can convince themselves that the people who are affected are bad or lazy. 
But there is no way for them to know what policies mean on the ground unless issues are 
unpacked and the average citizen...feels like their concerns have been represented" (e- 
mail correspondence, 11/14/00).
9'. Other members were Judith Bruce of the Population Council; Stephen Del Rosso of 
the Pew Charitable Trusts; John R. Dellenback, a Presbyterian Church leader; David 
Devlin-Foltz of PGSI, demographer Leobardo Estrada; PGSI Program Officer Susan 
Gibbs; political scientist Jack Goldstone; Robert Kaplan; Paul Kennedy; Robert Litwak 
of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; Christopher Makins of the 
Aspen Institute; Georgetown University professor Theodore Moran; George Perkovich 
of the W. Alton Jones Foundation; Jeremy Rosner of the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace; Emma Rothschild; Susan Sechler; John Steinbnmer of the 
Brookings Institution; Michael Teitelbaum; Barbara Torrey of the National Research 
Council; Thomas Wander from AAAS; and Jeff Wise at the Aspen Institute's 
Environmental Security Policy Project (PGSI 1994d). Interestingly, Homer-Dixon had 
recommended to Sechler in June that Joan Dunlop of the International Women's Health 
Coalition be part of the advisory team since she could help the project understand how 
its findings might be received or misperceived by women's groups. However, Dunlop 
did not join the team, and the project ended up having little contact with women's 
groups.
10. In addition to PGSI, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund provided funding for the briefing 
book.
n \ Homer-Dixon also told me that he found the India study workshop held in Rajasthan 
in December 1995 to be one of the most stimulating. Here, he came face to face with 
critical Indian NGO activists such as Smitu Kothari from Lokayan in New Delhi. 
Kothari told me that he got very angry at the conference because although the project's 
empirical evidence was strong, the analysis left out any consideration of the role of the
capitalist economy. When people are alienated from their resource base, he remarked, 
they may take to violence or migration or political action, but the point is what alienates 
them from those resources in the first place?
12. In a number of the memos to authors, Homer-Dixon cites Goldstone to legitimize his 
theory of the impact of population-induced scarcity on the state. Goldstone's writings 
clearly greatly influenced (and arguably greatly constrained) his view of the state. 
Goldstone, incidentally, was also the person from whom Homer-Dixon got the idea that 
the Chinese state was in danger of fragmenting.
13. ISA Workshop on Environment, Population and Conflict Research, co-sponsored by 
the Environmental Change and Security Project and the University of Califomia-Irvine 
Global Environmental Change and Human Security Project, Irvine, California, March 
18-19,2000.
274
CHAPTER SIX
Truths and Their Consequences:
Reflections on the Impact o f Environmental Conflict Ideas
How is one to measure Homer-Dixon's impact, and the impact of environmental 
conflict ideas more generally, over the short and the long terms? This is the question I 
address in this concluding chapter. When I originally conceived of this thesis, I 
anticipated finding concrete policy outcomes, but over time I realized that the impact 
was likely to be more complex and diffuse than a simple project or program, especially 
as Homer-Dixon himself maintained a certain scholarly aloofness, steering away from 
policy recommendations.
A State Department briefing in 1996, shortly after the launching of Warren 
Christopher's much-heralded environmental initiative, provides a particularly revealing 
example of this. When asked what kinds of concrete, cost-effective policy steps could 
have been introduced 20 years ago in places like Chiapas to foster positive 
environmental change, Homer-Dixon's group1 responded only with "population 
programs, improving local farming techniques, and tree-planting." They went on to 
describe these measures as "far more easily implemented than larger-scale structural 
change such as land reform" (State Department 1996a:4). Homer-Dixon admitted "a gap 
exists between what information he can produce and what the policymaker needs" (5).
However, many of the people I interviewed believed it was not just a question of 
an information gap, but rather that environmental conflict ideas did not have the
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necessary power to transform policy. Among the different reasons they offered were:
-  The environment has no agent to go after unlike terrorists or rogue states or 
even certain diseases. Who are you going to go after when the U.S. is the worst 
environmental abuser?
— To the extent that the environmental conflict field moved, the mover was Vice 
President Gore, at least in his first term. He took a personal interest in it, but now (spring 
2000) his personal interest is in running for president. If Gore loses the election, the 
arguments are not strong enough to withstand a Bush administration.
-  The foreign policy establishment cannot fit environmental conflict into their 
world picture, and now fascination with the environment is declining. People are also 
skeptical that investing in soil erosion will somehow reduce conflict. The core 
assessment of conflict is not likely to be environmental.
-- The State Department does not like issues that require long-term dedicated 
solutions; they want a quick fix to solve whatever is the current crisis.
— Homer-Dixon's methodology was too linear and mined the strength of 
predictiveness. The relationship between conflict and the environment is indirect and 
requires a different kind of conceptual model to get at this, one than engages people 
doing systems theory and complex adaptive theory.
However, I also heard more positive assessments. According to Army War 
College professor Kent Butts, Homer-Dixon's influence on policymakers was profound. 
It was directly related to the establishment of the CIA's Environmental Center and State 
Failure Task Force. These were in addition to Gore's decision to set up the MEDEA 
project, in which a select group of civilian scientists is working with the CIA to use
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classified intelligence community data to monitor environmental degradation and crises 
(Richelson 1998). Butts also credits Homer-Dixon as being a major catalyst in bringing 
regional environmental issues to the fore.
Part of the difference in opinion may lie in the distinction between intentional 
and unintentional policy consequences. If one looks at environmental conflict ideas 
through the lens of strategic intelligibility (Ferguson 1990), one can consider the ways in 
which environmental conflict ideas may have failed to lead to any policy outcome 
directly identifiable with them, but nevertheless had other important policy and 
ideological effects that become clearer with the benefit of hindsight.
The purpose of this chapter is to consider both the intentional and unintentional 
consequences of Homer-Dixon's ideas in order to gain greater insight into processes of 
knowledge production, diffusion and function. Part One analyzes Homer-Dixon's 
impact through the concepts of boundary object and strategic text, with examples drawn 
primarily from key U.S. government institutions. Part Two examines the nature of the 
knowledge communities which formed around environmental conflict. Part Three is a 
more speculative exploration of the possible future impact of these ideas, in particular 
their relationship to evolving trends in threat representation and environmental 
surveillance and securitization. I conclude by addressing the role of the critical 
intellectual in challenging such a belief system such as Homer-Dixon's.
Whatever their thoughts about Homer-Dixon, most interviewees agreed that 
interest in environmental conflict could persist at a low level of activity, and perhaps 
grow stronger if political circumstances were to change. As one IR scholar put it, such 
ideas have been around for a long time. "Desire and scarcity — you can trace it back to
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Malthus and Hobbes. Geopolitics are organized around the same kind of arguments.” In 
other words, the strategic value of scarcity is not likely to diminish any time soon.
I. REINSCRIBING ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT: 
INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTS
Timura (2001) argues that environmental conflict is a boundary object whose 
vagueness has allowed a wide variety of actors and institutions to enter the debate and/or 
use it for their own purposes. "At least one aspect of boundary objects is their ability to 
be appropriated by various institutions to serve already existing agendas," he notes (106). 
The participation of multiple players meanwhile increases the credibility of the 
discourse, helping to ensure its continued survival and expansion, not just in policy 
circles but elsewhere.
While the boundary object of environmental conflict may be vague (and 
environmental security even vaguer), one cannot say the same about Homer-Dixon's 
model which is a forthright specification of causal processes. Therein lies an important 
dimension of his influence: the specificity of his model, as well as his case study 
approach, gave the much-needed sheen of scientific rationality and scholarly rigor to an 
otherwise vague boundary object. As we shall see, this helps explain the way his work 
was frequently invoked by policymakers and commentators, even if their interest in 
environmental security was for quite different reasons. Funders like PGSI may have also 
viewed his causal logic as intrinsically appealing to policymakers for whom knowledge 
about cause and effect relationships is an important component of policy formation
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(Goldstein and Keohane 1993).
In addition to helping legitimize and stabilize the boundary object of 
environmental conflict, Homer-Dixon's work, particularly his key articles in Scientific 
American and International Security, can also be seen as strategic texts which became 
more significant as they were reinscribed by others (Boland 2000, see Chapter One). 
Highlighted in Kaplan's "The Coming Anarchy," Homer-Dixon's 1991 International 
Security article (which Kaplan argued could mark the beginning of post-Cold War 
foreign policy) became a strategic text within a strategic text. This mutual reinforcement 
gave both texts added punch in the policy world, Homer-Dixon's scholarly approach a 
useful foil for Kaplan's more dramatic nightmarish and racially charged visions.
In official circles, the main element distilled from Homer-Dixon's work was the 
neo-Malthusian degradation narrative, phrased in his particular idiom of environmental 
or resource scarcity. The degradation narrative, then, is the strategic subtext, the 
hegemonic myth that is not only reinscribed in his work, but in the work of many others, 
as noted in Chapter Three. Homer-Dixon's particular contribution was giving the myth 
enough of scholarly legitimacy that it could pass muster in the corridors of power. The 
degradation narrative in turn provided an avenue through which population issues and 
actors could intersect with the emerging environmental security agenda and vice versa. It 
was vital to the creation and continuing operation of the Woodrow Wilson Center's 
Environmental Change and Security Project (ECSP), the focal point of the knowledge 
community that has formed around environmental security.
The following sections illustrate these processes through examining the 
reinscription and deployment of Homer-Dixon's ideas primarily in key U.S. government
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institutions. The analysis is not intended as a catalogue of all effects in all relevant 
institutions; rather it teases out how the ideas interacted with and reinforced other 
institutional agendas.
The Clinton Administration: Something to Say
There is no question that Homer-Dixon's ideas provided the Clinton 
administration with "something to say" at a time when environmental issues were being 
incorporated into the foreign policy apparatus, largely at A1 Gore's initiative. In 1993 the 
administration not only created Timothy Wirth's position of Under Secretary of State for 
Global Affairs in the State Department, but established a directorate and Senior Director 
post for Global Environmental Affairs at the National Security Council (NSC), the 
position of National Intelligence Officer for Global and Multilateral Issues at the 
National Intelligence Council (NIC), and a Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for 
Environmental Security in the Department of Defense (DOD).
According to Dabelko and Simmons (1997), late in 1993, following a briefing by 
Homer-Dixon, the NSC Global Environmental Affairs Directorate and the office of the 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Environmental Security "began to incorporate 
environment and conflict ideas into their work" (135). In 1994 and 1995, the 
administration's National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, which is 
considered an important blueprint for foreign and defense policy, stated boldly in the 
preface that "Large-scale environmental degradation, exacerbated by rapid population 
growth, threatens to undermine political stability in many countries and regions" (White 
House 1995:47).
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Certainly, from about 1994 through 1997, some mention of environmentally 
induced conflict seems de rigueur in official speeches and reports on the environment, 
whether emanating from the administration, State Department, intelligence community, 
or the Defense Department (see Environmental Change and Security Project Reports for 
these years.) Even if he is not mentioned by name, Homer-Dixon’s ideas, often couched 
in language similar to his, are very much present.
For example, in 1994 Eileen Claussen, recently appointed NSC Senior Director 
for Global Environmental Affairs, delivered a speech which drew heavily on Homer- 
Dixon's notion of environmental scarcity. "Lack of access to productive agricultural 
lands combines with population growth to encourage migration to steep hillsides," she 
stated. "These hillsides are easily eroded, and after a few years fail to produce enough to 
support the migrants. The result is deepened poverty which then helps to fuel violence." 
Like Homer-Dixon, she went on to link resource scarcities to the insurgencies of the 
New People's Army in the Philippines and Sendero Luminoso in Peru (Claussen 
1995:40-41).
While Homer-Dixon's ideas featured as strategic text, it is less clear how 
seriously they reflected the presenter's actual beliefs. As one veteran Washington 
observer told me, one must take these references with a grain of salt, since speech writers 
do not necessarily reflect the real views of policymakers. Themes are often chosen to fit 
a particular political moment. Claussen told me that she recalled getting somewhat 
involved with Homer-Dixon's material and giving this talk around the Cairo conference, 
when she 'did' population as well as the environment. However, her true interest was in 
multilateral environmental concerns.
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One should also not discount the clueless factor. A senior Clinton administration 
official revealed that when the NSC first expanded to take on environmental issues in 
1992, no one had a clue about them. Viewed in this way, Homer-Dixon's work filled a 
temporary policy vacuum by usefully linking population and environment to national 
security.
The rhetoric of environmental conflict also served more strategic and ideological 
purposes. As noted in the previous chapter, Homer-Dixon's ideas were particularly 
useful to Wirth at the State Department in building a broader constituency for the Cairo 
population conference. They also figured in Secretary of State Warren Christopher's 
1996 initiative to improve the way environmental issues were incorporated in core 
foreign policy goals, which included the establishment of regional environmental hubs at 
embassies in Costa Rica, Uzbekistan, Ethiopia, Nepal, Jordan and Thailand.
Christopher's initiative identified a large variety of pressing environmental issues 
of strategic interest to the U.S., from climate change to ozone depletion to pollution; it 
also referred to resource scarcities and rapid population growth:
Rapid population growth in various regions — from the Mahgreb, 
to Sub-Saharan Africa, to South Asia, to Central America — can combine 
with stagnant economies or diminished natural resources, and contribute 
to domestic political disorder, or to migration and international conflict.
In a country like Haiti, establishing political stability would involve "confronting
environmental decline" (State Department 1996b:2).
In this, and other related State Department documents (e.g. State Department
1997a,b), one clearly sees the role of environmental conflict ideas in expanding the
boundary object of environmental security. This process of expansion ultimately leads to
an odd conflation: mentioned side by side, the problems of ozone depletion and Haitian
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refugees are effectively given equal weight. One can observe this phenomenon in 
presentations of environmental threats/risks. Often in official documents the 
environmental risks posed by industrial accidents such as the Chernobyl explosion are 
placed side by side with the degradation narrative, with the effect of making poor 
peasants as threatening as nuclear disasters. For example, a 1999 Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) publication on environmental security states:
Two well-known environmental disasters underscore the link 
between environmental degradation and threats to U.S. national interests:
-- The Chernobyl nuclear power plant explosion and the tragic 
health effects that followed.
-- The destruction of the forests of Haiti and the erosion of 
agricultural topsoil, contributing to untenable economic and living 
conditions and a flood of refugees fleeing to the United States (EPA 
1999:1).
This expansion/conflation has several effects. Arguably, pointing the finger at 
poor refugees is part of a larger process of obfuscating the risks of large-scale 
technological hazards, to which the state has no effective response or in which it is 
heavily implicated (see Beck 1995). Barnett (2001) notes the additional problem of 
conflating risk with threat: "Environmental security in this sense represents the state's 
particularly highly politicized assessment of risk rather than any scientific account of the 
actual risks" (89).
One also cannot discount the racial dimension of the conflation, since the 'human 
face' put to environmental disaster becomes that of a dark-skinned peasant turned 
refugee. Although unintentional on his part, Homer-Dixon's negative depiction of 
migration fit well with the anti-immigrant political climate in Washington, D.C., which 
culminated in 1996 in a spate of legislation which severely restricted the civil rights of 
immigrants and curtailed their social benefits (Political Research Associates 2002). It is
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also important to remember that Homer-Dixon's work was supported by a foundation, 
the PGSI, which was seriously considering the intentional manipulation of fears around 
environmental refugees flooding American borders as part of a strategy to win public 
support for population and development assistance (see previous chapter).
After 1997 environmental issues in general started to wane as a priority area for 
the State Department due to a variety of factors, including "internal opposition, deeply 
ingrained and hard-to-change behavioral patterns, lack of congressional support, and the 
inability of anyone to articulate a clear set of foreign environmental policy goals" 
(Matthew 2000:107). Hopgood (1998) also argues that non-governmental environmental 
epistemic communities could not achieve much impact on the policy process because of 
the relative autonomy of the American state (Hopgood 1998). In addition, Gore's 
presidential ambitions made him less eager to take political risks.
Environmental conflict ideas concurrently diminished in significance in the 
administration, although one State Department official told me in the late 1990s that they 
might still have their political uses. It was much easier to do environmental diplomacy 
work, this official said, when the Defense Department and CIA beat the drums over 
things like water wars.
The Defense Department: Preventive Defense and Strategic Engagement
The Department of Defense (DOD) originally took up the banner of 
environmental security independent of environmental conflict issues, primarily in 
response to legislative and regulatory pressure in the late 1980s and early 1990s to clean 
up contaminated military bases and weapons installations (see Thomas 1997). Facing
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possible budget cuts by the Clinton administration, the military was eager to attract and 
keep clean-up resources in-house; its success is indicated by die fact that by 1995, the 
DOD Environmental Security Office had a budget of $5 billion, almost equivalent to the 
entire budget of the EPA (Nitze 1995).
Clean-up operations also developed an international dimension as part of a 
strategy of strengthening ties to the militaries of newly democratic states. For example, 
an interagency collaboration between the DOD, EPA and Department of Energy has 
assisted the militaries of former Communist states in restoration of contaminated areas, 
particularly in the Baltic and Arctic regions (see Goodman 1996).2 Environmental 
security, however, would come to include more than just toxic clean-up.
In the mid-1990s, in response to the challenges posed by political conflict and 
humanitarian emergencies in places like Somalia and Sudan, the DOD introduced the 
doctrine of "preventive defense" which embraced environmental conflict ideas. In 
remarks to the National Defense University in 1996, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense 
for Environmental Security, Sherri Wasserman Goodman, underlined the importance of 
preventive defense, which includes understanding the causes of conflict and instability, 
providing early warning of potential crises, and acting "well before a crisis to avoid 
costly military interventions." Clearly echoing Homer-Dixon, she emphasized the role 
of environmental degradation and scarcity in generating conflict:
Scarcity of renewable resources such as water, forests, cropland, 
and fish stocks occur from degradation and depletion of resources, 
overconsumption and overuse of resources, and/or inequitable 
distribution of resources. Often these causes of scarcity combine to 
exacerbate the scarcity's impact. Environmental scarcities can interact 
with political, economic, social and cultural factors to cause instability 
and conflict (Goodman 1996:2).
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In a chapter on the environment, the influential 1997 Strategic Assessment of the 
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) repeated Goodman's words almost 
verbatim (INSS 1997:221). The report also described Haiti and Chiapas, where 
instability is "exacerbated by land scarcity, soil erosion and deforestation," as the two 
potential flashpoints of most concern to the U.S. since they are closest to American 
borders (225).
Whether these references to Homer-Dixon's work are more rhetorical bows than 
serious indicators of policy is a debatable question. According to an officer in the 
DOD's Environmental Security Office whom I interviewed in 1999, Homer-Dixon's 
work was useful to "bright light" the environmental degradation issue, but his model 
wasn't being used "anywhere around here." Except for water issues in the Middle East, 
this officer said, there are not clear-cut cases of environmental scarcity leading to 
conflict. He described Homer-Dixon's analysis, with its focus on scarcity, as way too far 
out to the right!3
It is worth noting, however, that the DOD Environmental Security Office was a 
major player in the NATO CCMS study which shares many of the same assumptions as 
Homer-Dixon (see Chapter Four). Army War College professor Kent Butts told me that 
Homer-Dixon's basic message that environmental degradation can trigger conflict had a 
major impact on policymakers, despite the academic naysayers.
Notwithstanding these differences of opinion, environmental conflict ideas have 
proved useful to DOD's strategy of building bridges to foreign militaries as well as 
civilian institutions in the South. For example, in an April 2000 ECSP workshop, 
General Anthony Zinni, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Central Command, which
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covers 25 countries from the Horn of Africa to the Middle East and Central Asia, spoke 
of environmental threats which potentially threaten regional stability. While he 
emphasized water scarcity issues, he also remarked:
Depletion of resources and loss of biodiversity can cause soil 
degradation. This, in turn, can lead to migration to the cities, which 
suffer from urban explosion and become hotbeds for extremism. 
Population growth in Africa and in the Arabian Peninsula is also a great 
concern, as these regions may not be able to sustain such a high 
demographic density (U.S. Central Command 2000:190).
Such concerns play a role as both context and pretext for U.S. military outreach
not only to other militaries but to non-governmental organizations. In the words of
Zinni's colleague, General Stephen Johnson, present at the same meeting, "The concept
of environmental security...gives the military the chance to interact and learn from
environmental experts and NGO representatives. Environmental security is an
engagement tool, one which has a win-win outcome" (190-191).4
According to Kent Butts, because of their proven effectiveness, these kinds of
outreach strategies continue today as security cooperation under the Bush administration.
Environmental security is a benign subject, Butts told me, involving issues like
population and health; it is a way to get down to the practitioners in the field.
Environmental security has been employed as a way to re-engage with India, and it has
proved a particularly useful means to get access to the militaries of the Central Asian
states. Butts was planning a Central Command environmental security conference in the
Persian Gulf in September 2002 as a means to promote communication and cooperation
between the militaries of this strategically important region and the U.S.
In Central America, according to Butts, the DOD and the Southern Command
are working to get militaries involved in reforestation efforts and the development of a
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protected biological corridor. Butts promotes the idea of civilian-defense partnerships, 
in which the U.S. military encourages national militaries to engage in environmental 
projects in cooperation with NGOs and other civilian interests as a way of strengthening 
the transition to democracy (also see Butts 1998:102). Butts spoke about the 
Philippines, where with the fall of Marcos, opportunities opened for using the military 
for positive environmental ends such as reforestation. As part of a larger development 
package, environmental aid is also a component of the current U.S. anti-terrorism 
program in the Philippines, and environmental security a major aspect of the Central 
Command's work in Afghanistan. The DOD also has biodiversity and conservation 
projects in 15 countries in Africa (U.S. Army War College 2000). Butts mentioned the 
case of Malawi, where game poachers were better armed than wildlife preserve guards, 
and the U.S.-equipped Malawian army provided the latter with semi-automatic weapons 
and anti-poacher training.
By focusing on the security aspects of population and environmental 
degradation in the South, then, environmental conflict ideas have enlarged the military's 
concept of environmental security, not just definitionally but geographically and 
operationally.
The Intelligence Community: Rhetoric, Rationale and Warning Signs
In the intelligence community, environmental conflict ideas helped fill the 
vacuum left by the demise of the Soviet Union. During the Cold War 50-60 percent of 
the CIA's resources were directed toward the Soviet Union; by 1993 the share had 
shrunk to 13 percent. To justify continued high levels of budgetary support, the first
288
post-Cold War Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) James Woolsey emphasized new 
threats to security, arguing that the U.S. now lived "in a jungle filled with a bewildering 
variety of poisonous snakes" (cited in Johnson 1996:41). In addition, the CIA 
encouraged more government agencies and policymakers to become consumers of its 
intelligence, and looked for new missions for its expensive satellite surveillance systems, 
which had been trained primarily on the Soviet Union (Twentieth Century Fund 1996).
It is within this context that environmental matters began to figure more 
prominently in the intelligence community in the 1990s.5 In a familiar pattern, high- 
ranking intelligence officials made Homer-Dixonesque remarks about population 
growth, environmental degradation and conflict in speeches on the environment (e.g., 
see DCI Speech 1996). A Wall Street Journal article on the new 'greenpolitik' of the 
intelligence community emphasized environmental conflict and referred to Homer- 
Dixon specifically in regard to China (Marcus and Brauchli 1997). Rhetoric aside, there 
were also a number of institutional effects of these beliefs.
First, environmental conflict ideas have served as a justification for the 
maintenance of expensive satellite surveillance systems, which cost around $1 billion 
each, with 12 typically operating at one time (Broad 1995). In 1996 DCI John Deutch 
linked satellite surveillance directly to the degradation narrative and threat of 
environmentally-induced conflict:
Environmental degradation, encroaching deserts, erosion, and 
overfarming destroy vast tracts of arable land. This forces people from 
their homes and creates tensions between ethnic and political groups as 
competition for scarce resources increases. There is an essential 
connection between environmental degradation, population growth, and 
poverty that regional analysts must take into account.
National reconnaissance systems that track the movement of 
tanks through the desert, can, at the same time, track the movement of the
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desert itself, see the sand closing in on formerly productive fields or 
hillsides laid bare by deforestation and erosion. Satellite systems allow 
us to quickly assess the magnitude and severity of damage. Adding this 
environmental dimension to alert policymakers to traditional political, 
economic, and military analysis enhances our ability to alert 
policymakers to potential instability, conflict or human disaster and to 
identify situations which may draw in American involvement (DCI 
Speech 1996:1).
Second, concern about the potential for environmental conflict was also an 
important factor behind Gore’s move to establish the DCI Environmental Center (now 
called the Environmental and Societal Issues Center) to serve as a focal point for 
environmental issues within the intelligence community. As noted in Chapter Three, the 
Environmental Center hosted a conference on environmental flashpoints in 1997, in 
which environmental conflict ideas figured prominently in the case studies. In 1999 the 
Center was working on a quantitative forecasting model using political, economic, 
environmental and demographic data to try to predict where conflict might break out in 
the future.
Third, environmental conflict ideas provided a possible avenue for the 
intelligence community, as for the military, to engage with nongovernmental experts and 
organizations. As one intelligence analyst told me, in the case of environmental issues, 
information sources are "way outside" the community, and contact with knowledgeable 
academics, NGOs and quasi-govemmental agencies is beneficial. According to journalist 
Steven Greenhouse, in Africa, where the CIA cut back on its intelligence presence 
during the Clinton administration, relief workers especially were considered "a trove of 
information" (Greenhouse 1995:A6).6
One of the express charges of the National Intelligence Council (NIC), described 
by the Los Angeles Times as "the most influential analytic arm" of the U.S. intelligence
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community (Wright 2000:1), is drawing on ’’nongovernmental experts in academia and 
the private sector to bring in fresh perspectives and analytic methods to enhance the 
intelligence process” (CIA 2002). As noted in the last chapter, Enid Schoettle, NIC 
Officer for Global and Multilateral Issues in the Clinton Administration, was a member 
of the PGSI Stewardship and Security steering committee which advised Homer-Dixon. 
She was also a leading force in the production of Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue 
About the Future with Nongovernment Experts (NIC 2000b), which is the largest project 
the NIC has done with outside engagement (Loeb 2000). Demographics and the 
environment are at the top of the report’s list of seven ’’key drivers” that will shape the 
future.
Fourth, environmental conflict ideas provide a useful interface between 
environmental scientists and the intelligence community in the development of early 
warning systems. For example, Alan Hammond of the World Resources Institute and 
British security scholar Gwyn Prins have been working on a conflict prediction model 
utilizing environmental indicators for possible use by both the CIA and the British 
defense intelligence agency (DERA). Hammond told me that the model, which uses 
land-based indicators such as soil fertility and population projections, would identify the 
critical threshold at which social disruption would likely occur. This kind of 
collaboration between environmental scientists and intelligence agencies, which raises 
both serious ethical and epistemic concerns7, may be one of the most lasting impacts of 
environmental conflict ideas.
In sum, environmental conflict ideas have served multiple objectives within the 
intelligence community, supporting the establishment of the Environmental Center,
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serving as a rationale for continuing expenditures on satellite surveillance, facilitating 
engagement with NGOs and academics, and providing an interface between 
environmental scientists and intelligence agencies in the design of early warning 
systems.
USAID: Agency within the Agency
Although Homer-Dixon told me that he felt USAID was one of the institutions 
where he had the most influence, others remarked that his influence was limited mainly 
to the speeches and writings of (former) USAID Director Brian Atwood, who also 
borrowed heavily from Kaplan in painting horrific visions of a degraded, violent and 
overpopulated Third World.8 However, Homer-Dixon may be right if one takes a 
longer-range view of USAID activities. By legitimizing neo-Malthusian views of 
resource scarcity and violence, Homer-Dixon provided USAID with a useful way to link 
population to security prerogatives and institutions. Matthew (2000) notes how Homer- 
Dixon's research, by highlighting population issues, was consistent with USAID's 
agenda.
It would be wrong to view USAID, and especially its population office, as 
homogeneously neo-Malthusian, however. There was, and continues to be, a tension 
between those at the agency who view the population issue within a reproductive 
rights/reproductive health perspective and those who see population growth as a key 
"strategic threat" that "consumes all other economic gains, drives environmental damage, 
exacerbates poverty, and impedes democratic governance" (USAID 1993:7), and thus 
demands a strong results-driven family planning response. After the 1994 ICPD this
292
division became even more pronounced at USAID's Population, Health and Nutrition 
Office (PHN). In my interviews I was told by several people at USAID that 
reproductive health now had the upperhand in PHN and that environmental security 
ideas were not very popular.
There was a notable exception to this trend, an interesting example of specific 
'agency within the agency.' Joanne Grossi, a Senior Technical Adviser and head of AID's 
Population and Environment Initiative, began to fund the Woodrow Wilson Center's 
ECSP when Pew funds dried up in 1997. Grossi stepped in as PGSI's Susan Sechler 
stepped out, both women, then, playing a vital role in sustaining the environmental 
security enterprise. If the ECSP had collapsed in 1997 from lack of funding, it is 
questionable whether the environmental security field would have continued to grow. In 
addition, Grossi, an ardent neo-Malthusian,9 helped to keep population central to the 
ECSP mission.
When I interviewed Grossi in 1999, PHN's contribution to the ECSP had risen 
from $75,000 to $600,000. She explained that the symmetry was beneficial; while 
USAID money helped the ECSP improve its reputation and attract more government 
officials to its events, the ECSP helped USAID get more of an audience for population 
issues. She did not foresee any concrete policy changes emerging from the collaboration, 
but instead more in the way of "intangibles" like the chance to dialogue. She remarked 
that some people at USAID hoped that having the DOD, CIA, Congressional staffers, 
etc. in the same room at the Wilson Center would help them to see USAID differently 
and impact how Congress feels about the agency. In terms of environmental security, 
the ECSP "was one of the only games in town."
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In addition to the "intangibles," there also appear to be more tangible 
programmatic consequences of USAID's involvement in the environment and security 
field. In 1996 the USAID-supported University of Michigan Population Fellows 
Program, which places early career population professionals in developing country 
institutions, established a new Population, Environmental Change and Security (PECS) 
initiative in collaboration with the ECSP. The initiative's goal is to link the insights of 
fellows working in population-environment projects to ECSP's experience in facilitating 
policy-level dialogue. "The result is a unique interdisciplinary forum for examining 
demographic and environmental roots of conflict and exploring program and policy 
options" (England 1999:74). In 1999 the focus was on migration, particularly the 
relationship of refugee flows and urbanization to environmental degradation and 
insecurity.
As a result of this initiative, joint population-environment projects undertaken by 
family planning, conservation and development NGOs began to receive significant 
visibility in ECSP Reports. Despite a professed commitment to communities identifying 
their own health and environmental needs, the main priority of many of these projects is 
to reduce population growth through increased uptake of family planning. A Michigan 
Fellows report contains this telling "lesson learned:"
In both Ecuador and Madagascar the concept of population was 
somewhat problematic. It was more difficult for participants to list 
quickly the activities that can be described as "population" compared to 
listing health or environment activities. In general, people are more 
comfortable discussing population activities under the umbrella category 
of health or reproductive health for political, cultural, and religious 
reasons. This preference seems a reasonable and strategic approach but 
could be a cause for concern if health does not include population-related 
needs and activities. In an integrated/linked population, health and 
environment program, there must be commitment and "intentionality" to
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ultimately undertake population activities, including family planning 
(Caudill 2000:73).
In the case of the Ecuador and Madagascar projects, population is integrated into almost 
all project activities, so that training in areas like guinea pig breeding, soil conservation 
measures, and improved cultivation practices has a family planning component.
Ideologically, population-environment projects reinforce the message that it is 
the population growth and agricultural practices of the local people themselves that 
cause environmental degradation. The problematic nature of these projects will be 
explored further in Part Three; here the important point is to note USAID's role in 
linking them to security concerns through the ECSP. Recently, USAID interest in 
environmental security has extended beyond the population program. Together with the 
MacArthur Foundation, USAID is funding a project undertaken by the African Center 
for Technology Studies (ACTS) in Nairobi, Kenya on "Ecological Sources of Conflict in 
Sub-Saharan Africa." In addition to assessing the extent to which natural resource 
scarcity and ecological stress contribute to conflict, the project's goal is "to promote 
dialogue between environmental agencies and those engaged in conflict prevention and 
management" (ACTS 2002).
Although the proposal draws specifically on Homer-Dixon (ACTS 2000), the 
project has a more complex and nuanced approach. As an international consultant told 
me, the African researchers involved, as well as many of the USAID personnel, do not 
accept Homer-Dixon's causal framework. However, he recounted the visit of one 
USAID official, carrying a copy of Homer-Dixon and Jessica Blitt's Ecoviolence under 
his arm, who was keen to set up a project in East Africa to deal with violent conflict 
between pastoralists, supposedly as the result of natural resource scarcities.
295
This example points to the need to monitor future developments at USAID in 
regard to conflict prevention strategies. In May 2001, as part of the agency's 
reorganization under the Bush administration, USAID announced that "conflict 
prevention and developmental relief' are one of the four new pillars of its work (USAID 
2001). This intensified focus on conflict prevention could re-open space for 
environmental conflict ideas to percolate into the development arena.
These examples from the State Department, DOD, intelligence community and 
USAID illustrate how environmental conflict ideas had a variety of ideological and 
institutional effects in U.S. government agencies, if not concrete policy outcomes. The 
following section looks briefly at their impact on institutions outside the U.S.
Bilateral and Multilateral Institutions
On the international level, environmental conflict ideas have percolated within a 
number of institutions10, though their precise impact is hard to gauge. The German 
government's Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear 
Safety has been one of the most active players internationally; Kurt Lietzmann from the 
Ministry was one of the instigators and directors of the NATO CCMS study (Lietzmann 
and Vest 1999). Several environmental researchers I interviewed noted how the German 
approach toward environmental security differed from that of the Americans, with more 
emphasis on human security issues and multilateral cooperation, and less on military 
engagement. However, in terms of the analysis of environmental conflict, the German 
approach in the NATO CCMS study has much in common with Homer-Dixon's analysis 
(see Chapter Four).
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The process of institutionalizing environmental security in European and 
multilateral institutions is reported to be slow. In 1999, German environmental 
researcher Alexander Carius (who was involved in the NATO CCMS study) told a 
meeting at the Woodrow Wilson Center that in Europe such efforts "remain in their 
infancy, in particular efforts to address environment and conflict linkages," partly 
because those linkages are still imprecise (Carius and Lietzmann 2000:169). The 
possible exception is the U.K. where the Blair government has established an 
Environmental Security Team in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's Environment 
Policy Department, and the Ministry of Defense document "Future Strategic Context of 
Defense" embraces resource scarcity arguments (British Ministry of Defense 2001).
Another reason for the slow absorption of environmental conflict ideas is that 
they have faced more opposition on the international level than within the U.S. For 
example, the UNEP initially proved very receptive to environmental conflict ideas as 
part of a larger strategy of positioning itself in a conflict prevention role. In 1999 UNEP 
produced a study on "Environmental Conditions, Resources and Conflicts" which 
paraphrases Homer-Dixon in many places (Schwartz and Singh 1999). (Schwartz, in 
fact, was then at the University of Toronto and has worked with Homer-Dixon).
According to Kurt Lietzmann, the G-77 countries ultimately blocked efforts by 
UNEP and other international intergovernmental organizations to institutionalize 
environmental security because they opposed "expanding the mandate of UN 
organizations to intervene in advance of perceived environmental conflicts" (Carius and 
Lietzmann 2000:169). One such proposed intervention was a UN "green helmets" force 
to respond to environmental disasters (Mendez 2002:321).
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Today, Carius is part of an initiative to bring about greater involvement of 
Southern governmental and non-governmental institutions in environmental conflict 
discussions. As the director of the Adelphi Research organization in Berlin, Carius has 
joined with Alexander Lopez of the Costa Rican NGO, Foreign Service Foundation for 
Peace and Democracy, and the ECSP to form the Environment, Development and 
Sustainable Peace Initiative (EDSP). This initiative recognizes a number of the 
problems with past Northern conceptualizations of environmental conflict, including 
Northern researchers' emphasis on "worst-case scenarios without incorporating a 
Southern perspective," lack of attention to development concerns, and the focus on 
governments rather than NGOs and grassroots communities (Mendez 2002:322).
At the recent World Summit for Sustainable Development in South Africa, the 
EDSP sponsored a roundtable billed as
an international effort to bridge the gap between Northern and 
Southern perspectives...Current efforts to translate the environment, 
population, and conflict debates into a positive, practical policy 
framework for environmental cooperation and sustainable peace have not 
enjoyed broad success. More importantly, these efforts have failed to 
engage a broad community of stakeholders, particularly in the global 
South. Fostering new efforts to bridge both the knowledge and policy 
gaps between the South and North is a critical step in the path to 
sustaining environment and sustaining peace (EDSP 2002).
The roundtable was also presented as a way to build networks between civil society
groups, government officials and think tanks working on these issues.
Whether or not this attempt is successful, it indicates that environmental conflict
ideas are still in circulation in policy circles, even if not deeply embedded in policy
institutions. The perceived challenge is to get more Southern stakeholders into the
debate. This raises two central questions: First, is the debate worth having, or would it
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be better to break out the environmental conflict box altogether, given the many perils of 
linking the environment to security and the deep neo-Malthusian assumptions that are 
still the dominant approach? Second, will the attempt to get more Southern stakeholders 
to the table end up being another example of circumscribed heterodoxy — which 
stakeholders from the South will be included, and even if more critical voices are 
allowed, will their names legitimize the project while their views are essentially ignored? 
It will be ironic indeed if environmental conflict ideas get a new lease on life by 
appearing to come "from the South.” However, looking on the more optimistic side, 
perhaps Southern perspectives will force a radical rethinking of the paradigm or at least 
weaken it substantially.
Ultimately, the staying power of environmental conflict ideas is not only 
dependent on their intentional, as well as unintentional, impacts on policy institutions, 
but the nature of the knowledge communities which have formed around them. This is 
the subject of Part Two.
II: IN  SEARCH OF A KNOWLEDGE FORMATION
When I attended the International Studies Association's 1999 annual meeting in 
Washington, D.C., I met a newly minted PhD in the environmental security field who 
told me that "We should get together and form a little epistemic community." 
Facetiousness aside, this comment illustrates just how much currency the concept of 
epistemic community has in such quarters.
Yet the question remains as to whether an epistemic community actually exists in 
the environment and security field. As IR scholar Ronnie Lipschutz told me, it makes
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more sense to talk of an episteme than an epistemic community. The latter implies a 
group of people who organize around a specific set of issues to impact policy, whereas 
an episteme is more inchoate — people are more loosely organized around shared ideas.
Given the vagueness of the boundary object of environmental security, and the 
diversity and multitude of possible policy objectives contained therein, episteme rather 
than epistemic community does seem a better fit. However, in its heyday in the early to 
mid-1990s, environmental security attracted a significant number of scholars and 
research institutes, both national and international, many with direct ties to 
policymakers. Among these are the International Peace Research Institute (PRIO) in 
Norway which has done considerable work in the field; the Pacific Institute in 
California, which has focused mainly on water conflict issues; Ecologic (Center for 
International and European Environmental Research) in Berlin which played a major 
role in conceptualizing and writing the NATO CCMS environment and security study; 
the Environment and Conflict Project of the Swiss Peace Foundation; and the Global 
Environmental Change and Human Security Project (GECHS), based in Canada. 
Researchers from these institutes met at conferences, participated in joint projects, and 
contributed to edited volumes, but their affinity was based more on the aim of 
interrogating and defining the parameters of environmental security (and in more 
material terms, attracting research funds), rather than on advocating a specific policy 
change in a specific institution.
Yet the concept of episteme alone does not adequately embody the nature of the 
knowledge communities which formed around environmental security. In particular, it 
leaves out the matter of strategic philanthropy and intentionality. In the last chapter, we
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saw how Homer-Dixon's own work was shaped by a proactive fimder-driven agenda 
which privileged population issues. The Pew Global Stewardship Initiative was not only 
the major funder of his work, but of the Woodrow Wilson Center's ECSP until the 
USAID Office of Population took over that role in 1997. Today, the ECSP also receives 
funding from an additional population-oriented foundation, the David and Lucile 
Packard Foundation.
The financial support of population interests has helped make environmental 
conflict, with its emphasis on the degradation narrative, a dominant theme of the ECSP. 
In the early years especially, Homer-Dixon's work is a major point of reference, and 
today population issues still occupy pride of place in the Environmental Change and 
Security Project Report (see Issue 8, 2002). One has to wonder how things might have 
worked out differently, if, for example, the funders had been more concerned with the 
role of U.S. carbon emissions in global climate change than with population growth in 
the Third World.
The intentionality behind the creation of the ECSP does not just have to do with 
the privileging of population, but with the endeavor to provide a physical and textual 
space where scholars, researchers and policymakers could meet. While this kind of 
interface institution is not unique, what distinguishes the ECSP is the extent to which it 
has proactively come to define the boundaries of the environmental security field and 
keep it alive, even in the face of major political transition in Washington, D.C.
What are the implications of this for understanding the knowledge formations 
around environmental security? If the concept of epistemic community does not fit, are 
the notions of issue network and discourse coalition (see Chapter One) more relevant?
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Issue Networks and the Role of Consensus
The more diffuse nature of issue networks, and the fact that although their 
members may share a knowledge base, they do not necessarily agree, more accurately 
describes those involved in the environment and security field. However, it is important 
not to neglect the role of consensus in issue networks.
As Halfon (1999) notes, consensus is less an absolute agreement than a process 
of continual negotiation, as ’’complex, multiple and contradictory’’ as the issue network 
itself. "A network facilitates the process of consensus production because it is both 
flexible enough to admit diversity yet disciplining" (2). In the case of environmental 
security, Homer-Dixon's ideas, whether disputed or not, were an important part of the 
consensus because there was general agreement that they mattered. In fact they mattered 
so much that they were the principle subject of debate in the 1996 and 2000 issues of the 
Environmental Change and Security Project Report. It is useful to think of consensus 
here in terms of consensus over the frame of reference. Ironically, constrained by this 
frame of reference, critics within the network can end up reinforcing it by the very act of 
criticizing it.
Another advantage of the issue network approach is that it acknowledges the 
possibility of multiple nodes. In the case of environmental security, some nodes are 
more magnetic than others, however. Thus, the ECSP, by virtue of its funding, access to 
U.S. policymakers, and effective outreach, became a more powerful node than other 
institutions, with more staying power.
Even if a network is flexible enough to admit diversity of views, it is also 
important not to forget the disparities in power between its members. The role of
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strategic philanthropy is critical in this regard, since private foundations play such an 
important role in policy-oriented research in the U.S. (Prewitt 2001). In her study of the 
Rockefeller Foundation, Kay (1993) notes the "negative space" outside the hegemonic 
consensus where those with less fashionable views receive less support (or in some cases 
lose it). Even if we locate that "negative space" within, not outside, the network 
consensus, its inhabitants still have less power in terms of access to funding and the 
connections to policymakers that often accompanies it. For example, critics may receive 
funding, perhaps even from the same sources, but at much lower levels than those who 
express the accepted, dominant view. Here, too, the politics of circumscribed 
heterodoxy operates; the consensus is strengthened by its apparent openness to different 
points of view, but since those holding critical views have less power and funds, the 
consensus is not fundamentally challenged. In the case of environmental conflict, the 
initial lack of scholarly critical analysis of Homer-Dixon's views may reflect, at least in 
part, fear of being consigned to the "negative space," with consequences for one's access 
to funding and professional career. Silence is often a strategic choice, especially in the 
face of a rising star like Homer-Dixon, who after all was dining with A1 Gore. Criticism 
ultimately became more acceptable, but largely within the bounds of circumscribed 
heterodoxy. The debate was mainly waged between Western IR male scholars, and with 
a few exceptions, there was little serious challenge to the underlying hegemonic myth of 
the degradation narrative.
This points to the importance of examining the internal politics and economics of 
issue networks and the role of strategic philanthropy in privileging certain actors and 
understandings over others. This privileging not only has relevance to the kind of
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knowledge which is produced, but to the producer's ability to appeal and have access to 
policymakers.
Discourse Coalition or Discourse Tapping?
It is also worthwhile to consider the concept of discourse coalition in relation to 
environmental conflict ideas, especially if one moves beyond the more scholarly actors 
in the field. According to Hajer (1995, see Chapter One), discourse coalitions can be 
comprised of diverse actors ~  scientists, politicians, activists, members of the media -- 
who employ a similar story line as they engage in environmental politics without 
necessarily ever meeting or sharing an explicit political strategy. Discourse coalitions are 
successful to the extent that a particular discourse becomes dominant and embedded in 
specific institutions.
The degradation narrative can be viewed as one such story line. Certainly, a 
diverse range of actors have employed it, from top government officials to population 
propagandists, and it has enjoyed considerable prominence in academic, policy and 
media circles. To the extent that environmental conflict ideas have been institutionally 
embedded, so has the degradation narrative. But does this necessarily mean an actual 
discourse coalition has formed around this particular story line? Is coalition too strong a 
term, implying more unity than actually exists?
Rather than the idea of a coalition, it is more useful to think of a sort of'discourse 
tapping' process in which various actors make use of a particular discourse or story line 
for strategic and ideological ends, and not necessarily with institutionalization as the 
benchmark of success. The degradation narrative and environmental conflict ideas were
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used by many disparate actors for disparate ends, and some actors tapped them more 
than others.
The population community provides a particularly illuminating example of this. 
While population-oriented foundation funding was vital to the production and spread of 
environmental conflict ideas, population NGOs have largely been reluctant to take them 
up, except when the ideas can be deployed in the service of some other objective. This 
reluctance stems from the fact that many people in the field view linking population to 
security as undermining the Cairo framework of refocusing population policy towards 
reproductive health and women's empowerment.
As one representative of a prominent population NGO told me, at first 
environment and security looked like it was going to be a big deal, but it hasn't had much 
sticking power because it is problematic. "What alliances would we make if we used it?" 
die representative said. "How would it affect our relationship with women's groups and 
environmental groups? If there are alliances to be made with conservative groups, what 
values does one place at risk? The population community does look for common ground 
with conservatives in Congress, but only if the core values of Cairo are not 
compromised." Nevertheless, this same person was considering doing a publication on 
environment and security if it would be useful in getting policymakers to see the 
importance of family planning.
For similar reasons, a number of population groups have tapped into the 
environmental conflict discourse. Population Action International featured Homer- 
Dixon's ideas in its 1997 publication "Why Population Matters," designed to make the 
demographic case for family planning assistance (Engelman 1997). A 1999 issue of
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Population Reports on "Why Family Planning Matters?," published by the USAID- 
funded Population Information Program at Johns Hopkins University, contains a section 
on resource conflicts that draws directly on Homer-Dixon (Population Information 
Program 1999).
The RAND Corporation's Population Matters series did a report in 2000 on "The 
Security Dynamics of Demographic Factors," again drawing on Homer-Dixon's work, 
financed by the U.S. Army and major population funders -- the Hewlitt, Packard and 
Rockefeller foundations. This publication links the need for more U.S. family planning 
assistance to governments "that wish to take the direct approach of reducing their fertility 
rates outright" to the army's need for technologies such as unmanned aerial surveillance 
vehicles and better body armor to fight in overcrowded urban areas of the Third World 
(Nichiporuk 2000:51-52).
More recently, a full page advertisement in the New York Times (6/19/02:A15) 
by the Population Institute attributes resource depletion, environmental degradation and 
civil unrest (as well as hunger and grinding poverty) to poor women's unintended 
pregnancies.
The two population projects which tapped most heavily into environmental 
conflict ideas were the Population Reference Bureau's (PRB) joint project with the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. on 
"Population and National Interests" (CSIS 1996) and the Rockefeller Foundation's 
lobbying publication High Stakes (Rockefeller Foundation 1997). The PRB/CSIS 
publication presents family planning as preventive diplomacy to mitigate a whole host of 
threats posed by population pressure, including conflict caused by resource scarcity. It
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emphasizes the connection between resource scarcity and migration, especially from 
Haiti,11 and asserts that the U.S. must regain control over its borders. PGSI instigated the 
collaboration between the two agencies; PRB was supposed to influence CSIS, but the 
context remained very much a security one. This led to a certain amount of 
disenchantment on the part of the PRB.
One of the PRB participants, Alex de Sherbinin, told me it was difficult to get the 
security people involved to move beyond the concept of the national interest to embrace 
development issues. The development people, meanwhile, were "twisting and turning" 
to relate to the security people but lost something in the process. He ended up writing a 
critical piece challenging the conventional environmental conflict line on Haiti (de 
Sherbinin 1996).
The controversy surrounding the Rockefeller Foundation's High Stakes report 
reveals the sharp division within the population community on whether or not to use 
environmental conflict arguments. Designed to counter international family planning 
budget cuts by a conservative Congress, the report draws heavily on Homer-Dixon to 
argue that unless steps are taken to reduce "surging population growth," resource 
scarcities will "ignite simmering tensions" and foment violent upheavals around the 
world (Rockefeller Foundation 1997:21). A foundation officer justified this line of 
argumentation to me on the basis that even if 10 percent of the report was alarmist, the 
other 90 percent was about reproductive health, and the only way to reach conservatives 
in Congress was through the idea of enlightened self-interest. The report was released 
with great fanfare in Washington. According to a prominent reproductive health 
advocate, the mythology at Rockefeller was that it really turned the tide in Congress,
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though in reality it was "in the dirt lobbying" that saved international family planning 
assistance.
The process of drafting the report produced an ideological struggle in the 
population community. According to Joan Dunlop, then president of the International 
Women’s Health Coalition, the draft was heavily criticized by reproductive health 
advocates, including herself. A line was clearly drawn between those willing to use 
national security arguments in the service of population assistance, and those who 
thought they would undermine the Cairo reforms.
Population groups thus made (and some continue to make) strategic use of 
environmental conflict ideas, but real and perceived opposition from feminist quarters 
helped prevent anything like a discourse coalition from forming around them. The 
irony, of course, is that population funding, mainly from PGSI and the Rockefeller 
Foundation, sustained Homer-Dixon's enterprise, but the NGO population community 
itself held back from full-scale support.
Several U.S. NGO environmental groups also tapped into environmental conflict 
ideas, although the community as a whole did not embrace them strongly. The 
Worldwatch Institute was the most prominent group to take up environmental conflict. 
This is not surprising given that both Lester Brown, who holds strong neo-Malthusian 
views, and Michael Renner were working on environmental security issues concurrently 
with Homer-Dixon. The Institute's publication Beyond Malthus (Brown, Gardner and 
Halweil 1999) uses Homer-Dixon's ideas in its chapter on population and conflict.
While not focusing on environmental conflict per se, the Natural Heritage 
Institute, with financial support from two anti-immigration funders (the Weeden and
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Compton foundations), produced a report for the U.S. Commission on Immigration 
Reform which linked population-induced environmental degradation and desertification 
to Mexican migration to the U.S. (Natural Heritage Institute 1997). The report, which is 
flawed methodologically12, was featured in the 1997 Environmental Change and 
Security Project Report.
Advocacy groups in other fields also did a bit of'discourse tapping.1 In 1999 the 
Center for Defense Information, an NGO watchdog group which monitors the military, 
made a television documentary "Water, Land, People and Conflict" for its America's 
Defense Monitor series (Show No. 1143), with support from the ECSP. In addition to 
talking heads talking about the threat of environmental conflict, the documentary 
contains lurid pictures of Third World violence and hunger.
Today, as many interviewees predicted, environmental conflict ideas continue to 
circulate, but at a much lower level of activity than in the 1990s, and often in 
conjunction with other environmental security concerns. One way in which they 
circulate is through websites and list serves which keep alive at least the illusion of a 
network, if not the reality. The ECSP has a longstanding list serve; other cyber sites 
include the website of the Environmental Security Initiative of the IUCN and 
International Institute for Sustainable Development (www.iisd.org/natres/security) and 
the Environment, Development and Conflict News based in Sweden 
(www.padrigu.gu.se/EDCNews). In addition there are a number of websites which focus 
on population and environment issues, created by groups such as the International Union 
for the Scientific Study of Population (IUSSP) and the Population Information Program 
at Johns Hopkins University.
309
Environmental conflict ideas also continue to circulate through the media. For 
example, a new documentary "On the Brink," part of a larger environmental series due to 
play on U.S. public television, was screened at the Woodrow Wilson Center in March 
2002. From reading the ECSP report on the film, it appears to be an unreconstructed and 
alarmist depiction of the degradation narrative, blaming population pressures, 
environmental degradation and migration for violent conflict in Peru, Bangladesh and 
along the U.S.-Mexican border. '"On the Brink' concludes that developed countries must 
address environmental security as major foreign policy issues," the report reads. 
"Bangladesh, Peru, and other areas are just examples of how water scarcity, land 
degradation, and forest depletion can help destablilize societies and contribute to 
revolution" (Lalasz and Greengrass 2002:1). The filmmakers decided to focus on 
environmental security when they were in Bangladesh filming another episode on global 
disease and a bomb went off a few feet away from them, "heightening their interest in 
how environmental pressures can contribute to conflict. 'The cameras don't lie,' said 
Zakin [the film's editor]. 'When people live without privacy, sanitation, or water, it can't 
help but exacerbate conflict'" (3).
Such media representations keep the Kaplanesque dark, violent Other alive in the 
American imagination, along with the neo-Malthusian chain of causality which goes 
along with it. It keeps the discourse alive for future tapping by whatever interests may 
find it useful.
In sum, the knowledge formations that have formed around environmental 
conflict do not easily fit one precise category, though the concept of issue network, if 
combined with attention to the role of strategic philanthropy, intentionality and
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consensus around the frame of reference, comes the closest. Rather than the concept of 
discourse coalition, it is more useful to look at the process of 'discourse tapping' to 
understand a range of different actors and agencies' engagement with environmental 
conflict ideas. They were not so much bonded by a common policy purpose, but by the 
utility of the discourse for various political ends.
Part Three now turns to a more speculative exploration of environmental conflict 
ideas in relationship to future trends in threat representation and environmental 
surveillance.
Ill: THE FUTURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT IDEAS IN THE 
STRATEGIC DEMOGRAPHY AND GEOGRAPHY OF THREATS
To repeat a popular truism in the U.S., we now live in a post-September 11 
world. There is no doubt that the security climate has changed. Tentative as they were, 
the Clinton administration's steps toward a more multilateralist foreign policy have given 
way to a unilateralist assertion of American power based on military might. Counter­
insurgency is back in vogue. A recent issue of the New York Times Magazine (7/21/02) 
contains a laudatory article about U.S. Special Forces training Filipino soldiers in jungle 
warfare (Webster 2002), while its Style section features two designer outfits side by side, 
one a sweater with a nature scene, the other a coat imprinted with the silhouette of a 
menacing helicopter. As I complete this thesis, the U.S. is preparing for war with Iraq 
despite widespread international opposition.
Can environmental conflict ideas survive this new security climate as well as the
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Bush administration's hostility toward both domestic and international environmental 
regulation? On first glance, one might be tempted to answer no, but there are indications 
otherwise. Environmental security remains a valuable engagement tool for the U.S. 
military, with a role to play in the Persian Gulf and 'the war against terrorism.' 
Environmental conflict ideas also continue to function discursively within the domains 
of strategic demography and geography, helping to identify and amplify new threats. In 
the case of strategic demography, environmental conflict ideas reinforce concerns about 
the "youth bulge" and religious and political extremism. In the case of strategic 
geography, they play a role in die increasing securitization of conservation. While 
environmental conflict ideas may no longer be center stage, they are still part of the 
supporting cast.
The Youth Bulge and the Muslim Terrorist
Chapter Three examined the "youth bulge" -- the belief that a large population 
cohort of young males provide the fodder for political extremism, particularly if they are 
urban and unemployed (see Hendrixson 2002) — as a concept related to the degradation 
narrative. Even before September 11, the youth bulge of primary concern was Islamic 
(e.g. Huntington 1996); today it is overwhelmingly so. Youth bulge theory is now 
combined with potent fears and stereotypes of out-of-control Muslim fertility to produce 
a quasi ethno-religious strategic demography. The October 15, 2001 cover of Time 
Magazine, for example, features a boy of Middle Eastern descent holding a toy gun, with 
the lead story entitled "Why They Hate Us: The Roots of Islamic Rage — and What We
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Can Do About It" (cited in Gluckman 2002:12). In February 2002, DCI George Tenet 
testified before the U.S. Senate Select Intelligence Committee:
Demographic trends tell us that the world’s poorest and most 
politically unstable regions, which include parts of the Middle East and 
sub-Saharan Africa, will have the largest youth populations in the world 
over the next two decades and beyond (Tenet 2002).
Environmental conflict ideas function within this strategic demography by 
linking youth bulge theory to resource scarcity. As noted previously, Homer-Dixon has 
incorporated the youth bulge into the degradation narrative. Resource scarcities force 
people to migrate from urban to rural areas, and according to Homer-Dixon,
Rural-urban migrants tend to be relatively young, which 
accentuates the youth bulge in urban populations in poor 
countries...Young urban populations, especially unemployed young men, 
are easier to mobilize for radical political ends (Homer-Dixon 1999:157).
Homer-Dixon portrays these "radical political ends" as often revolving around ethnic
and identity politics.
If resource scarcities, by driving migration, help create the youth bulge, the youth 
bulge in turn is seen to create more resource scarcities, both social and environmental. 
There are too few jobs and schools for too many young men, just as there is not enough 
water for them to drink, especially in the Middle East. Thus, writing in the wake of 
September 11, Robert Kaplan highlighted dangerous "bulges in the number of youths 
across the Middle East," followed in the next sentence with the warning that "the amount 
of available water per capita will diminish by nearly half in many parts of the Middle 
East over the next twenty years" (Kaplan 2002:54).
Security scholar Paul Kennedy believes that the Bush administration will have to 
take account of the threats posed by the youth bulge, population density pressures and
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resource scarcities, as manifested in places like Kashmir and the Gaza strip (e-mail 
communication 6/1/02). In a recent presentation at Amherst College, he spoke of the 
danger of frustrated young men without jobs, and the risk that they would become like 
the stone-throwing youths in Gaza and Kashmir. He characterized all Muslim societies 
as having higher fertility rates and argued that differential fertility between Hindus and 
Muslims was a cause of the communal violence in India (Kennedy 2002). Ironically, 
Kennedy uses such examples to argue for a broader approach to U.S. security, involving 
development assistance, not just military might, reflecting once again the deployment of 
neo-Malthusian stereotypes for ostensibly liberal ends (Kennedy 2001,2002).
The linking of the youth bulge to resource scarcities and high Muslim fertility 
has the effect of naturalizing and hence obscuring the economic and political reasons 
why young men might migrate to cities and be unemployed in the first place, and why 
they might join radical groups in the second. It also says nothing about the impact of 
U.S. foreign policy on the Middle East. The great strategic benefit of naturalization is 
that it cuts off serious interrogation.
Lately, the naturalization of the youth bulge has taken an even more bizarre 
twist, with evolutionary psychologists arguing that the size of a country’s young male 
population determines the incidence of war. Young male tendencies to engage in 
"coalitional aggression" have become an advantageous trait, in part because highly 
esteemed aggressive males attract "advantaged females" so that the genetic, cognitive 
and emotional structure conducive to coalitional aggression is passed down. War is thus 
a "natural" phenomenon13 (Mesquida and Wiener 2001:230-231). While presumably 
such ideas do not hold much sway in policy circles, their inclusion without rebuttal in
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the Woodrow Wilson Center's 2001 Environmental Change and Security Project Report 
is a worrying trend.
Youth bulge theory is not without its critics. For example, an article in the New 
York Times. "Radicalism: Is the Devil in the Demographics?," concludes with the 
observation that "it is not just the number of young people but the degree of their 
exclusion from economic and political participation that rouses them politically" 
(Sciolino 2001:2). While this point might seem obvious, the value of youth bulge theory 
in sustaining anti-Muslim sentiment and support for the 'war on terrorism' will probably 
keep it in circulation. In this sense, it serves as a useful tappable discourse, but will it be 
operationalized militarily?
Unfortunately, in the case of Chechnya, that may already be the case. The 
International Helsinki Federation recently charged the Russian army of abducting and 
murdering young Chechen males in a deliberate process "of thinning out a population of 
young men" (BBC News 2002).
As the U.S. 'war on terrorism' proceeds, it will be important to keep an eye on the 
deployment of youth bulge theory, both rhetorically and strategically, as well as on the 
supportive role environmental conflict ideas may play in reinforcing it by linking it to 
resource scarcity.
Environmental Surveillance: Securitizing the Local
Environmental conflict ideas continue to function as part of "the politics of 
planetary surveillance" (Deibert 1996). As noted in Part One, an important function of 
these ideas, and the linking of environment and security more generally, has been to
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support the use of military and intelligence assets for environmental surveillance. The 
environmental mission can also be used to mask what are fundamentally military 
objectives.
For example, Brazil's controversial System for Vigilance of the Amazon 
(SIVAM), a complex ground and aerial surveillance system, has been marketed as a way 
to enhance environmental protection capacities when its main aim is to monitor illicit 
activities in the Amazon, such as narco-trafficking and the movement of foreign 
guerrillas. According to National Defense University professor Guedes da Costa 
(2002:47), "The decisive factor in the acceleration of SIVAMs development was the 
United States' intensified push to curb drug production and smuggling from Colombia, 
Peru and Bolivia by air detection and interception of suspect aircraft." The U.S.-based 
Raytheon Corporation is one of the project's prime contractors and the US. Export- 
Import Bank is providing almost three-quarters of the finance (Guedes da Costa 2001).
Planetary surveillance is not just a function of military and intelligence agencies. 
GIS data from civilian sources is an increasingly important tool for scientists and 
researchers in the environment and related fields. The existence of GIS data is not 
problematic in and of itself; like most research tools, GIS has both positive and negative 
applications. However, it is not neutral and value-free. As Turton and Warner (2002) 
write, "Like any map, a GIS representation of the world imposes a set of values on its 
users. The answer to a research question is dependent on the assumptions underlying 
that question" (68).
If those assumptions are neo-Malthusian, for example, one can expect a certain 
interpretation and presentation of the data. A case in point is a 1999 UNEP report on
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early warning of selected environmental issues in Africa, which uses changes in 
population density data as a proxy for the location of emerging environmental threats 
(Singh, Dieye, et al 1999). The apparent sophistication of the GIS data sets obscures the 
simplistic nature of the causal analysis.
GIS data can serve the interests of what Turton and Warner (2002:71) call "gate- 
keeping elites," who collect and manipulate the representation of the data in ways which 
reflect their interests. The way data is colored-coded, for example, often is designed to 
elicit a certain response. In the UNEP report as well as others (e.g. Kennedy 1998), high 
population densities are mapped in red. GIS data can also be harnessed to locate 
exploitable energy and water reserves and map areas of genetic diversity for corporate 
capture. More profoundly, "at the philosophical, epistemological, and ontological level, 
GIS represents a Western tradition of decomposing the world into minutiae rather than 
integrating it holistically" (Turton and Warner 2002:71).
This process of decomposition has implications for how space itself is 
conceptualized. The 'deterritorialization' associated with the end of the Cold War and 
globalization has led to a 'reterritorialization' of the local, particularly in the South (see 
Chapter One and O Tauthail 1996). Through the lens of the remote sensor, the local has 
become a place that can be 'known* down to almost the last visible detail, providing the 
illusion, if not the reality, that any threats it contains can be controlled. In the blink of 
the satellite eye there is a profound erasure of both distance and time, reinforcing the 
sense that the near and far literally converge.
This convergence increases the range of locales of strategic importance. Defense 
scholar Gregory Foster writes of the convergence in the postmodern era "between the
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tactical (local) and strategic domains of action:"
Seemingly obscure, minor events in the remotest reaches of the 
globe can (and regularly do) have almost instantaneous strategic 
reverberations at many spatial and temporal removes from their point of 
occurrence. Thus, what might otherwise appear to be an environmental 
condition with purely local consequences -  polluted air or water 
supplies, the progressive diminution of arable land due to desertification, 
the loss of forest reserves -- can in effect produce effects of strategic 
import (Foster 2001:377).
The perception of convergence has ramifications for the securitization of local 
environments by both national and international actors. As Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 
(1998) point out, in the environmental field, it may be at the local level where one sees 
the real instrumental effects of securitizing the environment. I would venture that these 
instrumental effects may manifest themselves in an increase in coercive conservation 
measures, linked with commercial and counter-insurgency goals, as well as a 
proliferation of population-environment projects as one of the new frontiers of 
population control.
Coercive conservation measures, of course, are not a new phenomenon. Wildlife 
conservation efforts, from colonial times onward, have often involved the violent 
exclusion of local people. As Neumann notes, in much of colonial Africa,
both European hunting and wildlife conservation efforts were 
closely associated with military activities. People trained by the state in 
the use of weapons and the application of violence -- former police, 
prison, or military personnel -  have been traditionally the primary source 
of recruits for game rangers...This history is today reflected in the 
paramilitary style of organization of most wildlife and park agencies in 
Africa (Neumann 2001:307).
Both through their practices and claims (which are often neo-Malthusian), many
international conservation agencies have been implicated in coercive conservation
(Peluso 1993; Guha 1997).
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Concurrent with mounting interest in environmental security, in 1988 a coalition 
of environmental groups, led by the Worldwide Fund for Nature and including the 
World Bank, published a report on Conserving the World's Biodiversity. Its authors 
argued that international conservationists should "systematically’' approach national 
defense forces for protection of biological resources since many threats to national 
security are rooted in inappropriate resource management. The report stated that, ”As 
conflicts between people and resources increase in the coming years, the military will 
require detailed understanding of the biological, social, and economic issues involved if 
they are to deal effectively with these conflicts" (McNeeley, Miller et al 1988:131, cited 
in Peluso 1993:66-67). The DOD's assistance to conservation projects in Africa (See 
Part One) suggests that such advice was taken to heart.
In recent years, coercive conservation has come to mean more than just arming 
forest guards with more lethal weapons. Designed to reduce the need for overt state 
violence, "community participation" projects rely on self-surveillance at the village level. 
Neumann (2001) describes such schemes in Tanzania where peasants who inhabit the 
buffer zone around restricted wildlife areas receive some title to land and access to the 
material resources in the areas in return for policing the boundaries. "Control over the 
population is achieved not through force and coercion, but primarily through the 
ordering and partitioning of space" (327). On the surface the peasants' participation is 
voluntary, but the continuing threat of state violence greatly influences their decision to 
cooperate. Neumann contends that such schemes have the consequence of extending 
state control over village lands, in part to meet the needs of the growing eco-tourism 
industry. Similar self-policing processes are at work in India, where Sundar argues that
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Joint Forest Management schemes involving local communities often represent a shift to 
more "more micro-disciplinary forms of power" (Sundar 2001:352). Such schemes can 
reinforce the power of certain communities (often sedentary farmers) over less powerful 
ones (pastoralists).
This shift to "micro-disciplinary forms of power" in the classic Foucaultian sense 
indicates a new kind of securitization at the local level. Through a combination of the 
carrot and the stick, villagers not only take on some of the policing functions of the state, 
but through a process of education/indoctrination internalize "introduced ideologies" of 
conservation (Neumann 2001:326). Population-environment projects could increasingly 
complement these micro-disciplinary objectives by linking the control of women's 
fertility to conservation schemes. As noted in Chapter One, the UNFPA has called for 
greater integration of family planning programs with park and forest management 
schemes, because according to the agency, fertility rates are often higher around nature 
preserves and it is poverty and population growth which are destroying the environment 
there (UNFPA 2001).
These projects are already underway in a number of places. The World Wildlife 
Fund, for example, has a population-environment project in the Calakmul Biosphere 
Reserve in Mexico's Yucatan Peninsula (Ericson 2000). The Pathfinder Fund, a U.S. 
based family planning agency, has partnered with a Brazilian NGO in a population- 
environment project around the Grande Sertao Veredas National Park (Cohen, Garbus et 
al 1999). Several years ago Conservation International transitioned from focusing solely 
on the creation and protection of parks to population initiatives, with "the impetus for 
change" coming "from losing the battle to conserve nature because population growth
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was most rapid in the peak diversity hotspots" (Campbell, Nations, et al 2000:187). 
Norman Myers and colleagues (Myers, Mittermeir et al 2000) have popularized the 
concept of "biodiversity hotspots," areas where exceptional concentrations of endemic 
species are facing exceptional loss of habitat, and which thus warrant special attention.
Such "hotspots" are not only of value to the conservation biologist. There are 
other competing and complementary motives for protecting them, including their 
commercial value for natural resource extraction, eco-tourism and bio-prospecting14 and 
their security value to defense interests. In this latter regard, it should be noted that 
population-environment projects often utilize population monitoring systems, not only 
to register births but to track migration (see UNFPA 2001); potentially, this tracking 
could be of use to defense and intelligence interests. A monitoring system has been 
proposed for the World Wildlife Fund in the Calakmul Biosphere Reserve in Mexico, 
where many refugees from social unrest in Chiapas have settled in recent years. 
According to one of the designers, even though population density remains low around 
the Reserve, population growth has "a high potential ecological impact" because of the 
area’s low carrying capacity. In-migration would be tracked by "administration of short 
questionnaires to samples of key informant households every 12 months in 
representative 'sentinel' ejidos," a system which could then be adapted for use elsewhere 
(Bilsborrow 2002:85-86).
It is not too difficult to imagine a scenario where coercive conservation, 
population control and security objectives come together in a "hotspot" locale. For 
example, in the Lacandon Forest in Chiapas, Mexico, where the Zapatista movement has 
a strong base, Conservation International's Chiapas director has blamed deforestation on
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overpopulation. "It's obvious that the main problem is overpopulation," he told the 
Houston Chronicle. "The children of the farmers don't have any land. They can't all be 
peasants" (Althaus 2002a:2).
An ecologist advising the state's Indigenous Affairs Ministry countered that the 
real intention of the conservationists is to build "a great green wall to keep the resources 
in the hands of the multinational companies" (4). That there may be some truth to this 
allegation is indicated by the fact that Conservation International received a contribution 
of $3.5 million from a Mexican conglomerate which produces genetically modified 
seeds and operates a seed facility in the region (Althaus 2002a).
A recent article in La Jornada claims that Conservation International, using 
USAID-provided GIS imaging and digital photographs from its own airplane, identified 
indigenous (Zapatista) settlements in the Lacandon forest preserve which later led to 
their expulsion by the Mexican government. The article also mentions that Conservation 
International is operating population-environment projects in a nearby region 
(Bellinghausen 2002). In the Lacandon Forest itself the Mexican government has been 
pursuing an aggressive female sterilization campaign, albeit with limited success 
(Althaus 2002b).
Conservation International's Vice President for Agency Relations in Washington, 
D.C., James Nations, explicitly refers to Chiapas, Guatemala, Somalia, Rwanda, 
Cambodia and the Philippines as "environmental/population/human conflict hotspots," 
after writing favorably about the ECSP meeting where the evolutionary psychologists 
linked war to the prevalence of young men in a population. He urges more partnerships 
between conservation and population organizations to bring services to "dispersed rural
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families on the edge of the agricultural frontier in high biodiversity hotspots" (Nations 
2002:16-17).
Conservation International’s activities in Chiapas are only one example, but they 
point to the possibility of an emerging population-environment-security complex which 
uses state-sanctioned violence as well as more micro-disciplinary forms of power to 
enforce its strategic demography and geography at the local level. To forecast such 
developments is not to state that they are bound to happen. That would obviate the role 
of both contingency and agency in the making of policy and politics, as well as the 
important differences between specific places (and presumably between different 
organizations involved in these activities). What this kind of speculative forecasting 
provides is a guide to what may happen, and what to keep one's eye on, in order to make 
the most effective interventions as a critical intellectual. In the concluding part I turn to 
this question.
IV: THE ROLE OF THE CRITICAL INTELLECTUAL
In this thesis I have used a variety of methodological approaches, from the more 
discursive to the agent-based, to understand how a particular set of ideas about 
environmental conflict came to wield power in the world. The purpose was not to 
develop one clear synthetic model to explain the relationship between knowledge, power 
and policy, but rather to gain insights into that relationship through a contemporary case 
study in the U.S. involving a strategic issue area. My intention was also to approach 
environmental conflict ideas from a number of different directions in order to mount the 
most effective challenge to them. This was not just an intellectual but a political
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exercise, since I believe this particular set of ideas, based on deeply flawed neo- 
Malthusian reasoning, has had a number of negative effects. In interaction with other 
existing and evolving discourses and policy prerogatives, the ideas could continue to 
have negative effects into the future. Thus, it is doubly important to take them to task.
I have taken them to task in six main ways:
(1) In Chapter One, I considered the methodological approaches which are most 
useful to the project: Foucaultian concepts of the political economy of truth, biopower 
and strategic intelligibility; the contributions of constructivism and other approaches to 
knowledge communities; the role of strategic philanthropy in the production and 
dissemination of policy-relevant research in the U.S.; the politics of threat 
representation; and securitization.
(2) In Chapter Two, I explored the history of the larger neo-Malthusian discourse 
of which environmental conflict ideas are part and the means by which neo-Malthusian 
concepts and actors came to exercise such a strong influence on American foreign 
policy, including the important role played by strategic philanthropy. This history, 
though relatively well-researched and documented, is not well known to many scholars 
in the environment and security field. Without this history, it is difficult to understand 
the ways neo-Malthusian ideas are embedded in popular culture, environmentalism, the 
academy and policy circles, and the synergy between institutional expressions of them.
(3) In Chapter Three, I identified and analyzed the "degradation narrative," a 
hegemonic myth that has deeply influenced the evolution of the environment and 
security field. The persistence of this myth from colonial times to the present illustrates 
its tremendous staying power and hence the pressing need to uncover and contest it.
324
(4) In Chapter Four, I challenged the findings of Thomas Homer-Dixon’s 
environmental conflict model and case studies in the belief that it is not simply enough to 
understand and expose the roots of this problematic approach; one must also offer a clear 
point-by-point refutation grounded in empirical evidence and political economy.
(5) In Chapter Five, I looked at the actors and interests which have promoted 
Homer-Dixon’s work, from the role of private foundations to the support of key 
individuals such as Robert Kaplan, A1 Gore and Timothy Wirth. Understanding the 
personal, political and financial dynamics of how certain ideas and their architects gain 
prominence while others do not is central to understanding the private-public nature of 
policy-related knowledge production in the U.S. I develop the concept of circumscribed 
heterodoxy to show how a project can appear more inclusive and diverse than it actually 
is.
(6) Finally, in this chapter I examined die intentional and unintentional impact of 
environmental conflict ideas and speculated on their effects in the future. I also 
considered the nature of the knowledge communities which have formed around them, 
and the ways in which environmental conflict ideas function as a tappable discourse for a 
variety of different interests and objectives.
The irony, of course, is that in writing this thesis, I have found myself becoming 
part of, and to some extent welcomed into, the knowledge community/network around 
environmental security. This has both advantages and disadvantages. On the 
advantageous side, it has enabled me to sit at the same table with key players in the 
debate, including Thomas Homer-Dixon, and to join up with researchers who are trying 
to move the field more toward the human security direction. My involvement with the
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Global Environmental Change and Human Security Project, for example, has allowed 
me to write a policy brief on population challenging the degradation narrative (Hartmann 
2000b), present my views at the Woodrow Wilson Center, and have an account of the 
meeting published in the 2001 Environmental Change and Security Project Report.
On the negative side is the problem of circumscribed heterodoxy. Are critics let 
into the epistemic fold with the knowledge that it is safe to do so since they have less 
power but are useful in several ways? When does one’s engagement become a tool to 
legitimize a project by making it appear more open to other points of view than it 
actually is, or more diverse in terms of gender and ethnicity? And can one’s engagement 
lead to a problematic expansion of the boundary object so that the independent space 
from which critics operate progressively diminishes because of the politics of 
inclusiveness, if not cooption? Is this process even more problematic in a field where 
academics intersect with defense and intelligence officials? This latter question came 
home to me when I realized that my attendance at an environmental security conference 
in London was funded by the British Ministry of Defense.
None of these questions have easy answers and it is often a matter of navigating 
one's way through the tricky waters with a healthy dose of skepticism and common 
sense. There are certainly perils of engagement, but there are also perils of remaining 
aloof. Had there been more vocal outcry from the academy and policy circles when 
environmental conflict ideas started to gain prominence, might they have done less 
damage? Perhaps not, but perhaps so.
In the end I believe the role of the critical intellectual is to speak out as forcefully 
and convincingly as possible, even at the risk of flying in the face of the latest well-
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funded policy fad or getting absorbed in uncomfortable ways into the epistemic fold. 
Depending on the circumstance, it may also be important to draw a moral and political 
line beyond which one is not prepared to go, in this case cooperation with defense and 
intelligence agencies.
With the current intensification of American militarism, the fundamental 
question raised at the onset of the environmental security debate is even more salient 
today: Should environmental issues be linked to national security? As Daniel Deudney 
wrote eloquently over ten years ago:
The movement to preserve the habitability of the planet for future 
generations must directly challenge the tribal power o f nationalism and 
the chronic militarization of public discourse. Ecological degradation is 
not a threat to national security; rather environmentalism is a threat to 
national security attitudes and institutions. When environmentalists dress 
their arguments in the blood soaked garments of the war system, they 
betray their core values and create confusion about the real tasks at hand 
(Deudney 1991:28).
The challenge ahead is not only to de-link the environment from national 
security, but to de-link it from neo-Malthusianism and its strategic demographic and 
geographic manifestations. Securitization at the local level, through surveillance, 
coercive conservation, and population control, rests on the degradation narrative and 
other key assumptions about the relationship between the environment, population 
growth, and conflict. Neo-Malthusianism is also heavily implicated in the ongoing 
racialized representation of the dangerous Third World 'Other1, especially refugees and 
immigrants, and in the current 'war on terrorism', young Muslim men. My hope is that 
this thesis, by examining the origins and impact of environmental conflict ideas, helps 
lay bare the neo-Malthusian logic of strategic scarcity and thereby contributes to new 
understandings of the political economy of environmental degradation and conflict.
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Endnotes to Chapter Six
1'. It is unclear from the minutes whether other representatives of his project were in 
attendance, or the minutes are referring to him citing the group's findings.
2. Thomas (1997) suggests that DOD's desire to partner with the EPA can also be viewed 
more cynically, as a way for the DOD to keep the EPA from controlling the clean-up of 
its contaminated sites.
3. In regard to population, however, the official mentioned that the carrying capacity of 
the land is an important consideration in areas which could have a widespread disaster. 
He cited the case of Sudan where population is exceeding the carrying capacity of the 
land. In such areas, the military needs to be prepared for an emergency response, such as 
airlift missions to feed people.
4\ The DOD environmental security office has an Outreach Directorate "to integrate non­
governmental and public participation into the process of shaping and implementing 
DOD environmental policies" (ECSP 1997:208).
5'. According to a well-connected security scholar in Washington, it was Gore who really 
drove the process: "The intelligence community is being told to do this work and it's 
Gore who's doing the requesting," he told me. Although the CIA had been undertaking 
environmental analysis since the 1980s, under Gore's direction the relationship between 
the environment and political instability became a focus of attention.
6'. Greenhouse's article in the New York Times was one of the first pieces in a major 
media outlet to discuss environment and security as a new focus of the intelligence 
community.
7'. For an interesting discussion of these concerns in the MEDEA project, see Deibert 
(1996).
8'. In one speech, Atwood said, "If rural migrants overwhelm the cities by the tens of 
millions, we must breathe the air they pollute and drink the water they foul. Their 
diseases will find us. Their misery will envelop us" (Atwood 1996:86). Also see Atwood 
(1994).
9'. Grossi told me she was from the "carrying capacity side of things" and that USAID 
had gone too far in the direction of reproductive rights to the exclusion of population 
stabilization/carrying capacity issues.
10'. The OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) held an "In-Depth Session 
on Environmental Security and Displacement" in 1996, at which Homer-Dixon's co­
author Phil Howard was one of four featured speakers (OECD DAC 1996). The DAC 
also commissioned the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) to do 
a "State-of-the Art Review on Environment, Security and Development Cooperation,"
co-authored by Geoffrey Dabelko, Director of the ECSP Project, Steve Lonergan and 
Richard Matthew (2002). Based on a small survey, the initial draft of the study found 
little knowledge of, or keen interest in, environmental conflict among development 
agencies (Dabelko, Lonergan and Matthew 1998). The European Union (EU) Analysis 
and Policy Planning Unit held a seminar on environmental security in May 1997 
("Environmental Security -- The Economic Security Challenge"), which questioned 
whether it was just another green fashion. According to the organizers of the meeting, 
Veronique Arnault and Sabine Weyand, this meeting did not focus on environmental 
conflict in the Third World but rather major environmental challenges to EU economic 
security, such as climate change and nuclear pollution. They expressed their concern to 
me that discussions about EU economic security could potentially create a backlash 
against immigrants, noting the risk of over-simplification and creating "a threat 
perception."
n . At the time CSIS was doing a major study of population and security in Haiti.
12. For example, population pressure on natural resources is measured by the rate of 
deforestation (though it may have little to do with deforestation), and the authors assert 
that population growth is linked to migration because it is associated with poverty, and 
poverty is a major determinant of migration (Natural Heritage Institute 1997).
1 ^ . Wiener and Mesquida downplay ethnic differences, however; the Zapatistas, Somali 
insurgents, and Khmer Rouge are all just "young men." They propose that the "male age 
composition thesis" explains conflict much better than the traditional environmental 
conflict model (Mesquida and Wiener 2001:230-231).
14. The UNFPA (2001) notes, for example, how "most of the world's most effective 
pharmaceutical products" are derived from plants and animals frequently found "in 
tropical climates, where biodiversity is greatest, and often in 'biodiversity hotspots' 
subject to increasing human pressure" (47). That pressure is mainly defined as 
population pressure. Also see Bilsborrow (2002).
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF INTERVIEWS
(positions noted are at time of interview)
NORTH AMERICA 
United States:
Carmen Barroso, Director, Population Program, Mac Arthur Foundation. Chicago, IL, 
June 1,2000.
Kennette Benedict, Area Director, Program on Global security and Sustainability, 
MacArthur Foundation. Chicago, IL, June 1, 2000.
Jeffrey Boutwell, Associate Executive Officer, American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences, Cambridge, MA. Phone, November 10,2000.
Kent Butts, Director, National Security Issues Branch, Center for Strategic leadership, 
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA. Phone, June 19,2002.
Beth Chalecki, Research Associate, Pacific Institute for Studies in Development, 
Environment and Security. Oakland, CA. September 28,1999.
Robert S. Chen, Deputy Director, Center for International Earth Science Information 
Network, Columbia University. New York, May 14,1999.
Eileen Clausen, Director, Pew Global Climate Change Initiative. Washington, D.C., 
March 13,2000.
Barbara Crane, Senior Policy Adviser, Office of Population, Center for Population, 
Health and Nutrition, U.S. Agency for International Development. Washington, D.C., 
June 11, 1999.
Ken Conca, Assistant Professor, Department of Government and Politics, University of 
Maryland. Phone, November 10, 2000.
Geoffrey Dabelko, Director, Environmental Change and Security Project, Woodrow 
Wilson Center. Washington, D.C., June 8,1999.
Joan Dunlop and Kate Grant, Women's Lens on Foreign Policy, Rockefeller Brothers 
Fund. New York, January 13,1999.
Elizabeth Economy, Senior Fellow, China Studies and Deputy Director, Asia Studies,
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Council on Foreign Relations. New York, January 12,1999.
Robert Engelman, Vice President for Research, Population Action International. 
Washington, D.C., March 13, 2000.
Alene H. Gelbard, Director, International Programs, Population Reference Bureau. 
Washington, D.C., June 10,1999.
Wendy R. Grieder, Office of International Activities, Environmental Protection Agency. 
Washington, D.C., March 13,2000.
Joanne Grossi, Senior Technical Advisor, Population, Health and Nutrition Office, U.S. 
Agency for International Development. Washington, D.C., June 9,1999.
Peter Haas, Professor of Political Science, University of Massachusetts. Amherst, MA., 
April 3,1998.
Jacqueline Hamilton, Director of Population Programs, Natural Resources Defense 
Council. Washington, D.C., June 9,1999.
Colonel Mark Hamilton, Acting Deputy, Force Protection, Office of the Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense for Environmental Security. Washington, D.C., June 8,1999.
Allen Hammond, Senior Scientist and Director of Strategic Analysis, World Resources 
Institute. Washington, D.C., June 9,1999.
Colin Kahl, PhD candidate, Columbia University. Washington, D.C., February 19,1999.
Norman Kahn, Director of Assessments, DCI Environmental Center, Central 
Intelligence Agency. Vienna, VA, June 10,1999.
Michael Klare, Director, Five College Program in Peace and World Security Studies. 
Amherst, MA., October 21,1998.
Chris Lenhardt, Associate Director for Information Services, Center for International 
Earth Science Information Network, Columbia University. New York, May 14,1999.
Marc Levy, Associate Director, Center for International Earth Science Information 
Network, Columbia University. New York, May 14,1999.
Ronnie Lipschutz, Associate Professor, Politics Department, University of California, 
Santa Cruz. Phone, April 25,2000.
Jonathon Margolis, Director, Office of Policy Coordination and Initiatives, Bureau of 
Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, U.S. Department of 
State. Washington, D.C., June 11,1999.
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Ellen Marshall, United Nations Foundation. Washington, D.C., June 10, 1999.
Richard Matthew, Assistant Professor, Department of Urban and Regional Planning, 
University of California, Irvine. San Jose, Costa Rica, December 11,1999.
Margaret Pollack, Director, Office of Population, U.S. Department of State. Phone, 
March 24,2000.
Laura Reed, Coordinator, Five College Peace and World Security Studies Program. 
Amherst, MA., February 27,2002.
Peter Riggs, Program Officer, Rockefeller Brothers Fund. New York, January 13,1999.
Susan Sechler, Director, Global Inclusion Program, Rockefeller Foundation. New York, 
November 13, 2000.
Sarah Seims, Associate Director, Population Sciences, Rockefeller Foundation. New 
York, January 13,1999.
Brian D. Smith, Research Analyst, Evidence Based Research Inc. Washington, D.C., 
June 10,1999.
John C. Topping, Jr., President, Climate Institute. Washington, D.C., June 11,1999.
David Victor, Robert W. Johnson, Jr., Fellow for Science and Technology, Council on 
Foreign Relations. New York, January 12, 1999.
Lyuba Zarsky, Co-Director, Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable 
Development. Berkeley, CA, September 28,2002
Canada:
Simon Dalby, Professor, Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, Carleton 
University, Ottawa. Phone, January 28,2000.
Thomas Homer-Dixon, Director, Peace and Conflict Studies Program, University 
College, University of Toronto. Irvine, CA., March 18, 2000; Toronto, CA., September 
8, 2000.
EUROPE:
Belgium:
Veronique Arnault, Head of Unit, and Sabine Weyand, Analysis and Policy Planning, 
Directorate General I — External Relations, European Commission. Brussels, June 8,
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1998.
Margaret Brusasco-MacKenzie, Adviser, Follow-up to UN Conference on Environment 
and Development, Directorate-General XI — Environment, Nuclear Safety and Civil 
Protection, European Commission. Bmssels, June 9,1998.
Nicholas Christoforides, Directorate-General IB: External Relations, European 
Commission, June 9,1998.
Alan Cross, Space; Earth Observation, Directorate-General XII — Science, Research and 
Development, European Commission. Bmssels, June 9,1998.
Martin Landgraf, Foreign Policy Unit, Directorate-General VII — Development, 
European Commission. Bmssels, June 8,1998.
Dieter Oldekop, Head of Unit, Directorate-General IB — External Relations, European 
Commission. Brussels, June 8,1998.
Germany:
Alexander Carius, Ecologic, Center for International and European Environmental 
Research, Berlin. Phone, May 19,1998.
Netherlands:
Wouter T. de Groot, Deputy Director, and Ruth Noorduyn, Center of Environmental 
Science, Environment and Development Program, Leiden University. Leiden, June 4, 
1998.
Dr. M.A. Mohamed Salih, Senior Lecturer in Politics of Alternative Development 
Strategies, Institute of Social Studies. The Hague, June 3,1998.
Martin van den Berg and Frank Werring, Directorate for Industry and Consumer Policy, 
Directorate-General for Environmental Protection. The Hague, June 3,1998.
Luc L. P. van de Goor, Coordinator, Research Project on Causes of Conflict in the Third 
World, Netherlands Institute for International Relations, Clingendael. The Hague, June 
3,1998.
Rob Visser, Head, Poverty Analysis and Policy Division, Dutch Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. The Hague, June 3, 1998.
Norway:
Nils Petter Gleditsch, Research Professor, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo. 
San Jose, Costa Rica, December 11, 1999.
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Dan Smith, Director, International Peace Research Institute (PRIO), Oslo. Washington, 
D.C., February 18,1999.
Switzerland:
Alex de Sherbinin, International Union for the Conservation of Nature, Social Policy 
Group, Geneva. Phone, June 29,1998.
Mark Halle, Project Director, State-of-the-Art Review on Environment, Security and 
Development Cooperation, International Union for the Conservation of Nature. Geneva, 
July 23,1998.
United Kingdom:
Philip Champain, Training Manager, International Alert. London, May 20,1998.
Timothy Dyson, Professor of Population Studies, London School of Economics. 
London, June 1,1998.
Cecile Jackson, Senior Lecturer in Gender Relations and Agrarian Change, University of 
East Anglia. Norwich, June 16,1998.
Norman Myers, Writer and Consultant in Environment and Development, Green 
College, Oxford University. Oxford, June 12,1998.
Koos Neefjes, Policy Adviser, Environment and Development, Oxfam. Oxford, June 23, 
1998.
Timothy O'Riordan, Professor and Associate Director, Center for Social and Economic 
Research on the Global Environment, University of East Anglia. Norwich, June 16, 
1998.
Dennis Pain, Social Development Adviser, Department for International Development. 
London, June 30,1998.
James Tansey, PhD candidate, Center for Environmental Risk, Environmental Sciences, 
University of East Anglia. Norwich, June 16,1998.
Sir Crispin Tickell, Director, Green College Center for Environmental Policy and 
Understanding, Oxford University. Oxford, June 29,1998.
Emma Visman, Project Coordinator, Saferworld. London, May 20, 1998.
Kitty Wamock, Panos Institute. London, July 3,1998.
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OTHER COUNTRIES
India:
Smitu Kothari, Lokayan, Delhi. Amherst, MA., October 21,1998.
Philippines:
Walden Bello, Co-Director, Focus on the Global South, Thailand and Philippines. 
Amherst, MA., September 30,1998.
335
APPENDIX B
LIST OF PROJECT PUBLICATIONS
Project on Environmental Change and Acute Conflict
Occasional Papers Series published by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 
Cambridge, MA:
Peter Gleick, "Water and Conflict," No. 1, September 1992.
Miriam Lowi, "West Bank Water resources and the Resolution of Conflict in the Middle 
East," No. 1, September 1992.
Vaclav Smil, "Environmental Change as a Source of Conflict and Economic Losses in 
China," No. 2, December 1992.
Jack Goldstone, "Imminent Political Conflicts Arising from China's Environmental 
Crises," No. 2, December 1992.
Sanjoy Hazarika, "Bangladesh and Assam: Land Pressures, Migration and Ethnic 
Conflict," No. 3, March 1993.
Astri Suhrke, "Pressure Points: Environmental Degradation, Migration and Conflict," 
No. 3, March 1993.
The Project on Environment, Population and Security
Reports published by the American Association for the Advancement of Science, 
Washington, D.C., in collaboration with University College, University of Toronto:
Thomas Homer-Dixon (1995). Strategies for Studying Causation in Complex 
Ecological-Political Systems.
Peter Gizewski and Thomas Homer-Dixon (1995). Urban Growth and Violence: Will 
the Future Resemble the Past?
Valerie Percival and Thomas Homer-Dixon (1995). Environmental Scarcity and Violent 
Conflict: The Case of Rwanda.
Valerie Percival and Thomas Homer-Dixon (1995). Environmental Scarcity and Violent 
Conflict: The Case of South Africa.
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Kimberley Kelly and Thomas Homer-Dixon (1995). Environmental Scarcity and Violent 
Conflict: The Case of Gaza.
Philip Howard and Thomas Homer-Dixon (1995). Environmental Scarcity and Violent 
Conflict: The Case of Chiapas. Mexico.
Peter Gizewski and Thomas Homer-Dixon (1996). Environmental Scarcity and Conflict: 
The Case of Pakistan.
Peter Gizewski with Lars Bromley and Brian Smith (1996). Data Sources: Environment. 
Population and Security.
Edward Barbier and Thomas Homer-Dixon (1996). Resource Scarcity. Institutional 
Adaptation and Technical Innovation: Can Poor Countries Attain Endogenous Growth?
Thomas Homer-Dixon and Valerie Percival (1996). Environmental Scarcity and Violent 
Conflict: Briefing Book.
Project on Environmental Scarcities, State Capacity and Civil Violence
Reports published by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Cambridge, MA in 
collaboration with University College, University of Toronto:
Charles Victor Barber (1997). The Case of Indonesia.
Elizabeth Economy (1997). The Case of China.
Mao Yu-shi, Ning Datong, Xia Guang, Wong Hongchang, and Vaclav Smil. An 
Assessment of the Economic Losses Resulting from Various Forms of Environmental 
Degradation in China.
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